Dynamics of party preferences: a study on the volatility and stability of individuals using household panel data from Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland by Kuhn, Ursina








Dynamics of party preferences: a study on the volatility and stability of
individuals using household panel data from Germany, Great Britain and
Switzerland
Kuhn, Ursina





Kuhn, Ursina. Dynamics of party preferences: a study on the volatility and stability of individuals using








DYNAMICS OF PARTY PREFERENCES  
 
A study on the volatility and stability of individuals using 





Presented to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
of the University of Zurich 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
by Ursina Kuhn 
 
Accepted in the spring semester 2013  
on the recommendation of the doctoral committee: 
Prof. Dr. Hanspeter Kriesi (main advisor) 








I would like to thank my advisor Prof. Dr. Hanspeter Kriesi for his encouragement, 
advice and contagious passion for research. He has not only supervised this thesis, but 
was - long before -involved in setting up the Swiss Household Panel. Thanks to him, 
this data  includes many variables on political issues and behavior which make it a 
unique source for longitudinal analysis in political science. It was thus a pleasure, 
honour, but also hard work, to analyse the first twelve years of this data and compare 
it to similar household panels in Great Britain and Germany. I would also like to 
thank Prof. Dr. Marco Steenbergen for serving as a 2
nd
  expert of this PhD. 
 
I also want to thank my employer, FORS, who supported my research activities and 
enabled me to follow the PhD program at the University of Zurich in parallel to my 
job at the Swiss Household Panel. Special thanks go to Robin Tillmann for the 
freedom and confidence, which enabled me to pursue my projects. I also want to 
mention and thank Erwin Zimmermann who motivated me to engage in a PhD. 
 
I am grateful to my family and friends, in particular Florent, for their support, 








This study has been realized using the data collected by the Swiss Household Panel 
(SHP), which is based at the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences FORS. 
The project is financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation. 
 
The data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) used in this publication 
were made available by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin).  
 
This work was based on data from the British Household Panel Survey, Waves 1-18, 
1991-2009: Secure Data Service Access, National Grid Reference (Easting, Northing, 
OSGRDIND), produced by the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER) at 
the University of Essex, sponsored by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC), and supplied by the Secure Data Service at the UK Data Archive. The data 
are the copyright of ISER. The use of the data in this work does not imply the 
endorsement of ISER, ESRC or the Secure Data Service at the UK Data Archive in 





Table of content 
Index of Tables ............................................................................................................ iii 
Index of Figures ............................................................................................................ iv 
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1 
2 Overview of theories and literature review ............................................................ 8 
 Socio-structural characteristics, socialisation and party identification ............ 8 2.1
 The debate on the stability of party identification ......................................... 11 2.2
 Information flow, information processing and campaign effects .................. 13 2.3
 Interpersonal influence .................................................................................. 16 2.4
 Rational choice models and economic voting ............................................... 19 2.5
3 Concepts and operationalisation of volatility ...................................................... 22 
 Party identification and vote .......................................................................... 22 3.1
 Measuring change .......................................................................................... 31 3.2
 Party blocks ................................................................................................... 36 3.3
 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 51 3.4
4 Data and Methods ................................................................................................ 54 
 Household panel data ..................................................................................... 54 4.1
 Data management .......................................................................................... 65 4.2
 Statistical methods ......................................................................................... 67 4.3
 Conclusions .................................................................................................... 80 4.4
5 Descriptive Analysis: Capturing dynamics over many waves ............................. 82 
 Contrasting theories on the dynamics of party preferences ........................... 82 5.1
 Descriptive Results: Trajectories in party preferences .................................. 85 5.2
 Conclusions .................................................................................................. 100 5.3
6 Reinforcement, life-cycle, cohorts and periods ................................................. 103 
 Life-cycle effects ......................................................................................... 103 6.1
 Cohort effects and other effects of socialisation .......................................... 105 6.2
 Period effects and dealignment .................................................................... 107 6.3
 Reinforcement effects .................................................................................. 108 6.4
 Methods and operationalisation ................................................................... 109 6.5
 Results .......................................................................................................... 119 6.6
 Conclusions for age, cohort and period effects............................................ 137 6.1
7 Political awareness and predispositions ............................................................. 140 
 Political awareness ....................................................................................... 140 7.1
 Predisposition strength ................................................................................. 146 7.2
 Methods and operationalisation ................................................................... 151 7.3
 Empirical results and discussion .................................................................. 156 7.4
 Conclusions for awareness and predispositions .......................................... 167 7.5
8 Campaign effects ............................................................................................... 170 
 Introduction .................................................................................................. 170 8.1
 Household panels data as a complement ..................................................... 172 8.2
 Model specification ..................................................................................... 175 8.3
 Results and discussion ................................................................................. 178 8.4
 Conclusions for campaign effects ................................................................ 187 8.5
9 Interpersonal influence....................................................................................... 189 
 Theoretical and empirical background ........................................................ 189 9.1
ii 
 
 Model specifications .................................................................................... 192 9.2
 Results and discussion ................................................................................. 194 9.3
 Conclusions for interpersonal influence ...................................................... 203 9.4
10 The economic situation ...................................................................................... 205 
 Economic voting ..................................................................................... 205 10.1
 Proximity model ...................................................................................... 210 10.2
 Model specification ................................................................................. 210 10.3
 Results and discussion ............................................................................ 216 10.4
 Conclusions for pocketbook voting ........................................................ 224 10.5
11 Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 226 
12 References .......................................................................................................... 235 
Curriculum Vitae Ursina Kuhn .................................................................................. 248 
iii 
 
Index of Tables 
Table 1: Stability of party identification and stability of electoral choice. ............................................. 30 
Table 2: Illustration of coding the variable “change between parties” (1 change 0 no change) ............. 36 
Table 3: Party blocks in Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland ......................................................... 48 
Table 4: Frequencies of variable „change between parties” ................................................................... 51 
Table 5: Attrition bias: correlations with panel participation in the SOEP, BHPS, and SHP ................. 64 
Table 6: Transitions in party preferences between two waves in DE, GB and CH ................................ 87 
Table 7: Trajectories of party preferences over eleven years by groups in DE, GB and CH ................. 92 
Table 8: Types of party switches in DE, GB and CH ........................................................................... 100 
Table 9: Measuring duration of party preferences ................................................................................ 113 
Table 10 : Correlation between duration of party preferences and other variables .............................. 115 
Table 11 : Measuring life cycle effect: bivariate models for age and years of eligibility on probability to 
switch parties in CH, DE and GB ............................................................................................... 118 
Table 12: Change between parties: Age, cohort, period and reinforcement in Germany, Great Britain 
and Switzerland ........................................................................................................................... 120 
Table 13 : Within-block and between-block change: age, period, cohort and reinforcement in DE, GB 
and CH ........................................................................................................................................ 127 
Table 14: Types of party switches by age in DE, GB and CH ............................................................. 137 
Table 15: Within-block and between-block change: political awareness and predisposition strength in 
CH, DE, and GB ......................................................................................................................... 157 
Table 16: Types of party switches by interest in politics and education in DE, GB and CH ............... 165 
Table 17: Types of party switches by predisposition strength .............................................................. 167 
Table 18: Transitions since the last election (dependent variable for campaign effects models) ......... 177 
Table 19 : Activation, deactivation and persuasion in DE, GB and CH (Model 1) .............................. 179 
Table 20: Activation, deactivation and persuasion by political awareness in DE, GB and CH (Model 2 
and Model 3) ............................................................................................................................... 183 
Table 21 : Change between parties:  intra-household influence in DE, GB, CH .................................. 196 
Table 22: Change between parties: intra-household influence by sex in DE, GB, CH ........................ 199 
Table 23 : Average marginal effects of intra-household influence on the probability of switching parties 
by sex in DE, GB and CH. .......................................................................................................... 200 
Table 24: Change between parties: intra-household influence and political discussions in CH ........... 201 
Table 25 : Operationalisation of the perceived personal economic situation ....................................... 215 
Table 26 : Change between parties: income improvement and deterioration in DE, GB and CH ........ 217 
Table 27 : Income change: effect on preference for government party in DE, GB and CH ................. 220 




Index of Figures 
Figure 1: Standard causal model of party identification and electoral choice ........................................ 25 
Figure 2: Party positions in Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland ................................................... 46 
Figure 3: Attrition in household panels: number of interviews by survey wave .................................... 61 
Figure 4: Wide and long data format ...................................................................................................... 67 
Figure 5: Probability of switching parties by length of trajectory in DE, GB and CH ........................... 89 
Figure 6: Changes between parties: number of changes by number of parties named ........................... 97 
Figure 7 : Decision tree to attribute trajectories to types of switches ..................................................... 98 
Figure 8 : Probability to switch parties by years of party preference in CH, GB, DE .......................... 123 
Figure 9: Predicted probabilities of switching parties by age in DE, GB and CH ................................ 125 
Figure 10: Predicted probabilities for switching parties by age and distinction of block in DE, GB and 
CH ............................................................................................................................................... 126 
Figure 11 : Party switches: period effects in CH, GB and DE ............................................................. 130 
Figure 12 : Period effects and party blocks .......................................................................................... 131 
Figure 13: Predicted probabilities for switching parties by interest in politics (without control for 
predisposition strength in DE, GB and CH ................................................................................. 159 
Figure 14: Predicted probabilities for switching parties by interest in politics controlling for 
predisposition strength in DE, GB and CH. ................................................................................ 161 
Figure 15 : Predicted probabilities for activation, deactivation and persuasion in DE, GB and CH .... 180 
Figure 16: Predicted probabilities for deactivation by interest in politics in DE, GB and CH ............. 182 
Figure 17 : Predicted probabilities for activation by interest in politics in DE, GB and CH ................ 185 
Figure 18: Predicted probabilities for persuasion by interest in politics in CH, DE, GB. .................... 186 
Figure 19 : Intra-household influence: average marginal effects on the probability of switching parties 
in DE, GB and CH. ..................................................................................................................... 197 
Figure 20: Intra-household influence: predicted probabilities for switching parties by frequency of 





In this thesis, we will address the stability and volatility of party preferences. How 
often do individuals switch parties and what patterns emerge? Which factors make 
citizens remain with the same party or change between parties? These questions are 
related to the heart of democracy. In particular in representative democracies, where 
citizens cannot directly influence political decisions, it is essential to understand what 
reasons bring citizens to change parties. For example, the key role of the electorate 
according to democratic theory is to reward or punish political actors for their 
performance. But if electoral change reflects randomness or manipulation instead, 
democracy does not function.  
Dynamics are a fundamental aspect of electoral behaviour, with a long tradition of 
research. If we want to understand voting behaviour, political participation or 
electoral outcomes, we need to understand why individuals remain with a party or 
change to another one (e.g. Jennings and Niemi 1981; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Box-
Steffensmeier and Smith 1998; Clarke and McCutcheon 2009).  Although the 
longitudinal perspective is a fundamental aspect of voting behaviour and opinion 
formation, electoral research mainly takes a cross-sectional perspective. More 
recently, longitudinal studies on individuals have become more popular, due to the 
increasing concern of endogeneity in social science, but also due to the increasing 
availability of panel data.  
But still, we know relatively little on why individuals change or remain stable in their 
party preferences. Does volatility occur mainly among young voters with little 
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experience of voting, or do citizens reconsider their preferences over their life course? 
Are volatile voters, for the most part, ill-informed citizens who are easily influenced 
or vote randomly? Or does volatility rather occur among highly sophisticated voters 
who follow political developments and constantly adapt their preferences according to 
circumstances? How do other individuals or electoral campaigns alter someone’s 
preferences? Do cleavages (still) stabilise individual party preferences? Does 
volatility mainly occur between parties with similar ideologies? How frequent is 
ambiguity, meaning that citizens switch back and forth between two (or several) 
parties? These are some of the questions which we will discuss and investigate 
empirically in this thesis. 
Volatility has been interpreted in different ways. Early contributions (e.g. Converse 
1969) found voters to be badly informed, without meaningful attitudes and without 
consistent preferences. Volatility has been interpreted as a sign of uninformed and 
malleable citizens (Bartels et al. 2011) or as an indicator for instable political systems. 
In contrast, normative democratic theory and rational choice theories build on 
interested and informed citizens with clear preferences. According to these theories, 
volatility is the result of learning, of updating opinions due to new information and to 
new issues, or as a response to a changed environment. Volatility is thus a sign of an 
attentive or enlightened electorate, which reacts to political offerings, assesses the 
performance of parties and political leaders and holds them accountable. Depending 
on the perspective, volatile citizens may be seen, either as destabilising elements for a 
political system, or rather as sign of a vibrant and healthy democracy.  
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Volatility or stability has been mainly addressed on an aggregate level using the share 
of party votes in elections (net volatility). In contrast, gross volatility focuses on 
individual change in voting behaviour. Even though aggregate and individual 
dynamics are correlated, it is dangerous to infer from aggregate data to individual 
behaviour. First, stability at the aggregate level may mask volatility at the individual 
level. Secondly, aggregate level change is not necessarily caused by individual 
volatility. Electoral replacement or changing electoral participation can result in 
aggregate volatility, even if individuals remain stable. Thirdly, there is the danger of 
ecological fallacy when inferring from aggregate characteristics to individuals 
(Johnston and Pattie 2000). Finally, causal interpretations from aggregate-level 
analyses are often problematic for methodological reasons of endogeneity, 
multicollinearity and few degrees of freedoms. To understand individual behaviour, 
we therefore need individual data. 
Currently, there are different streams of research on individual dynamics (using 
individual level data). The most prominent one is the debate on the stability of party 
identification, which opposes the traditional and the revisionist model of party 
identification. Another stream of research focuses on socio-psychological theories, 
and is interested in the mechanism of information processing. It looks at how political 
awareness, predispositions and characteristics of information (source, intensity, 
direction, familiarity) impact opinion formation and change. Theories on socialisation 
or life course look at how political opinions and preference are formed in the first 
place and how they evolve over the life course. Many recent studies address the 
interpersonal influence in general and the influence between household members in 
particular. Others address the effects of life events (e.g. unemployment, a new partner, 
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a new job, moving house) on political opinions. Finally, economic voting theory 
explains changes due to economic conditions.  
So far, these different lines of research or perspective have remained largely 
unconnected and have had little influence on mainstream electoral research. Here, we 
will look into and connect these different streams of research on individual dynamics.  
To analyse volatility, we will use household-panel data from Germany (Socio-
Economic Panel SOEP, 1999-2010), Great Britain (British Household Panel Survey 
BHPS, 1991-2008), and Switzerland (Swiss Household Panel SHP, 1999-2010). 
These surveys are carried out annually with the same individuals and households. By 
now, the data covers at least 12 years and is thus well suited to study dynamics over a 
long time span. We will focus on areas where household panels can add to previous 
literature on volatility and stability. For example, aspects investigating aggregate level 
(party system, party characteristics) will not be our main focus of attention, although 
we will take account of this body of literature if necessary. To capture dynamics, we 
will use both descriptive statistics and panel data models (mainly event history 
analysis, random effect models).  
The selection of the countries is first of all given by data availability. Germany, Great 
Britain and Switzerland are the only countries which run household panels containing 
information on political behaviour. Nevertheless, the comparison of the three 
countries also makes sense from a theoretical perspective. Switzerland, Germany and 
Great Britain are all western democracies, but represent very different electoral and 
party systems. Great Britain has a classical majoritarian system dominated by two 
major parties. The government has, in recent times, been formed by one of these two 
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parties. Germany has, until recently, been a classic case of a proportional electoral 
system dominated by two large parties. From 1970 to 2005, government has been 
formed by either the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) or the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) and a smaller party (Liberal Party (FDP) or Green party) as their junior 
coalition partner. In Switzerland, the electoral system varies between cantons, but is 
mainly proportional. The number of parties in Switzerland is however much higher 
than in Germany. From 1959-2007, government has been formed by a coalition of the 
four largest parties which, between them, accumulate over 80 % of all votes. None of 
these parties are able to dominate the executive or the legislative. Other important 
aspects of the Swiss political system include strong federalism and direct democracy. 
Related to the electoral system and government coalition, the number of parties also 
differs greatly between the three countries. Thus, the three household panels allow the 
study of individual behaviour in three very different contexts. According to Lijphart 
(1999), Switzerland is the paradigmatic case of a consensus democracy, Great Britain 
is the paradigmatic case of a majoritarian democracy and Germany is somewhere in 
between. If we find similar patterns in these three countries, we can thus assume that 
results are not specific to a country or context. 
In Chapter 2 we will give an overview of theories and literature on volatility, and 
point to our contribution to literature. More details and development of hypotheses is 
included in the chapters 5-10. 
In Chapter 3 we will discuss concepts and their operationalisation to measure 
volatility. We will use the notion of party preferences as a general concept, 
encompassing party identification and voting intention. This is necessary, because the 
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data sources have different measures of party preferences. We will justify 
theoretically and empirically why we think a comparative approach is fruitful despite 
different indicators for party preferences. 
We will also present our measures for individual volatility. In contrast to most studies 
on individual dynamics, we will concentrate on change between parties rather than on 
change in and out of party preference. Another difference to most previous research is 
that we distinguish change within and between party blocks, as suggested by Bartolini 
and Mair (1990). We will develop our measure of party blocks in detail. 
In Chapter 4 we will present data and methods, but also discuss in more general terms 
the use of household panel data in political science. We will also address potential 
problems from non-response and attrition and its implications for the analysis. 
Chapter 5 addresses volatility and stability empirically. We will describe patterns of 
change using trajectories over 12 years. Apart from the traditional and the revisionist 
model, we will consider alternative models of long-term party preferences: Bounded 
partisanship, ambiguity, stability in party blocks and random changes.  
The remaining chapters address potential explanations for volatility. In Chapter 6 we 
will look at the role of the life-cycle, cohorts, period, and reinforcement effects. In 
Chapter 7, we will test for the influence of predisposition and political awareness. In 
Chapter 8 we will address campaign effects, by assessing how change relates to the 
electoral cycle. In Chapter 9, we will look at the influences within the household, 
distinguishing influence between partners, mothers and their children, fathers and 
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their children and between siblings. In Chapter 10, we will address pocketbook voting 




2 Overview of theories and literature review  
 Socio-structural characteristics, socialisation and party identification  2.1
Until the 1960’s, the dominant perspective in electoral research was on socio-
demographic characteristics and stability. Social-class and religious affiliation were 
seen as the main explanatory factors for voting choice (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and 
Gaudet 1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). Because socio-structural 
characteristics are highly stable and influential, voting behaviour is generally stable. 
Although age is a routine control variable in any model on electoral research, the 
underlying mechanisms why age matters is often neglected. Typically, volatility is 
found to decrease with age. Socialisation and cohort theories claim that the conditions 
of socialisation shape individual preferences (e.g. Inglehart 1977). In the extreme, 
these preferences persist over the life course. The other extreme is lifelong openness, 
meaning that citizens adapt to changing context over their entire life course (Jennings 
and Niemi 1981). In Chapter 6, we will disentangle life-cycle and cohort effects, and 
include reinforcement as a separate mechanism. To test and control for duration of 
party preference, we will apply an innovative way to deal with left-censoring in 
panels. 
Also on an aggregate level, stability of party systems has been attributed to socio-
structural characteristics, reflecting cleavages society. Parties are seen to represent 
different groups or subcultures. The most important cleavages are class and religion. 
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With “the American Voter” by Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960), party 
identification has become the key concept in electoral research.
1
 As the name 
suggests, the basic notion is that voters develop identification with a party. Party 
identification is mainly acquired during childhood and early adulthood. In its 
traditional form, identification refers to the affective attachment to a group. As for the 
Columbia studies and cleavage theories, the American voter focused on stability. But 
stabilisation occurs not only on the basis of socio-structural characteristics, but mainly 
through a psychological process of identifying with a party. Party identification also 
has a heuristic function. It provides orientation for ill-informed citizens or helps 
rational voters to take positions in complex issues at little cost (Key 1966).  
From the 1970s, the focus shifted from explaining stability to explaining volatility. At 
the aggregate level, volatility was found to increase over time (e.g. Pedersen 1979; 
Pedersen 1983; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Drummond 2006). New parties appeared 
and established parties declined. These processes are seen as the result of 
dealignment, referring to the declining attachment of citizens to parties. The share of 
voters without party identification increased along with volatility in individuals’ 
voting preferences.  
A main explanation for dealignment is the detachment of voters from previous 
cleavage structures. Many studies found that traditional cleavages lost importance. An 
exception is the book by Bartolini and Mair (1990), which covers the years 1885-
1985. It argues that the traditional class cleavage has remained relevant. A main 
argument is that to assess volatility, particularly in changing party systems, the unit of 
                                                 
1
 For its origin, see also (Belknap and Campbell 1952; Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954). 
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analysis should not be a single party, but blocks of parties. More recent studies on 
cleavage theory agree on the decline of the traditional class and religious cleavages. 
However, they argue that traditional cleavages have been transformed or replaced by 
others (e.g. Oesch 2006; Lachat 2007; Kriesi 1998). When discussing the impact of 
the strength of predispositions in chapter 7, we will explicitly test for the stabilising 
effect of socio-structural characteristics and found that the strength of socio-structural 
predispositions still has a stabilising effect. 
In parallel to the declining importance of traditional cleavages and party 
identification, electoral research focused increasingly on short term effects, such as 
candidates, party leaders, campaign activities, salient issues or economic conditions 
(e.g. Alvarez, Nagler, and Bowler 2000). If short-term influences have become more 
important over time, volatility should increase. 
Apart from cleavages, another prominent theory to explain dealignment is cognitive 
mobilisation. It postulates that party identification has become less important because 
educational levels have increased and political skills improved. Citizens are better 
able to form their preferences without relying on identities (Dalton 1984; Dalton and 
Wattenberg 2000). However, analysis at the individual level clearly shows that the 
correlation between education and dealignment is not causal (Albright 2009). Highly 
skilled and educated citizens are more likely to hold a party identification. Moreover, 
party identifications of highly knowledgeable or educated citizens are generally 
stronger than party identifications of citizens with lower education or political 
knowledge. The cognitive mobilisation hypothesis has been clearly rejected. 
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 The debate on the stability of party identification 2.2
The stability of party identification is an intensively researched field. According to the 
concept of the “American voter”, party identification is a group affiliation similar to 
social class or religious affiliation. It is acquired during socialisation and remains 
largely stable over the life course. Party choice may temporarily diverge from party 
identification. The main reasons for such temporal divergences are political issues and 
candidates, which influence voting choice in the short term. Nevertheless, Campbell 
and his colleagues named several factors which potentially impact party identification 
in the long term: marriage, a new job, a change in neighbourhood or major policies 
like the New Deal (Campbell et al., 1960, p.150).  
Fiorina (1981) has formulated an alternative view on party identification. Party 
identification is seen as a running tally, which is constantly updated according to issue 
positions, party performance or learning. This concept of party identification is 
usually referred to as the revisionist model, as opposed to the traditional model by 
Campbell et al. Van der Eijk and Franklin (2009) see party identification as simply a 
reflection of voting habits for a party or a group of parties. In the revisionist view, 
party identification is a rational rather than an affective phenomenon, serving mainly 
to reduce costs of continuously collecting and evaluating political information (Key 
1966; Clarke et al. 2004, 7f.). Not only voting behaviour, but also party identification 
may be influenced by short term effects. Party identification is state dependent and 
endogenous to voting.  
There are different ways to empirically test the traditional against the revisionist 
model. A popular test is to assess individual dynamics over time.
 
Some studies found 
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high stability in party identification (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Green and 
Yoon 2002; Bartels et al. 2011) and interpreted this as support for the traditional view. 
Others found considerable volatility (Franklin and Jackson 1983; Franklin 1984; 




Several studies have analysed the stability of party identification with the German 
SOEP. Most found considerable volatility in party identification (Zuckerman and 
Kroh 2006; Schmitt-Beck, Weick, and Christoph 2006; Kroh and Selb 2009; Kohler 
2002). Using the same source, others concluded that party identification is stable 
(Arzheimer and Schoen 2005), or that changes rarely occur between parties 
(Neundorf, Stegmueller, and Scotto 2011; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007).  
The results strongly depend on the statistical model of choice. Many contributions 
focus on methodological aspects, e.g. on the appropriate dynamic model, the control 
of measurement error and the control of unobserved heterogeneity. However, the 
question on stability should not be reduced to a methodological issue only. Rather, the 
opposition of the traditional and the revisionist model might not be appropriate, 
because it assumes that the electorate is homogenous. Some individuals may simply 
be more stable than others. 
More recently, the debate is shifting, as researchers start to acknowledge and take 
account of individual heterogeneity. There have been two main approaches to this. 
                                                 
2
 But (Achen 1992) has shown that empirical stability is compatible with the revisionist model. 
Similarly, (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) argue that empirical volatility may be in line with 
the traditional model because empirical volatility reflects measurement error. 
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The first attributes voters either to a group of stable partisans or to a volatile group 
(Clarke and McCutcheon 2009; Neundorf, Stegmueller, and Scotto 2011). In the 
second approach, volatility is treated as a (latent) continuous variable, where 
individuals vary in their degree of stability. Rather than testing whether party 
identification is state dependent, these approaches try to explain why some individuals 
change and others do not. The empirical models assess relationships between change 
and other variables (Kohler 2002; Arzheimer and Schoen 2005; Schmitt-Beck, Weick, 
and Christoph 2006; Kroh and Selb 2009) . The question is not so much whether party 
identification is stable or not, but how the individual level of volatility can be 
explained.  
We will use both approaches. In Chapter 5, we will attribute individuals to different 
groups, but do not restrict the models to the traditional and revisionist view. The 
concept of bounded party identification (Zuckerman and Kroh 2006; Neundorf, 
Stegmueller, and Scotto 2011) claims that changes occur primarily in and out of 
supporting major parties, rather than between parties. There are several alternative 
models on dynamics, which are mainly ignored in the debate on stability of party 
identification. One is the stability in party blocks by Bartolini and Mair (1990), who 
claim that volatility occurs mainly between close parties, but rarely across important 
cleavage lines. Another is ambiguity (Zaller 1992) or simultaneous preferences for 
parties (Van Der Eijk and Franklin 2009).  
 Information flow, information processing and campaign effects 2.3
To form political opinions and preferences, citizens take account of information. 
Social psychological theories focus on how individuals process information and on 
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how information impacts opinions or preferences. Electoral research mainly focuses 
on the impact of mass communication.  
An important reference in research on information and information processing is the 
book by Zaller (1992). It provides a clear and encompassing theoretical framework 
and has made socio-psychological theories known and popular in political science. 
The RAS-model is comprised of three parts in public opinion formation, which need 
to be looked at separately: Reception, Acceptance and Sample. In order to be 
influenced by information, individuals first have to receive the information and 
secondly to accept it. Whether reception and acceptance occur depends on the level of 
political awareness, predispositions, and characteristics of the information 
(familiarity, density, one-sided or two-sided). The last part of the RAS-model, sample, 
refers to information retrieval. It is assumed that individuals have different and also 
conflicting considerations stored in their memories. The probability of expressing a 
particular opinion depends on the proportion of considerations in favour of that 
particular answer. Respondents report the consideration off “the top of their head” 
when answering a survey question. 
Many studies have focused on the influence of political awareness, predisposition and 
information type to better understand information processing. However, results on the 
RAS model are still ambiguous and seem to depend strongly on the study design, 
measures of variables and the specific context. 
In Chapter 7 we will look at the influence of political awareness and predisposition 
strength on volatility in party preferences. By distinguishing socio-structural 
predispositions and psychological predispositions, change within block and between 
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party blocks, and reconsidering the interplay between predispositions and awareness, 
we found rather consistent results, offering a new explanation for the influence of 
political awareness or stability.  
Much research on information flow and information processing focuses on electoral 
campaigns. Systematic research on campaign effects goes back to studies by the 
Columbia school on US Presidential Elections in the 1940s (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and 
Gaudet 1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). The authors surveyed the 
same individuals at different times during the electoral campaign. Only a few voters 
were found to change their preferred party or candidate during the campaign, yet, 
several other campaign effects were discovered. First, campaigns reinforced those 
who made up their minds early in the campaign. Secondly, they helped undecided or 
unsure individuals to choose a party or candidate in line with their predispositions. 
Thirdly, campaigns made certain issues more salient for voting choice. However, 
because the study did not find persuasion effects, the result has been denoted as 
“minimal effects” and discouraged research on campaign effects for decades.  
However, since the 1980s, campaigns have come back into the focus. At first, 
research focused mostly on framing and priming, but scholars have become 
increasingly interested in persuasion (Bartels 1993).
3
 Current research mainly focuses 
on the mechanism and conditions of when and how campaigns matter (e.g. Bartels 
1993; Arceneaux 2006; Brandenburg and Van Egmond 2012). Data sources used 
cover relatively short time spans, either involving an experiment or stretching over a 
campaign.  
                                                 
3
 For systematic reviews on campaign effects see Iyengar and Simon (2000) and Hillygus (2010). 
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To understand how campaigns affect citizens and what moderates campaign effects, it 
is important to distinguish the different types of campaign effects, such as activation, 
persuasion or priming (Claassen 2011). A prominent article by Gelman and King 
(1993) criticised the unsatisfactory distinction between activation and persuasion. In 
Chapter 8, we will deploy a new approach to distinguish persuasion and activation 
effects. Additionally, we will look at whether campaigns mostly influence highly 
aware citizens or those with little awareness. 
 Interpersonal influence 2.4
Communication and discussions with others is an important part of opinion formation 
and opinion change. Citizens have to be understood within a particular setting 
(Barber, 1984; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Beck et al., 2002). 
There is a long tradition of research on personal contexts. In the 1940s and 1950s, 
reference group theory was a dominant approach to studying political attitudes and 
behaviour. The first major panel survey on attitudes interviewed women at 
Bennington College (USA). Most of them were from conservative families and had 
conservative attitudes when coming to the college. During their four years of college 
from 1935-1939, the majority adopted more liberal attitudes (Newcomb 1943). Those 
who maintained closer family ties and were less involved in college activities, were 
less likely to change. Follow up studies in 1960-1961 and 1984 showed that attitudes 
endured mostly over the life course (Newcomb et al. 1967; Alwin 1992). The stability 
of attitudes was facilitated by the maintenance of networks. Also, in the Columbia 
studies (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 
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1954), social networks played a key role. Family, friends, church members and work 
colleagues were found to be the most important influences for the vote.  
An important reference for interpersonal influence is the book by Huckfeldt and 
Sprague (1995), which provides a theoretical model for inter individual influence. It 
consists of three building blocks. The first addresses the purposes of individual 
citizens and their need to inform themselves. Instead of consulting mass media or 
party communications, individuals may turn to others. Asking someone usually takes 
less time and is more efficient. Furthermore, individuals may refer to a person they 
trust in and who shares the same viewpoints and, therefore, have more control over 
the potential bias of their information source than when recurring to other sources. 
The second part of the model is on inter-individual influence. Because individuals 
only have probabilistic and incomplete control over their information source, they 
cannot avoid receiving information which counters their predispositions. Information 
from someone may thus cause opinion change. The third part of the model is 
contagion. Individuals form an opinion and then share it with others. Their peers may 
react positively or negatively to opinions and so reward or punish the individual. 
Depending on the reaction, individuals reconsider and retest their opinion until 
agreement is reached. Consequently, contexts tend to homogenise. Change occurs 
through disagreement. If people are part of politically homogeneous populations, we 
expect stability, and, when change does occur, it typically increases the homogeneity 
of the micro context (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1997, p.19).  
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Over many decades, interpersonal influence has received little attention or was 
considered as secondary.
4
 In randomised population surveys, individuals are selected 
and surveyed independently of their context, so that such analysis is not even possible 
(Zuckerman 2005; Johnston et al. 2005). This has changed with household panels, 
which have been used in many recent contributions with a focus on the household 
context (Wernli 2006; Coffé and Voorpostel 2010; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and 
Fitzgerald 2007; Kroh and Selb 2009; Kohler 2002; Schmitt-Beck, Weick, and 
Christoph 2006; Fitzgerald 2011; Fitzgerald and Curtis 2012). But so far, this 
literature is not well integrated into electoral and public opinion research (Vreese and 
Boomgaarden 2006; Chaffee and Mutz 1998). 
In Chapter 9 we will look at interpersonal influence and add to literature on 
interpersonal influence on several aspects. By focusing on change instead of 
comparing party preferences of different individuals, we will overcome the 
endogeneity problem which research on interpersonal influence is confronted with. 
Furthermore, we can disentangle the direction of the influence. We will distinguish 
influence between partners, from parents to children, from children to parents and 
between siblings. We will also address the mechanism on interpersonal influence. The 
role of political discussions and more informal channels is still not clear. It is assumed 
that influence occurs through political discussion. We will test the impact of political 
discussion empirically using information on the frequency of political discussion in 
the SHP.  
                                                 
4
 For example, Zaller states that “Even when we learn from friends or family members about some 
aspect of public affairs, often we may still be second-hand consumers of ideas that originated more 
distantly among some type of elite” (1992: p.6). 
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 Rational choice models and economic voting 2.5
The rationalist framework is often seen as an alternative to sociological theories 
which focus on predispositions and socio-structural characteristics (Clarke et al. 
2004). The rational framework goes (among others) back to Downs (1957). It assumes 
self-interest of politicians and voters. Voters compare parties and support the party 
which maximises their utility. For Downs, utility refers to “incomes from government 
activity” (Downs 1957, 138), usually operationalised with the left-right continuum. In 
the simple model, the position of the left-right continuum reflects preferences on the 
amount of public goods and services to be provided by the government. Put very 
simply, rich citizens should favour (economically) right-wing parties proclaiming 
little government spending, low taxes and weak income redistribution. Poorer citizens 
tend to support (economically) left parties, who favour high government spending, 
high taxes and strong income redistribution. In current electoral research, proximity 
models usually refer to ideological closeness (position on the left-right axis or in issue 
space) more generally rather than to personal income and direct utility maximisation.  
However, income and economic conditions play an important role in economic voting 
theory which assumes that voters hold parties or candidates accountable for their 
performance. The accountability hypothesis postulates that citizens support the party 
with the best economic performance or expected performance. If the economic 
conditions are good, voters are assumed to support the incumbent party, if economic 
conditions are bad or worsening, voters are assumed to support the opposition.  
Economic voting has given rise to extensive literature and several debates. One such 
debate is about whether the personal economic situation (egocentric voting) or the 
national economic situation (sociotropic voting) influences the vote. Although 
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sociotropic voting seems generally stronger in empirical studies, the role of the 
personal economic situation is less clear and varies between countries (Lewis-Beck 
and Paldam 2000). Another debate is on whether evaluation on economic 
performance is prospective or retrospective (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992; 
Norpoth 1996). 
A third debate in economic voting theory is about whether the objective economic 
situation or rather the perceived economic situation matters. At the aggregate level, 
objective economic measures, mostly economic growth, unemployment and inflation, 
have an impact on electoral outcomes (Kramer 1971; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 
1992). At the individual level, findings on the personal economic situation are 
inconsistent (Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000). When the perceived economic 
situation is used as a measure for the economic situation, also individual-level models 
work well. However, such models have been criticised as endogenous (Duch, Palmer, 
and Anderson 2000; Nannestad and Paldam 1994). Supporters of the incumbent party 
tend to perceive the economy more optimistically than supporters of the opposition. 
The perception of the economy may thus reflect rationalisation rather than a causal 
impact. The debate is on-going, as the exact mechanism of how economic conditions 
influence the vote is still unknown. It has also become clear that the extent of 
economic voting is context-specific. Recently, research has moved to explain cross-
national (and cross-temporal) difference in economic voting (Duch and Stevenson 
2008; Van der Brug, Van der Eijk, and Franklin 2007). 
Both rational choice thoery and economic voting suggest thus that personal income 
affects voting, although the proposed mechanism are quite different. According to 
economic voting, personal income influences support for the government or 
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opposition. According to Down’s proximity model, personal income influences 
support for left or right wing parties. Surprisingly, empirical research has largely 
neglected these two competing hypotheses when addressing the effect of the personal 
economic situation. In Chapter 10, we will look at how changes in the personal 
economic situation impacts change in party preferences. 
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3 Concepts and operationalisation of volatility 
 Party identification and vote  3.1
The relation between individuals and parties is central to electoral theory. Various 
concepts and labels describe these relations: party attachment, partisan 
predispositions, party identification, voting intention, and voting behaviour. While 
these terms are closely related, clear distinctions between them are rare and their use 
is often inconsistent and ambiguous.  
It is crucial to define concepts not only for theoretical reasons, but also because they 
have direct implications for the interpretation of empirical results. This is, because the 
surveys analysed use different concepts. While the SOEP asks about leaning towards 
a party, the SHP asks about voting intention and the BHPS applies a mixture of the 
two concepts.  
SHP: “If there was an election for the National Council tomorrow, for which 
party would you vote?” 
SOEP: “Many people in Germany lean towards one party in the long term, even 
if they occasionally vote for another party. Do you lean towards a 
particular party? [If yes] Toward which party do you lean?” 
BHPS: “Generally speaking do you think of yourself as a supporter of any one 
political party? Which?” 
[If no:] “Do you think of yourself as a little closer to one political party 
than to the others? Which?” 
[If no:] “If there was to be a General Election tomorrow, which political 
party would you vote for?”5 
 
                                                 
5
 In Great Britain 40 % name a party in the first question, a further 20 % name a party after the second 
question and a further 15 % after the third question. In total, 75 % name a party in the three questions. 
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We can only reasonably compare the three household panels, if these questions are 
similar. An assessment of the theoretical and empirical consequences of comparing 
these different questions is thus crucial. There are two main arguments which, as we 
will show, justify the comparison of the three panel surveys: the endogeneity of party 
identification and the empirical characteristics of the measures. We therefore think 
that the comparative approach is instructive if we keep the differences in mind when 
interpreting the results. Furthermore, our results can contribute to understanding the 
differences from a question of party identification and voting intention. Before 
addressing these arguments, it is important to discuss the concepts, in particular the 
theoretical and empirical differences of party identification, voting intention and 
voting choice.  
We start with voting choice, which corresponds to an observable behaviour and 
therefore presents a relatively straight-forward concept .
6
 Voting choice involves two 
interdependent decisions: whether I vote or not and – if I do vote – which party I vote 
for. Surveys which measure voting choice ask these two questions and are usually 
conducted shortly after an election.  
Voting intention is closely connected to voting choice. It does not refer to a directly 
observable behaviour but is hypothetical. It is usually asked in surveys which are not 
connected to any particular election or in surveys fielded during a campaign. If the 
question does not refer to a particular election, candidates, campaigns and strategic 
considerations should have a lesser influence than when asking about a particular 
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election. Another difference between voting choice and voting intention concerns 
non-voters. For voting intention, there is no separation between participation and 
party choice. Consequently, the measurement of voting intention usually involves 
only one question. Although respondents naming a party when asked about their 
voting intention are more likely to actually vote than those not expressing any party 
preference, this is not necessarily the case.  
In standard models of electoral research, most importantly in the Michigan model, a 
causal relationship between party identification and electoral choice is assumed. An 
exemplary causal model, encompassing party identification, voting intention and 
voting choice is shown in Figure 1. Apart from voting intention, this is very close to 
the funnel of causality which can be considered as mainstream in electoral research. 
Party identification is usually seen – at least implicitly – as a causal influence on 
voting choice. But looking more closely at the relationship between party 
identification and voting, there are several questions and potential problems: 
endogeneity of party identification, the applicability of party identification outside the 
United States, and the measurement of party identification. They have given rise to 




Figure 1: Standard causal model of party identification and electoral choice 
 
Endogeneity of party identification 
As discussed above, the traditional model sees party identification as a stable trait 
determined mostly during socialisation (A. Campbell et al. 1960, 147–48). Green, 
Palmquist and Schickler (2002) emphasise that party identification is a social identity 
similar to race, religion or social class, and is thus to a large part inherited. In this 
view, party identification is clearly exogenous, and its use as an explanatory variable 
is therefore unproblematic. But if party identification is not exogenous, it does present 
a problem. If we want to know whether party identification is truly exogenous, we 
need to understand how party identification is formed.  
It is well known that socialisation, which can be considered as exogenous, plays an 
important role in the development of party identification (e.g. Greenstein 1965; 
Easton and Dennis 1969; Kroh and Selb 2009). Furthermore, innumerable empirical 
studies confirm that parents and childhood experiences influence party identification 
(Jennings and Niemi 1981; Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005). Lewis-Beck, Nadeau 
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they pass it onto their children about 75% of the time. Also the political environment 
during childhood and adolescence plays an important role (Hawkins, Pingree, and 
Roberts 1975; Jennings 2002). Even electoral campaigns have shown to increase the 
strength of party identification in adolescents (Sears and Valentino, 1997).  
Although socialisation is crucial, many studies show that party identification is not 
stable after childhood and adolescence. Variables that influence party identification 
include e.g. a series of votes counter to identifications (Markus and Converse 1979), 
performance of the incumbent party (Fiorina 1981), relative policy distance between 
the voter and candidates (Franklin and Jackson, 1983), political awareness (Green and 
Yoon, 2002; Arzheimer and Schoen, 2005), party size (Schmitt-Beck, Weick, and 
Christoph 2006), or a new partner (Kohler 2002). Previous research therefore clearly 
suggests that party identification is not entirely exogenous.  
In contrast to the traditional model, party identification is updated and influenced by 
party choice in the revisionist view (Fiorina, 1981). Or similarly, Van der Brug and 
Franklin (2009) see party identification as a habit of voting for the same party or the 
same group of parties. In this sense, party identification is endogenous by definition. 
The endogeneity of party identification is problematic when introduced in regression 
models to explain voting behaviour. Assumptions of regression are violated and all 
coefficients may be biased. This problem is not new, for example Page and Jones 
(1979, 1079) state: “Thus the many studies of party identification as a determinant of 
candidate evaluations or voting choices, from the American Voter onward, may have 
overestimated its effect by ignoring the opposite possibility (Campbell et al., 1960). 
The Michigan Tradition dies hard”. In the sense that it is still relatively standard to 
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include party identification as an explanatory variable for electoral choice and thus 
implicitly assume exogenous party identification, this critique still holds today. The 
endogeneity of party identification to voting does not question the value of the 
concept, but its use a causal effect on voting choice in electoral research. There is 
clear evidence in the cited studies that party identification is not as independent from 
voting choice as is usually assumed.  
Apart from the lack of consensus on what party identification stands for, there are 
problems with the measurement of party identification and its travelling capacity 
outside the USA (Budge, Crewe, and Farlie 1976; Scarbrough 1984; Fleury and 
Lewis-Beck 1993).
 
Party identification may not be the same in the USA than in other 
countries. In the USA, voters have to vote for candidates of many different posts. 
Therefore, party identifications have to be translated into candidate support (Kroh and 
Selb 2009). In contrast, in most European countries, voters vote for parties or for 
fewer candidates, so party identification is less important as a guide in elections (Van 
Der Eijk and Franklin 2009). If both party identification and voting choice refer to 
parties, the problem of endogenous relationships between party identification and 
voting choice is more severe. Another important difference with the USA are 
multiparty systems. Many more survey questions and variables in a model are 
necessary if one wants to include strength of party identification for more than one 
party into a model.
7
  
                                                 
7
 There are scholars who argue that party identification is even multi-dimensional in the USA (e.g. 
(Weisberg 1980). Citizens are attracted to each party and to the category “independent” as symbols and 
may be separately favourably or unfavourably disposed to any of these three symbols. 
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Empirical differences between party identification and voting  
Another approach when discussing the relation between party identification and 
voting intention is to compare their empirical properties. According to its definition, 
party identification should be more stable than voting intention or voting behaviour. 
Only then, the use of party identification to explain voting behaviour is justified.  
If, in a simple test, we find that party identification is indeed more stable than voting 
choice, this confirms that party identification is different to voting choice (1) and that 
this difference can be captured - at least partially - by survey questions (2). If we do 
not find significant differences in the stability of party identification and voting 
intention, this either implies that party identification does not differ from voting 
intention or that the difference cannot be measured appropriately in surveys. Such a 
test has been conducted by Falter et al. (2000) for Germany. To their surprise, 
stability of party identification and stability of voting choice did not differ 
significantly in West Germany. Yet, party identification turned out to be more stable 
than voting intention in East Germany. This is against expectations, because East 
Germans rarely acquired party identification through socialisation, so party 
identification should have had a lesser stabilising effect in East Germany. Similarly, 
Meisel (1975) found that in Canada, party identification is as volatile as the vote 
itself. 
With the two-wave Selects Panel from 1999 and 2003 in Switzerland, it is possible to 
apply a similar test to Switzerland. We analyse two different sub subsamples of this 
survey. The first consists of the respondents with party identification and party choice 
both in 1999 and 2003 (n=251). The second also includes individuals who did not 
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report a party preference or voting intention in 2003 (n=352).
8
 Table 1 shows stability 
rates of party identification for both samples. In the first sample, which limits the 
analysis to individuals who indicated a party identification and voting choice in both 
waves, the stability of the two measurements is very close and the difference is not 
significant (on the basis of 95 % confidence intervals). In the second sample, which 
includes those who abandoned their party identification or voting choice, stability in 
party choice turned out to be higher than stability in party identification, which is 
against theoretical expectations. 67 % expressed the same party choice but only 57 % 
expressed the same party identification in both waves. Party choice appears more 
stable because many respondents who voted for the same party in the second wave did 
not identify with this party any more. This confirms the result for West Germany by 
Falter et al. (2000) and suggests that stability levels of questions on party 
identification and questions on voting choice do not differ. Kohler (2002) came to a 
similar conclusion using a different approach. He found that stability of party 
identification as measured by the SOEP in two consecutive years is as strong as the 
relationship between party identification and recalled voting or voting intention. 
Analysing stability in the longer term, he found substantial volatility and concluded 
that either party identification in Germany is not stable, or that the question from the 
SOEP measures actual preferences rather than party identification (Kohler 2002, 118, 
193).  
                                                 
8
 The difference between the two samples are respondents who, in 2003, had a party identification but 




Table 1: Stability of party identification and stability of electoral choice. 
sample party choice party ident. n 
party identification and 
party choice 1999 and 
2003 
75.7 % stable pi 
24.3 % other PI 
78.8 % stable 
21.2 % other PI 
251 
party identification and 
party choice in 1999 
67.4 % stable party 
 5.8 % no party 
26.8 % other  party 
57.0 % stable 
27.4 % no PI in 2003 
16.6 % other PI  
352 
 Source: Selects Panel 1999-2003 
 
Although stability levels of party identification and voting intention are similar, an 
important difference between the two measures remains: respondents are much more 
likely to name a party when asked about voting intention than when asked about party 
identification. With questions on party leanings in the SOEP, we are thus likely to 
have a sample of more stable individuals than in the SHP and BHPS, because party 
preference of non-identifiers is not measured. However, among respondents with a 
party identification, the stability or volatility should not be significantly different.  
Recently, another test regarding the empirical equivalence of the dynamic properties 
of the two concepts was conducted by Fitzgerald and Curtis (2012), who justified the 
comparison of the SHP, the SOEP and the BHPS within these data sets themselves. 
They showed that stability in party preference over 10 years (per cent of respondents 
who still like the same party as they did at the beginning) is nearly identical across the 




Party preferences as an encompassing concept 
Because party identification is endogenous and has similar dynamic properties to 
voting intention, we consider it justifiable to compare data from the different 
household panels in terms of their stability, even though they have differently worded 
questions. The SOEP asks respondents about party identification, the SHP about 
voting intention and the BHPS asks a combination of those two concepts. For the rest 
of this contribution, we will use the term party preferences as a general concept which 
encompasses both party identification and voting intention.  
Apart from the justifications, we think that there are also conceptual advantages of 
referring to party preferences. We use a neutral concept which is not linked to any 
particular theory or assumption. We do not assume any particular causality between 
party identification and voting intention. Furthermore, we can separate theoretical 
questions from measurement issues by referring to latent and manifest party 
preferences. By nature, latent concepts or variables remain unobserved. Party 
identification as a concept can thus be seen as a latent party preference Latent party 
preferences are relatively stable, but the extent of stability remains an empirical and 
not a theoretical question. In surveys, we can only measure manifest and not latent 
party preferences. In this perspective, voting intentions, voting choice, closeness to a 
party or identification for a party are different (manifest) indicators of party 
preferences.  
 Measuring change 3.2
Volatility refers to voters’ instability. At the aggregate level, volatility is usually 
captured by an index referring to the net electoral change between two consecutive 
32 
 
elections and also referred to as net volatility (e.g. Pedersen 1983; Bartolini and Mair 
1990).  
At the individual level (gross volatility), the concept of volatility and its 
operationalisation is less standardised. This may be due to the specific research 
designs, or to the still relatively scarce literature on this topic. The ways in which 
individual volatility or stability are assessed in previous research is plentiful. The 
choice of measurement is crucial, because it influences results and the conclusions 
about the amount of volatility. Instead of enumerating all these approaches separately, 
we will discuss several issues which arise when measuring volatility. We discuss the 
treatment of no party preference, indirect changes between parties, and the number of 
parties. We will situate previous approaches according to these criteria and then 
present our measure of volatility. The first important decision to make when 
measuring volatility is the treatment of observations with no party preference. In the 
context of USA, citizens without party preference or identification are called 
independents but this may be misleading in other contexts. Many individuals do not 
express a party preference, particularly when individuals are asked about party 
identification. When asked about voting intention, more reveal a party preference. In 
the SOEP, more than half of the respondents  
(53 %) do not name a party. This share is high compared to other data sources in 
Germany (e.g. Arzheimer 2006), but compares to party identification in the BHPS 
data (38 % are non-identifiers). With voting intention, the share of respondents with 
no preference amounts to only 3 % in the BHPS. In the SHP in Switzerland, 20 % do 
not name a voting intention and an additional 19 % claim to vote for candidates and 
not for parties. Together, this adds to 39 % who do not name a party.  
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When measuring volatility, we have to decide whether to treat no preference in the 
same way as having a preference for parties. Many studies illustrate that change 
between parties and change between having and not having a party preference are 
fundamentally different. For example the empirical analysis by Schmitt-Beck et al. 
(2006) shows that very different mechanisms lie behind these two types of change. 
Also the concept of bounded party identification (Zuckerman and Kroh 2006) stresses 
the importance of separating the decision whether to name a party and which party to 
name. It emphasises that voters only consider a restricted choice set when asked to 
name a party preference. They usually do not choose among all alternatives available. 
Respondents rather choose between naming or not naming a major party, but rarely 
change to the other major party (Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald, 2007; Clarke 
and Suzuki, 1994). Zuckerman and Kroh argue that party preference should be 
considered as a two-stage process, separating the decision whether to name a party 
from the decision of which party to name. 
Despite this, many studies on dynamics of party identification treat no party 
preference as a category like any other party. In Markov models, no preference and 
preferences for small parties are sometimes even coded into the same categories. 
Although rarely discussed, this is mostly done to restrict the number of categories of 
the dependent variable or to avoid small categories. For example, the dependent 
variable in studies applying Markov Models typically distinguish only two or three 
categories: movers and stayers, or the two major parties and all other choices 
respectively (e.g. Clarke et al. 2004; Neundorf, Stegmueller, and Scotto 2011). With 
this coding, preferences for smaller parties and no preference are implicitly 
considered as equivalent.  
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The treatment of no party preference has important implications on the understanding 
of volatility and stability. Treating no preference like any other preference for a party 
means that those who remain without party preference are then considered stable, and 
are not distinguished from respondents who remain with the same party. Moreover, 
changes between having and not having a party and changes between two parties 
cannot be distinguished. For our empirical analysis, we believe that the difference 
between having and not having a party preference is fundamental.  
The second issue on the measurement of change which we will discuss is indirect 
changes between parties. By indirect change, we mean trajectories from a party to no 
party and then to another party (e.g. party A – no party – party B). To take account of 
such transitions, we need to look at more waves than just transitions between two 
points of observations. Ignoring indirect change underestimates the amount of change. 
Indirect changes are quite frequent, particularly when the probability of not having a 
party preference is high. In Germany for example, we observe twice as many indirect 
changes than direct changes between parties (see also Kohler 2002). Previous 
analyses did not take account of indirect changes. This applies to Markov models, 
autoregressive regression models, but also to the event history analysis by Schmitt-
Beck et al (2006), who have considered abandoning a party preference and party 
switches as competing events. In contrast, we consider it important to take account of 
direct and indirect changes between parties when analysing change between parties.  
The last point we will address in the discussion of the measurement of volatility is the 
number of parties included in the analysis. Studies mainly focus on major parties 
only, typically two major parties (e.g. Zuckerman and Kroh, 2006; Zuckerman, 
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Dasovic, and Fitzgerald, 2007; Clarke and McCutcheon, 2009; Neundorf, 
Stegmueller, and Scotto, 2011). Kroh and Selb (2009) distinguish five parties in 
Germany. While this is often reasonable and necessary for methodological reasons, it 
becomes problematic in multiparty systems. In Germany, the share of small parties 
amounts to 18 %, and in Switzerland it is even greater. To also capture small parties 
or to include Switzerland into the analysis, we need a measure or method including 
possibly all parties. However, when we use the parties as the dependent variable in a 
regression (particularly in multi-level modelling), the number of response categories 
should be limited.  
Taking account of these different concerns, we present our measure of (gross) 
volatility. For the statistical models, we distinguish whether a change has occurred or 
not. Because we think it is crucial to capture indirect changes between parties, change 
refers not necessarily to the previous wave of observation but refers to the last wave 
where a party has been named. If no party preference has been named before, 
observations are dropped. The exclusion of observations before a party preference has 
been named is also necessary for event history models. Individuals who did not 
indicate a party preference in a previous wave cannot switch parties and are therefore 
not in the risk set. The selection also implies that only individuals who mentioned a 
party preference at least once are in the sample.  
An example of the coding of the dependent variable for a hypothetical individual is 
provided in column 4 in Table 2. The same can be done for changes between party 
blocks, which we will address below 
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Table 2: Illustration of coding the variable “change between parties” (1 change 0 no 
change) 







. Excluded because no party named before 
2 A . First time party named. Excluded because no party 
has been named before. 
3 A 0 No change since last party named (A in wave 2). 
4 B 1 Change since last party named (A in wave 3). 
5 No 
pref. 
0 No change since last party named (B in wave 4). 
6 B 0 No change since to last party named (B in wave 4). 
7 A 1 Change since last party named (B in wave 6). 
A consequence of this coding is that we do not capture change between having and 
not having a party preference. As argued before, we think that change between parties 
and in and out of party preference are fundamentally different from party switches. 
Here, we are mainly interested in changes between parties.  
 Party blocks 3.3
The concept of party blocks 
A change between parties in two-party systems is not equivalent to a change in 
multiparty systems. Similarly, a change between ideologically similar parties is not 
equivalent to a change between parties with opposing ideologies. When measuring 
change, and comparing levels of volatility across countries (or time), we are 
inevitably confronted with the question on how to account for these differences 
Bartolini and Mair (1990) argue that the important units in (Western) Europe are party 
blocks rather than parties. Although party blocks have been used in electoral research 
there are no established standards on how parties should be grouped into blocks. 
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Studies using party blocks apply different criteria, which are generally not further 
justified.  
Criteria to build party blocks 
Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis (2006, 190) name party families, left and right, 
new and old, as well as opposition and government as examples of possible criteria to 
build party blocks. Bartolini and Mair, who argue strongly in favour of applying party 
blocks as units of analysis, see the class cleavage as the relevant structure. They 
distinguish parties with a socialist or communist origin on the one hand and all other 
parties on the other. However, this definition is not suited for the present analysis. 
First, we are not primarily interested in the class cleavage, but refer to political space 
in general. Secondly, Bartolini and Mair have looked at dynamics up until 1985. Since 
then, new parties, most importantly the Green parties, have become established. 
Bartolini and Mair’s criteria would result in counter-intuitive and unusual groups: 
Green parties and socialist parties would belong to different blocks, but Green parties 
and extreme right parties to the same block. Lachat (2007) uses party blocks for 
Germany and Switzerland to study individual level dynamics. In Germany, he builds 
party blocks according to government coalitions, which implies that the configuration 
of party blocks varies over time. For Switzerland, Lachat distinguishes four blocks 
and Nicolet and Sciarini (2006) three party blocks. 
To construct party blocks for our analysis, we will start with the definition of party 
blocks as ideological closeness. For this, we have to measure ideological closeness 




Measuring ideological closeness for party blocks 
A common way to capture ideological positions is the left-right dimension (Fuchs and 
Klingemann 1990; McDonald, Mendes, and Kim 2007). Another approach refers to 
the political space determined by cleavages. While the vast literature on the evolution 
of cleavages agrees that the traditional cleavages (class and religion) have become 
less relevant since the 1950s or 1960s (Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984; Inglehart 
1990; Kriesi, Saris, and Wille 1993), there are various different views on how the 
political space is now structured. Many scholars describe new cleavages, which have 
been referred to as new politics (M. N. Franklin 1992; Müller-Rommel 1984), new 
value (Inglehart 1977; 1990), new classes (Kitschelt 1994; Evans 1999; Kriesi 1998; 
Lachat 2007; Oesch 2006) or globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006).  
There are several studies which provide empirical groundings for the dimensionality 
of the political space. There is no consensus on the number of dimensions of party 
competition. Van der Brug and van Spanje (2009) point out that the dimensionality 
depends on the data source. While political space of the demand side (voters) is 
clearly two-dimensional, party competition may take place on a single dimension. The 
different accounts vary not only in the number of dimensions, but also on what these 
represent. Among analysis finding two dimensions, the first is usually labelled as a 
socio-economic dimension (Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi et al. 2008) or as the traditional 
left-right axis. The second dimension is called the “authoritarian-libertarian 
dimension” (Kitschelt, 1994), cultural dimension (Kriesi et al., 2006 and 2008) or a 
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Data sources to measure ideological closeness 
There are different potential data sources for the construction of party blocks: expert 
surveys, the comparative manifesto project (CMP), newspaper articles or self-
placement of voters. Each has its strength and weaknesses regarding data validity and 
reliability, dimensions of political space, coverage for small parties, and coverage of 
time periods. We will address each data source in turn.  
Expert surveys ask several experts to classify the parties of a country on a left-right 
scale or by other dimensions. Expert surveys are available for a wide range of 
countries and different time periods (e.g. Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 
1992; J. Huber and Inglehart 1995; Benoit and Laver 2006, Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
(CHES)). Because they are relatively inexpensive, they not only cover the major 
parties but also the small parties of countries. The dimensions on which parties have 
to be classified are designed before the survey takes place. Expert surveys could 
therefore miss some relevant issue dimensions or may contain dimensions that are 
politically irrelevant. Party positions of expert surveys have shown to be valid and 
highly reliable, because uncertainty in estimations is taken into account by relying on 
several experts. Compared to other sources on party positions, they are highly stable 
over time. Depending on the research interest, this can be seen as an advantage or 
                                                 
9
 Van der Brug and van Spanje (2009) found that on the basis of expert surveys that 
the second dimension only represents the EU integration while all other issues are 
contained in the first dimension. 
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disadvantage. For our purpose of constructing party blocks, the long-term stability of 
expert surveys is a very good quality. The party blocks should, if possible, remain 
constant for the period of observation (from 1999 to 2009). For the countries and 
time-period of our analysis, the CHES (Hooghe et al. 2010; Steenbergen and Marks 
2007) offers left-right placements as well as positions on the economic left-right and 
the GALTAN dimensions for Germany and Great Britain in 1999, 2002 and 2006.  
The comparative manifesto project (CMP) dataset codes the proportion of an electoral 
manifesto that is devoted to favourable and unfavourable quasi-sentences on various 
issues. Because parties’ positions are derived from party programmes, the positions 
represent the priorities of parties rather than diverging positions on political issues 
(Budge and Farlie 1983, 281). Changes of positions within political space therefore 
reflect not only ideological changes but also changes in the political agenda (Van der 
Brug and Van Spanje 2009). For this reason, parties’ positions are for the most part 
more volatile in CMP data than in expert surveys. McDonald, Mendes and Kim 
(2007) estimate that about two third of this volatility is due to real movements, while 
the other third represents random noise. They recognise the strength of CMP records 
to discover dynamics of party positions and to discover meaningful differences across 
nations.  
For several reasons, the CMP is not well suited to construct party blocks for our 
purpose. First, we are neither interested in short-term movements of political parties 
nor in comparing party positions across countries. Secondly, ideological positions are 
more important than capturing the actual political agenda. Thirdly, CMP data requires 
additional assumptions to carry out factor analysis (Kriesi et al., 2006). On empirical 
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grounds, the CMP data does not result in a two-dimensional space. Cole (2005) 
limited his analysis to two factors despite having found more than two dimensions. 
For these reasons, we will not consider CMP data for the construction of party blocks. 
Another approach to studying political space is media coverage. Kriesi et al. (2006) 
code the positioning of parties of six countries (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, 
Netherlands, France, Britain) on the basis of newspaper articles during the electoral 
campaigns in the 1990ies and in early 2000s. Party positions reflect both issue-
specific positions as well as the salience attributed to the different issues. Positions of 
the major parties are measured on all policy categories that are discussed in the media. 
These positions reflect how parties are presented in the mass media. Political space 
and the parties’ positions within this space were constructed using Multidimensional 
Scaling (MDS). Because this method does not require previous assumption on 
political space, they are well suited for the construction of party blocks. In each 
country, the authors identified two dimensions and three party blocks. 
As for manifesto data, the ideological movements of parties are likely to be 
exaggerated in media coverage (Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). The data is thus 
a good basis on which to assess the dimensionality of the political space and the 
number of party blocks. For these reasons, and because the study by Kriesi et al. 
(2006) covers the countries considered here, it is well suited for our analyses. 
However, because the approach is less suited for exact party positions, as there is a 
large volatility of parties’ positions over time, and because only large parties are 
covered, we will also rely on other sources.  
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Self-placement of voters is a frequently used proxy for parties’ positions, although it 
reflects the demand side of politics. An advantage of self-placement is that voters 
choose parties according to how they perceive them and not according to how 
political experts perceive them. Of the panel data used here, only the SHP contains a 
regular question on the left-right placement. The SHP also includes questions on issue 
positions, which will we use to construct political space. We will conduct a principal 
component analysis of respondents' issue positions using the pooled data from the 
SHP from 1999 to 2009. According to Kaiser’s criterion, which is often used, we 
retain factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1. This leaves us with two factors, as in 
many other similar accounts. For more interpretable factors, we rotate the factor 
scores (Varimax rotation). The first factor represents economic issues (tax 
progression, government expenses) and ecological issues (environmental protection, 
nuclear energy). The second factor represents cultural issues (foreigners, European 
Union). The question on the Swiss army is not clearly attributed to any of the two 
dimensions. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy amounts to 
0.705 overall, which is considered as satisfactory. 
Building party blocks from ideological closeness 
Although there is a broad literature comparing these data sources and discussing 
political space, studies rarely connect these analyses to the construction of party 
blocks. An exception is Kriesi et al. (2006 and 2008), who found a tri-polar 
configuration of the main parties in all six countries. The three poles are generally 
represented by the three most important traditional political camps: the Social 
Democrats, the Liberals and the Conservatives, or Christian Democrats. In France, the 
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populist right constitutes a new third pole, and in Austria and Switzerland the 
conservative parties have become the equivalent of the Front National in France. For 
Switzerland, several empirical analyses on various data sources confirm the picture of 
three party blocks among the large parties: Hermann and Leuthold (2003) on the basis 
of referendum votes, Suter et al. (2009) on the basis of recommendations of parties for 
referenda and Kriesi (2001) on the basis of voting behaviour of the members of the 
National Council. 
These empirical grounded party blocks have however the problem that they only take 
account of large parties. The assignment of small parties to blocks is not always clear. 
To which party blocks should we for instance assign radical right parties such as the 
German Republikaner? Do they belong to a right-conservative party block or do they 
rather constitute an altogether different party block, which would increase the number 
of blocks? Other examples of difficult assignments are small parties which lie on the 
border of two party blocks.  
There are different options on how these difficulties may be addressed. The strategy 
most frequently used is to exclude small parties from the analysis (e.g. Nicolet and 
Sciarini 2006). The option we will apply here is to assign small parties according to 
their ideological distance to other parties and to strictly build party blocks according 
to the ideological distances between parties.  
Another difficulty on building party blocks is the dynamics of party positions. 
Because of the varying degrees of saliency of issues, changes between a governing 
role and an opposition role or for other strategic reasons, parties adapt ideological 
positions. Furthermore, the political space itself may change as a function of the 
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parties' positions. Finally, the measured volatility of party positions depends to a large 
extent on the data source used to assess party positions and may also be due to 
measurement error.  
For party blocks established through ideological closeness, dynamics in parties' 
positions may result in incoherent party blocks over time. Changes between the same 
two parties would therefore be sometimes considered as a within-block change and 
sometimes as a between-block change. Or in the extreme, an individual can change 
between party blocks while remaining faithful to the same party. For this reasons, we 
use static positions of parties for the analysis. Because we do not analyse party 
systems over several decades (but over about one decade) these decisions seems 
further justified.  
Based on these discussions, we will proceed as follows to construct party blocks in 
our analysis: First, we rely on a two-dimensional ideological space. For the demand-
side of politics, which we will study here, scholars almost always find two dimensions 
(Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). Furthermore, the two dimensional space is 
confirmed by media content analysis (Kriesi et al., 2006) which does not rely on 
strong assumptions and by the SHP, and thus within the data used itself. Secondly, we 
will use the following data sources. For Germany and Great Britain, we will rely on 
CHES data. The economic axis and the GALTAN axis, correspond to the economic 
and cultural dimension found by Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008). For Switzerland, we will 
use the respondents' positions according to SHP issue positions. This is, because 
CHES-data is not available for Switzerland and only the SHP allows the parties to be 
positioned within the data used to analyse individual-level dynamics. Thirdly, we will 
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use static party blocks. For the CHES data, the mean positions of the surveys 
conducted in 1999, 2002 and 2006 will be considered. For Switzerland, we will pool 
the data from 1999 to 2009.
10
 The concept of party blocks and the distinction of 
within- and between-block changes would become too vague if parties are allocated to 
different blocks over time. The parties’ ideological positions according to this 
procedure are presented in Figure 2.  
                                                 
10
 In 2010, issue opinions have not been collected. 
46 
 












































































Three measures of party blocks in Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland 
We will present three different measures of party blocks: three party blocks, two party 
blocks and flexible party blocks. This should help to achieve valid and reliable results 
so that we can be assured that conclusions are stable across different definitions. 
The first measure distinguishes three party blocks. The resulting groups of parties are 
presented in Table 3. In Switzerland, each block comprises at least one of the four 
biggest (and governmental) parties. In Germany, according to this classification, 
within-block changes mainly occur within the left party block. In Great Britain, each 
of the three largest parties is in a separate block. The assignment of the large parties to 
blocks is in line with groups found by Kriesi et al. (2008). 
The second measure of party blocks consists of two party blocks. In all three 
countries, most parties are either positioned in the second or forth quadrant in Figure 
2, and thus they either take a right position in both dimensions or a left position in 
both dimensions. For these parties, the attribution to either the left or the right block is 
straight-forward. The remaining parties are assigned to the left or right block 
according to a diagonal between the economic and cultural left and the economic and 
cultural right.  
In Great Britain, all parties are either left or right on both dimensions, so that the 
construction of two blocks is easy. For Germany, the FDP is integrated into the right 
party block (compared to 3 party blocks), because it lies on the right side of the 
diagonal separating left and right positions. In Switzerland, the LdU, CSP and GLP 




Table 3: Party blocks in Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland 
CH 3 blocks Left: SP, PdA, GP
Centre-right: FDP, LPS, CVP, LdU, CSP, EVP, GLP 
Cons.-right: SVP, EDU, FP, SD, LEGA, BDP.
2 blocks Left: SP, PdA, GP, LdU, CSP, GLP, EVP
Right: FDP, LPS, CVP, SVP, EDU, FP, SD, LEGA.
flexible Within block: FDP-CVP, FDP-LPS, FDP-CSP, CVP-LPS, 
CVP-CSP, SP-LDU, SP-EVP, SP-CSP, SP-PDA, SP-GP, SVP-SD, 
FDP-BDP, SP-GLP, LPS-EVP, SVP-EDU, SVP-FP, SVP-Lega, 
EVP-CSP, EVP-GP, EVP-EDU, EVP-GLP, EVP-BDP, CSP-GP, 
CVP-EVP, CSP-GLP, PDA-GP, GP-GLP, SD-EDU, 
FP-GLP, CVP-GLP, SVP-BDP, 
DE 3 blocks Left: PDS/Linke, Grüne, SPD.
Centrist-right: FDP. 
Right: CDU/CSU, Republikaner
2 blocks Left: PDS/Linke, Grüne, SPD. 
Right:, CDU/CSU, Republikaner, FDP
flexible Within block: Grüne-SPD, PDS/Linke-SPD, Rep-CDU
GB 3 blocks Left: Liberal party, Plaid, Green Parties, Scottish National Party
Centrist-right: Labour
Right: Conservative party, UK Independence Party, Brit.National Party
2 blocks Left: Labour, Green Parties, Scottish National Party, Liberal party, Plaid
Right: Conservative party, UK Independence Party
flexible Within: cons-other, scot-lab, lib-scot, lib-plaid, lib-green, 
plaid-green, lab-lib  
The previous two constructions of party blocks consisted in deciding on the number 
of party blocks and assigning each party to one of these blocks. A problem of this 
approach is that for some parties the attribution to a block is somewhat arbitrary. For 
instance in Switzerland, the EVP is placed very close to the diagonal and changes 
between the CSP and the CVP are considered as a between-block change despite their 
closeness.  
A possible solution to this problem is to apply a purely data driven or statistical 
assignment of parties to blocks. For this, we abandon the notion of fixed party blocks, 
and consider the actual ideological distance between two parties. This will be our 
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third measure for party blocks following a flexible approach. For this, placements of 
all parties have to be considered. On the basis of parties’ positions in Figure 2, we 
calculated the distances in political space between any pair of parties. In a second 
step, we then classed each possible change between two parties as either a within or a 
between-block changes. 
To decide whether a change between two parties (e.g. a change between the Christian 
Democratic People’s party (CVP) and the Liberal party (LPS) in Switzerland) is a 
within-block change or a between-block change, we have to define a threshold. 
Ideological distances above the threshold are considered as between-block changes 
and distances below that threshold are considered as within-block changes. Fixing the 
threshold is arbitrary, although objective criteria are sed. We set the threshold 
pragmatically in the sense that it should be in line with the categorisations of large 
parties in other constructions of party blocks. For Switzerland, we set the threshold so 
that changes between CVP and the Swiss Peoples’ Party (SVP) are considered as 
between-block changes (distance of 0.79, but the absolute value is not important). All 
changes between parties with an ideological distance less than 0.79 are considered as 
within-block changes.
11 
By choosing distance between the CVP and the SVP as a 
threshold, we obtain classifications of large parties consistent with other 
classifications of party blocks.  
If we had, for an example, chosen the threshold as the distance between the Liberal 
(Radical) Party (FDP) and SVP (0.93), this would imply that changes between CVP 
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 The percentage of within-block changes depends on the threshold point chosen. We experimented 




and SVP are coded as a within-block change, but FDP and SVP changes are 
considered as a between-block change. This would contradict almost all other 
constructions in party blocks. Because we do not have strong arguments for why this 
should be so – as we have no hard criteria for choosing the threshold – we set the 
threshold as mentioned as between CVP and SVP. Consequently, changes from FDP-
SVP are a between-block change and changes from CVP-FDP are a within-block 
change.  
For Germany, we set the limit so that changes between Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) and Christian Democratic Union (CDU) are classified as between-block 
changes (distance of 3.44). All changes between parties which are closer than 3.44 are 
classified as within block changes. This results in only very few within-block 
changes. Only changes between SPD and the Green Party and changes between CSU 
and Republikaner/DVU are considered as within-block changes. Changes between 
CDU and CSU are not coded as changes, but as stability, because the two parties do 
not compete within the same regions. So the only possibility to switch between CDU 
and CSU is a geographical move. 
The procedure for Great Britain is similar to the one used for Germany. We classify 
changes between the two major parties, the Conservative Party and Labour, as a 
between-block change (distance of 3.64). All larger distances are classed as between-
block changes and all smaller distances as within-block changes. The resulting 
classification turned out to be identical to the two-blocks defined before. The 
conservative party and other parties (mainly the independent party) are in the right 
block and all other parties constitute the left block. 
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Frequencies of the change variable (see section 3.1) for the three measures of party 
blocks are illustrated in Table 4. For the BHPS we show measures for voting intention 
(VI) and measures for party identification (PI). We see that stability levels vary 
between 82 and 94 %. Not surprisingly, stability levels are higher for measures of 
party identification than for measures of voting intention. As discussed (see section 
3.1), the reason is a selection effect: when asking about party identification we 
observe party identification only for a more stable subsample of the electorate. 
However, independently of the wording of the questions and definitions of party 
blocks, changes between blocks are not marginal. However, the extent of change 
depends on the definition of party blocks. The measures of flexible blocks (according 
to measured ideological distance) take an intermediary position between those of two 
and three party blocks. We will discuss stability and change in detail in Chapter 5. 
Table 4: Frequencies of variable „change between parties”  
  DE (PI) GB (PI) GB (VI) CH (VI) 
No change        93.3         93.7         88.2         81.7  
Change between party          6.7           6.4         11.9         18.3  
Change between 2 party blocks          2.7           3.1           5.8           5.8  
Change between 3 party blocks          3.7           5.9         10.8           9.8  
Change between flexible party blocks          3.6           3.1           5.8           5.8  
Total      100.0       100.0       100.0       100.0  
n 240'950 135'285 150'003  43,364  
Source: SOEP (1984-2010), BHPS (1991-2008), SHP (1999-2010) 
 Conclusion 3.4
This chapter presented key concepts and their measurement, which are crucial for the 
empirical analyses in the next chapters. First we discussed the comparability of the 
SOEP, BHPS and SHP. While the SOEP asks respondents about party identification, 
the SHP asks about voting intention and the BHPS a combination of these two 
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concepts. However, taking account of the endogeneity of party identification and the 
similar empirical properties of the different concepts, we consider these different 
variables as indicators for party preferences. Nevertheless, there are important 
empirical differences between party identification and voting, which have to be taken 
into account. Most importantly, fewer individuals have a party identification than a 
voting intention and those with a party identification are more stable than those 
without a party identification. But comparing stability levels of party identification 
and voting intention for the same individuals, reveals very similar stability levels. For 
our study, this implies that in Germany we observe party preference only for 
individuals with relatively strong partisan predispositions. Bearing the differences in 
the question wordings in mind, the three panel studies offer a unique possibility to 
study dynamic aspects of voting behaviour.  
Second, we discussed the measurement of change between parties. Many seemingly 
contradictory findings on the stability of party preference in literature can be 
attributed to explicit or implicit choices about the measurement of change. Most 
importantly, we think that movements between a party and no preference should be 
distinguished from movements between parties. Our main dependant variable for 
regression models (chapters 6 – 10) captures whether a change between parties has 
occurred or not (binary variable). Change refers not necessarily to the previous wave 
of observation, but to the last wave a party has been named. With this measurement 
we do not take account of the preferred party is preferred, but capture whether the 
same party is preferred as in the past. An important advantage of our measure 
compared to previous studies is that we can take account of small parties. 
Furthermore, we can use the same dependent variable for each country and facilitate 
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so the comparison between Switzerland, Germany and Great Britain. Nevertheless, a 
change between two ideologically close parties in a multi-party system (such as 
Switzerland) may be very different in nature than a change between the two main 
parties in a competitive system (such as Great Britain). To make changes between 
parties more comparative between different party systems, we distinguish changes 
within party blocks and between party blocks. We defined party blocks according to 
the ideological closeness of parties in a two-dimensional political space distinguishing 
an economic and cultural dimension. Empirically, we used data from the CHES in 
Germany and Great Britain and from the SHP in Switzerland to assign each party to a 
block. We developed a coding with two party blocks in each country, a coding with 
three party blocks in a country and a coding relying on the closeness of each pair of 
parties within the two-dimensional space. 
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4 Data and Methods 
 Household panel data  4.1
Comparison to other surveys 
With the collection of survey data, researchers have started to study individual level 
dynamics. Most widely available is data on recalled electoral behaviour, where 
citizens are not only asked about voting in the current election, but also about the 
previous election. Recalled voting behaviour allows the study of many countries and 
relative long time periods (e.g. Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000; Lachat 
2007). The problem of retrospective questions is that they overestimate consistency 
and underestimate change (Weir 1975; Himmelweit, Biberian, and Stockdale 1978; 
Van der Eijk and Niemoller 1983; Waldahl and Aardal 2000). Furthermore, they 
capture dynamics between only two points of observation. 
Because of the problems of recalled voting behaviour, panel data are better suited to 
studying dynamics and vote switching. Panel surveys collect information from the 
same individuals at different points in time. Panels are often carried out within 
national electoral studies. Typically, such electoral panels cover two consecutive 
elections and sometimes include intermediate observations. Additionally, there are 
many panel surveys covering (electoral) campaigns. 
Here, we use household panel studies which interview the same households and 
individuals on an annual basis. Three countries conduct household panel studies, 
which include questions on political behaviour: The German Socio Economic Panel 
(SOEP), the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), and the Swiss Household Panel 
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(SHP). The SOEP has been running since 1984 and added new samples in 1990 (from 
East Germany), 1998, 2000, and 2006.
12
 The BHPS started in 1991 and has included 
an additional sample for Scotland and Wales since 1999. Because of the distinct party 
system, we have not included the sample from Northern Ireland in our analysis. The 
BHPS ended in 2008 but the samples have been integrated into a new panel: 
Understanding Society.
13
 The SHP started in 1999. A refresher sample was added in 
2004. All these household panels are scientifically driven and based on random 
population samples. They provide detailed documentation on the data collection (e.g. 
sample selection, following rules, modes, and incentives) and data preparation (e.g. 
checks, weighting, and attrition). Although political scientists are beginning to use 




We will use panel waves up to 2010 (2008 for the BHPS) which were available at the 
time of analysis. An exception is chapter 9, where we also consider SHP data from 
2011, because this wave contains additional variables. We restricted the sample to 
citizens with the right to vote and therefore excluded observations of individuals 
below 18 years of age or without the country’s citizenship. 
We will now discuss the main characteristics of household panels relevant for their 
use in political science. First of all, household panel data present a rare opportunity to 
                                                 
12
 The high-income sample from 2002 (sample G) has been excluded for this analysis. 
13
 At the time of analysis, data from the old BHPS sample within Understanding Society has not yet 
been available. 
14
 For example, Bartels et al.  (2011) noted: “Ideally, panel data tracking even broader time spans 
would also be studied, though high quality panel data with several waves covering, e.g., a decade are 
sorely lacking in political science”. 
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study the same individuals over a relatively long time span. This is interesting for 
studying dynamics but also for the study of relatively rare events (e.g. divorce, having 
a child, and geographical moves) by pooling data.  
Secondly, household panels are designed for different disciplines of social science. 
They do not focus primarily on political behaviour, but cover a wide array of topics 
including work, health, leisure, psychological traits, income, well-being, housing and 
much more. They contain only a limited number of strictly political variables. The 
SOEP and BHPS include annual questions on party preference (see section 3.1), 
strength of party identification and interest in politics.
15
 The SHP includes additional 
variables on left-right placement, opinions on several political issues, forms of protest, 
overall satisfaction with democracy, confidence in the federal council and the feeling 
of political influence.
16
 Despite the relatively broad coverage of political variables, 
the SHP has been used only by a few scholars interested in dynamics (Fitzgerald 
2011; Fitzgerald and Curtis 2012; Kuhn 2009).  
While household panels include relatively little information on political behaviour, 
they do contain many variables which are not typically included in electoral surveys. 
This presents opportunities to address research questions that could not be empirically 
addressed otherwise, such as intra-household influences (see chapter 9 and section 
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 The SOEP contains annual questions on worries (e.g. the environment, peace, job security) and a few 
irregular questions (e.g. electoral participation, personal influence in 2005 and 2010, left-right position 
in 2005 and 2009). The BHPS asked about unionist vs. nationalist positions (2002, 2003, 2006, 2007, 
2008), and vote choice in previous election. In 1991, 1993 and 1995 the BHPS als collected a six-item 
battery of questions for a left-right ideological scale. The SHP asks all respondents about the left-right 
position of their parents. All panels contain variables on party membership. 
16
 From 2010 on, the political module has been revised. Voting intention, interest in politics and the 
left-right placement are still collected annually. In 2011 and then every 3 years, the survey contains a 




2.4), life events (Kohler 2002; Schmitt-Beck, Weick, and Christoph 2006), area of 
living (Ströbele 2012), or social class (Oesch 2006).  
The third characteristic of household panels worth mentioning is their data quality. 
Because of their long experience and the resources invested in data collection and 
preparation, household panels are of high quality although they are confronted by the 
same challenges and potential sources of errors as all surveys. The problem of 
attrition is peculiar to panels, referring to temporary or permanent drop-outs from the 
survey. Attrition is more obvious than other sources of errors and cannot simply be 
ignored; however, it can be more easily corrected than other errors. Nevertheless, 
attrition remains a problem, in particular for political characteristics, which is why we 
will address non-response and attrition in more detail below.  
A fourth particular characteristic of household panels is their complexity. The survey 
design with personal and household interviews, its longitudinal structure, as well as 
its fight against attrition, all require large efforts for data collection but also for data 
analysis in terms of data management and statistical methods, factors which we will 
address below. For these reasons, entry-costs for the analysis of household panel data 
are relatively high, which may explain the small number of political scientists 
working with this data.  
The last characteristic of panel data to mention is its comparability across countries. 
Each household panel is run independently but collaboration between countries is 
organised within the Cross National Equivalence File (CNEF) which currently 
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contains eight countries (Frick et al. 2007).
17
 But political variables are not (yet) a part 
of the CNEF. Therefore, it is up to the data user to assess the comparability of the data 
and establish harmonisation. Because the questions and scales on political variables 
vary considerably between the countries, we have to take account of this for data 
analysis and interpretation. So far, only Zuckerman and his colleagues (2007), and 
Fitzgerald and Curtis (2012) have used household panels comparatively in political 
science. 
Levels of non-response and attrition 
First, we will look at initial non-response (in cross-sectional surveys or in the first 
wave of a panel). This occurs if individuals cannot be contacted or do not cooperate. 
If non-response is due to health or language reasons, respondents are usually 
considered as neutral drop-outs.  
For household panels, computation and comparison of wave 1 response rates is 
difficult. First, nonresponse occurs both at the household and at the individual level. 
Secondly, survey and sample designs vary across countries and despite established 
standards, methods used to compute response rates vary.  
In Germany, the willingness to participate in surveys has declined over time. This is 
reflected in wave 1 response rates in the SOEP. From 1984 to 2006, the participation 
rate decreased from 61 % to 40 %. In the BHPS, wave 1 response rates amounted to 
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 Other household panels included in the CNEF are Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID, since 
1970), the Canadian Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID, since 1993), the Russia 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE, since 1995), the Korea Labor and Income Panel Study 




and 74 % for the original sample (1991) and 63 % for the Scottish and Welsh samples 
from 1999. For the SHP, computation of the response rate for the 1999 sample is only 
possible with assumptions because not all of the addresses sampled were exploited.
18
 
For the 2004 refreshment sample, the household response rate amounted to 63 %, 
which is good in comparison with other cross-sectional surveys in Switzerland.
19
  
We now turn to attrition. To assess attrition, the survey design plays a crucial role. 
Individuals may stop participating because they become ineligible through death, 
moving out of the country, moving to an institution (e.g. care home), or according to 
following rules.
20
 Alternatively, individuals are still eligible for interviews but cannot 
be contacted or refuse to participate. To compute attrition rates, only the drop-out of 
eligible individuals should be taken into account. Unfortunately, the reasons for drop 
outs are not always known. For example, if a person in a single household cannot be 
contacted, it is often not clear whether this person has moved to an institution, has 
died or simply could not be reached.  
We will first use a simple measure to illustrate attrition: we will look at the number of 
interviews without taking account of the eligibility status. Usually, the number of 
interviews in a sample decreases over time. However, new individuals may enter the 
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 First wave non-response lies somewhere between 49 % (treating all the remaining households as 
non-contact and thus assuming that none of them would have participated in the survey) and 64 % 
(assuming that the remaining households would have the same refusal rates as those already contacted). 
19
 For example the response rates in the Swiss Electoral Studies Selects amounts to 51 % in 1999, 47 % 
in 2003, 49 % in 2007 and 35 % in 2011 at the household level. 
20
 In some cases, only households where all individuals participated in the survey have been retained in 
later waves (SOEP sample from 1984, SOEP East-German sample from 1990, SHP sample from 1999). 
Also the following rules applicable to individuals differ between surveys or have changed over time 
(Frick et al. 2007). Some individuals may not be re-interviewed once they leave the household (because 
they are Non Original Sample Members). 
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sample by reaching the minimum age to be interviewed or by moving into a 
household in the sample. In addition to definite drop-outs and new sample members, 
individuals may participate irregularly. 
Figure 3 shows the number of interviews as a percentage of interviews in wave 1. 
Two samples of each survey are shown: the original sample and a more recent 
refreshment sample. Usually, participation rates drop relatively strongly at the 
beginning of a panel and stabilise after four to five waves In later waves, loss is 
typically smaller than 5 %. We also see that participation in more recent samples is 
lower.  
The evolution of the SHP differs from the SOEP and BHPS and needs further 
explanation. Attrition was strong in the first few years but after 2006, the number of 
interviews increased in absolute numbers. The interview mode is one of the reasons 
for this difference. The SHP is conducted by telephone, while the SOEP and the 
BHPS are Face-to-Face surveys (personal visits of interviewers). Telephone 
respondents may be less committed to further participation than those receiving 
personal visits by an interviewer (Lipps 2009). In telephone surveys, it is also more 
common that not all household members participate (partial unit non-response) and 
that individuals participate irregularly. However, refusals seem to be less prevalent 
than in Face to Face surveys. In the longer term, mode seems to play a smaller role. 
After, 2006 the number of interviews in the SHP increased as a result of various 
measures, mainly the introduction of financial incentives, contacting earlier drop-outs, 
improved communication with households and improved tracking of addresses. 
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Figure 3: Attrition in household panels: number of interviews by survey wave 
 
 Note: Number of interviews in first wave as 100%.  
Bias from non-response and attrition 
Response rates are widely used as a quality measure for surveys. Although many 
studies confirm that initial non-response leads to bias (e.g. Behr, Bellgardt, and 
Rendtel 2005; Groves and Peytcheva 2008), low response rate does not necessarily 
mean a high non-response bias and vice versa (e.g. Groves 2006). Not the level of 
non-response, but the size of bias is decisive for data quality. The size of the bias 
depends on the extent to which non-response occurs systematically, and on the extent 
to which it can be controlled by observed variables (Little and Rubin 2002). Literature 
has shown that non-response is strongly related to social involvement, integration and 
isolation (Stoop 2005; Watson and Wooden 2009; Groves and Couper 1998). 
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The assessment of bias differs for initial non-response and for attrition. For initial 
non-response, only a little information is available. Usually, some socio-demographic 
characteristics are known from the sampling frame. Other information sources for 
assessing non-response bias are contact data (e.g. number of contact attempts, 
description of house or environment), non-response surveys, or aggregate 
demographic statistics from the population to compare to the sample. Therefore, it is 
difficult to assess bias from initial non-response.  
Analysis of attrition is easier because individuals have participated in earlier waves 
and many characteristics of drop-outs are known. Various studies address attrition 
effects in household panels (Lipps 2007; Voorpostel 2010; Spiess and Kroh 2008; 
Burton, Laurie, and Lynn 2004; Lipps 2009). Interest in politics, participation in 
associations, voluntary work or unemployment are main explanatory variables for 
attrition. The underrepresentation of foreigners is not a problem for this analysis, 
because we are only interested in individuals with the right to vote and thus with the 
country’s nationality.  
To correct for unequal sampling probabilities and non-response, household panels 
provide weights which are usually built on the basis of socio-demographic factors. 
These weights are general and not targeted to specific topics. Consequently, bias in 
political variables is only partially corrected.
21
 Because we know that political 
variables are strongly affected by non-response and attrition, we have to look at 
potential bias more closely. We computed correlation coefficients between panel 
                                                 
21
 Documentation on the construction and use of weights can be found in the User Guides of the 
surveys (Haisken-DeNew and Frick 2005; Taylor 2010; Voorpostel et al. 2011). 
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participation and several variables of interest (cf. Table 5). Panel participation is 
measured in relative terms as the number of interviews with a respondent divided by 
the number of interviews for which the respondent would have been eligible. The 
correlations are systematically stronger in the BHPS than in the SOEP and SHP. This 
is, because eligibility status is well documented in the BHPS and therefore, relative 
panel participation has only a small measurement error. In the SHP and SOEP, it is 
more difficult to exclude individuals who are no longer eligible for the survey (most 
importantly due to death). Therefore, we cannot compare relative participation across 
the panels but we can compare correlations of variables within the same survey. 
Correlation coefficients in Table 5 confirm that survey participation is related to 
social participation and political participation. In all three panels, survey participation 
increases with age and interest in politics. Individuals who participate in household 
panels are also more likely to have a party preference. Of particular interest for us is 
the variable change, which measures party switches (see section 3.2). Those who stay 
in the panel tend to be more stable than those who drop out, but the association and 
potential bias is weak. Apart from this, we see from the SHP that participation in the 
survey is related to participation in referenda and left wing political positions. In the 
SOEP and the BHPS faithful respondents tend to have stronger party identification.  
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Table 5: Attrition bias: correlations with panel participation in the SOEP, BHPS, and 
SHP 








Age       0.20        0.20        0.26        0.33        0.09        0.08  
Interest in politics       0.06        0.05        0.09        0.09        0.12        0.12  
Has party preference       0.04        0.04        0.10        0.11        0.08        0.07  
Change of party preference      -0.01       -0.01       -0.02       -0.03       -0.01       -0.01  
Strength of party identification       0.04        0.03        0.08        0.10  
Left-Right position          -0.03       -0.03  
Vote participation           0.14        0.13  
 
Note: Pearson correlation coefficients. Cross-sectional weights provided by the panels are used.  
Source: SOEP 1984-2010, BHPS: 1991-2008, SHP: 1999-2010. 
We computed correlations with and without the weights provided by the surveys. 
Weights have only a marginal effect on correlations and hardly reduce bias. In the 
SHP and the SOEP, the corrections through weighting go in the right direction but in 
the BHPS weighting seems to increase bias for our application.  
Measures to account for non-response and attrition 
Non-response and attrition have several implications for our study. First, attrition does 
cause bias, particularly for political variables. The more we restrict the sample to 
faithful respondents, the more bias we could have. Thus, we have included as many 
individuals in the sample as possible and use an unbalanced panel for analysis. 
Secondly, the potential attrition bias varies between variables. Because we focus on 
volatility rather than political preferences itself, bias should be limited. However, for 
studies on political participation or on whether individuals have a party preference, 
the bias could be stronger. Thirdly, we know the direction of the bias. For volatility, 
we are likely to overestimate stability and underestimate volatility. Regarding the 
other variables considered, we are likely to underestimate changes in and out of party 
preference, and to underestimate the proportion of citizens without party preference. 
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When interpreting results we have to take potential bias into account, in particular 
when we look at descriptive statistics. Fourthly, weighting hardly corrects the bias of 
political variables. Nevertheless, we will use weighted results for descriptive analysis 
to correct for unequal sampling probabilities. For analytical models, weighting is less 
obvious and academics disagree on its necessity. Correlations between variables are 
assumed to be less biased than descriptive statistics. Variables related to non-response 
and attrition can be added as control variables to limit bias. Furthermore, not all 
statistical software and models allow for weighting. We checked the effects of 
weights for several models and found that it does not affect the conclusions. 
Therefore, multivariate models presented in this thesis are not weighted. Finally, we 
will use the variable on panel participation (number of observations of an individual / 
potential number of observations) as a control for attrition in regression models. 
 Data management 4.2
The complex survey design of household panels is reflected in the data structure. 
Apart from the longitudinal structure, information is collected at both the individual 
(for all household members) and at the household level. As a result, the data is made 
available in many different data files. For example, the first 12 waves of the SHP 
produced 29 data files, not including complementary files (e.g. containing cross-
national harmonised variables, interviewer data, and imputed income). In the SOEP 
and the BHPS, researchers are confronted with over 100 data files.
22
  
                                                 
22
 More recently, the SOEP offers data in the long format, but there are still 14 data files, plus the files 
with unique (biographical) information. 
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Compared to cross-sectional analysis, household panel data requires a lot of data 
management.
23
 Different levels and units have to be combined (household and 
individuals, individuals over time, partners, parents and children). Also, for the 




The comparability of data across waves is not trivial. For example, new parties may 
appear; some parties may change their name, or their political orientation, may merge 
with other parties or become irrelevant. It is therefore not always straight forward to 
track changes between parties. Data preparation for longitudinal analysis also 
involves many decisions on how to recode or harmonise variables.
25
  
A fundamental distinction for panel data analysis is whether the units of analysis are 
individuals or single observations clustered in individuals. In the former case, data is 
typically organised in wide format (see Figure 4), where one row corresponds to one 
individual and all variables from different waves are combined in the same row. In the 
latter case, data is organised in long format (also called stacked data, pooled data or a 
person-period file). There are many more observations, but fewer variables. Two 
variables are needed to uniquely identify an observation: a person identifier and a year 
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 To provide guidance, strategies and syntax examples using Stata, the Swiss Household Panel 
provides a document entitled “Swiss Household Panel – Data management with Stata”, which can also 
be applied relatively easily to other panels. It can be found under  -> Teaching/Support-> SHP Data 
Management ->Stata. 
24
 An example here is social class based on job characteristics. If respondents are not working, we have 
to take information from previous waves. If respondents have not been working in the first panel wave, 
information on last job is collected and can be used to construct social class. 
25
 In the SOEP the categories on parties changed over time. For our analysis, we used the harmonised 
data of the long file. 
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identifier (person identifier pid and year in the example). The wide and long formats 
are two ways of organising the same information. 
Figure 4: Wide and long data format 
pid party2004 party2005 party2006 party2007  pid year party 
41 A A A B  41 2004 A 
42 B A . .  41 2005 A 
56 C . B B  41 2006 A 
      41 2007 A 
      42 2004 B 
      42 2005 A 
      56 2004 C 
      56 2006 B 
      56 2007 B 
         
Wide format    Long format 
 
 Statistical methods  4.3
We will briefly present the different methods for panel data analysis. We do not 
intend to give a general introduction to panel data analysis: there are many good 
textbook and journal articles which do this (e.g. Wooldridge 2010; Cameron and 
Trivedi 2009; Baltagi 2008; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). Rather, we will 
discuss the use of these methods in research into the volatility of party preferences 
and their suitability for our research questions and data.  
Non-linear regression models 
Because party preferences and change of party preferences are clearly categorical 
variables, we should use non-linear models for estimation. But non-linear regression 
is far more complex than linear regression. First of all, there is no closed form 
solution for regression coefficients. Models have to be obtained with iterative 
algorithms, using Maximum Likelihood, Restricted Maximum Likelihood estimation 
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or Bayesian algorithms. Often, specialised software is needed and convergence may 
take a very long time. The second disadvantage of non-linear models lies in the 
interpretation of regression coefficients. Coefficients show the direction of an effect 
but not the effect size.
26
 We can compare coefficients within a model only if 
explanatory variables are equally scaled (e.g. dummy variables) but we cannot 
compare coefficients across models (Mood 2010; Best and Wolf 2012). Also 
interaction effects (even their direction) can be misleading when looking at 
coefficients (Ai and Norton 2003). For these reasons, we illustrate the effects of non-
linear models with predicted probabilities.
27
  
Cross sectional analysis versus panel data methods 
For regression analysis with panel data, data is usually organised in long format. The 
unit of analysis are observations clustered in individuals. The clustering has two main 
implications for data analysis. First, we lose statistical power, because observations of 
the same individual are not independent. The effective sample size to consider is 
therefore smaller than the number of observations. Consequently, the standard errors 
of regression coefficients increase. If clustered data is analysed with cross-sectional 
methods (e.g. OLS, logistic regression), standard errors have to be corrected for 
clustering.  
But by using standard regression approaches, we do not take advantage of the second 
peculiarity of clustered data. With panel data, we have two different types of variance: 
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 Sometimes, odds-ratios are reported and interpreted instead of coefficients. But odds-rations are 
mostly interpreted incorrectly (see (Best and Wolf 2012) against the use of odds-ratios). 
27
 For practical reasons, we do not show confidence intervals for predicted probabilities. In most 
models, we have to compute predicted variables manually, because algorithms provided in Stata 
(margins, clarify, spost) do not work.  
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variance between individuals and variance within individuals over time. To analyse 
variance between individuals, we compare groups. To analyse variance within 
individuals, we look at changes of individuals over time. The two types of variance 
thus address different research questions. Apart from the substantive difference, 
variance within individuals has a methodological advantage: it allows for control of 
unobserved heterogeneity among individuals. 
Unobserved heterogeneity is usually related to unobserved variables. It is rare that all 
relevant variables for a model are observed. If a regressor is related to an omitted 
variable in a regression model, the regressor and the residual are correlated and 
coefficients are likely to be biased. A classic example is the effect of education on 
wages (Wooldridge 2010). Regression coefficients for education may not only reflect 
the causal impact of education, but also ability, motivation, or social background. 
Because these other (stable) impacts are rarely observed and controlled for in 
empirical models, we say that there is unobserved individual heterogeneity.  
Using variance within individuals, we can (almost) exclude the possibility that stable 
characteristics explain variance in the dependent variable. If, for example, we observe 
the same person before and after marriage, we can better explain the effects of 
marriage than when comparing married and unmarried individuals. Or, if we observe 
a person before and after education, we are better able to explain the causal effect of 
education than when comparing individuals with a particular education and without 
that education. The advantage of within variance is that we can control the stable 
characteristics, even if they are not measured. When applying conventional cross-
sectional methods to panel data, we do not distinguish within and between variance.  
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Within variance models: fixed effects regression 
Fixed effects regressions exploit only the variance within individuals. The main 
advantage is that stable individual characteristics are controlled, even if they are 
unobserved. Fixed effects regression estimates how changes in the independent 
variables affect the dependent variable. Fixed effects are thus better indicators for 
causality than OLS. Statistically, fixed effect regression can be derived in different 
ways. One possibility is to include a dummy variable for each individual. This is 
illustrated in the following model for a bivariate regression,  
yit  = ai + bxit + eit (1) 
where yit represents person i’s dependent variable in year t, x represents an 
explanatory variable and e the residual. In contrast to standard OLS regression, the 
intercept a is indexed by i, designating a different intercept for each individual (which 
is constant over time).  
A second possible way to derive the fixed effect regression (equivalent to equation 1) 
is the within-transformation. For each individual, the mean of the dependent and 
independent variables is calculated and subtracted from each observation. The effect 
of the intercept (ai) is eliminated, because it is constant across waves: 
  yit − y̅i = (ai − a̅i) + b(xit − x̅i) + (eit − e̅I)                                                       = b(xit − x̅i) + (eit − e̅i)  (2) 
For non-linear regression, the within-regression is not identified. However, for 
logistic models (and poisson models), conditional logistic estimators can be used to 
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estimate within-variance (Wooldridge 2010). Kohler (2005) has used conditional 
fixed effects regression to estimate the stability of party identification in the SOEP. 
With an increasing concern for causality, fixed effect models have become popular in 
social science. But whether they are well suited depends on the research question and 
data. Fixed effects models can only assess effects of time-variant variables. Effects of 
gender, socialisation or cohorts cannot be estimated, because there is no variance of 
individuals over time and their effect cannot be separated from the intercept. Nor are 
fixed effects models suitable if we want to understand differences between groups, 
e.g. those who change between parties and those who do not.  
Fixed effects models do not use variation between individuals at all. If there is only 
little variation of individuals over time, estimates are unstable. This applies to short 
panels and relatively stable dependent variables. For logistic regression, within 
models imply that only individuals who vary in the dependent variable are included in 
the analysis.  
For our main dependent variable “change” (0 for no change, 1 for change) fixed 
effects regression is not suited, because the variable already refers to within-variance. 
Apart from this, all stable individuals would be excluded from the sample. However, 
we will use fixed effects regression in chapter 10, where we look at whether change in 
financial situation affects party preferences.  
Random effect models 
Random effect models are also known as multilevel models (with random intercept) 
or hierarchical models. Random effect models distinguish variance within individuals 
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and variance between individuals. The residual is decomposed into a separate 
intercept for each individual (ui, constant over time for each individual) and a person- 
and time specific residual (eit).  
yit = a + bxit + ui + eit  (3) 
The random effect ui estimates unobserved heterogeneity. But in contrast to fixed 
effects, random effects do not estimate individual-specific effects but their 
distribution. In fixed effects regression, unobserved heterogeneity is eliminated from 
the model. In random effect models, it remains part of the residual and the potential 
problem of endogeneity persists. Only if we assume that the regressors are 
independent from unobserved heterogeneity (Cov(x,u)=0), can coefficients be 
interpreted as causal effects. In reality, this assumption is rarely met. But if it holds, 
random effect models are more efficient than fixed effect models, because fewer 




Comparing random and fixed effects models, the main problem of random effect 
regression is potential bias from unobserved heterogeneity. The advantages of random 
effects regression are that variance between individuals is also taken into account and 
stable characteristics can be modelled. But the choice between models (random or 
fixed effects) should not mainly involve statistical criteria. Rather, fixed and random 
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 In this respect the Hausman test is often used. This test compares estimates from fixed effects and 
random effect models, assuming that the fixed effect model is correct. If estimates of the two models 
do not significantly differ, the random effect model is preferred.  
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effect models address different research questions (differences between groups, within 
variation).  
We will use random effects regression in most statistical models in the empirical 
section. First, by looking at change as the dependent variable, we have already 
focused on within variance. We actually estimated an event history model which we 
will discuss next. Endogeneity should therefore not be a main concern. Secondly, we 
are not only interested in individual changes over time, but also in comparing 
individuals who change with those who do not. Thirdly, we can use the whole 
imbalanced sample of individuals with at least two observation points and do not have 
to restrict the sample to those who those who switched parties (which would be 
necessary in a fixed effects model). Finally, the model takes account of clustering in 
the data (there are several observations per individual). 
Event history models 
In event history models, the dependent variable is the hazard rate (risk) of an event 
occurring. The event studied is change in party preferences. Schmitt-Beck, Weick and 
Christoph (2006) have applied event history models to studying the stability of party 
identification, distinguishing stability, direct switches between parties and abandoning 
party identification. 
The hazard rate (ht) is conditional on the duration of a spell (dur in equation 4) and 
other variables. Technically, (discrete time) event history models are estimated using 
logistic (or probit) regression in long data format.
29
 By using random effects, we take 
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 An less-common alternative is the complementary log-log function. 
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account of the clustering of the data and unobserved heterogeneity (ui in equation 4).
30
 
To distinguish changes within party blocks and changes between party blocks, we 
estimate a competing risk model, which has to be estimated with multinomial logistic 
regression or multinomial random effects models. 
log ( ht1−ht) = a + b1dur + b2xit + ui + eit  (4) 
With event history analysis, we should only include individuals in the sample who 
have a positive risk for the event happening (risk set). In our application, individuals 
without a party preference or unknown party preference cannot switch parties. We 
therefore exclude observations until a party preference has been named (see 
construction of the variable change in section 3.2, Table 2).  
Dynamic models 
Dynamic models include lagged dependent variables (yi,t-1) on the right-hand side of a 
regression model: 
yit = a + b1yi,t-1 + b2xi,t + eit   (5) 
There are two main purposes for using dynamic models. First, dynamic models are 
used to estimate true state dependence (coefficient b1 in equation 5); they have 
frequently been used to assess stability of party identification (Converse, 1964; 
Fiorina, 1981; Franklin and Jackson, 1983; Alwin and Krosnick, 1991; Kohler, 2002; 
Green and Yoon, 2002; Wawro, 2002; Kroh and Selb, 2009; Bartels et al., 2011). The 
                                                 
30




second aim of dynamic models is to use the lagged dependent variable as a control or 
proxy for otherwise unobserved variables (Wooldridge 2010). In time-series analysis 
(small n, large t) and time-series-cross-section data, controlling for previous outcomes 
is standard. But in panels (large n, small t), dynamic models are biased.
31
 The problem 
is that the lagged variable (yi,t-1) and the residual (eit) are correlated and all 
coefficients potentially biased. To illustrate the problem, we have re-written the 
model from equation 5 for t-1 
yit-1 = a + b1yi,t-2 + b2xi,t-1 + ei,t-1  (6) 
and substituted (6) into (5): 
yit = a + b1(a + b1yi,t-2 + b2xi,t-1 + ei,t-1 ) + b2xi,t + eit  (7) 
Because eit-1 is part of the independent variable in equation 7, the correlation between 
yi,t-1 and the residual becomes obvious. The shorter a panel is, the larger the bias from 
this built-in endogeneity (Nickell 1981). 
Another difficulty of dynamic models is the distinction between true state dependence 
and individual heterogeneity (Bartels et al. 2011). For party choice, true state 
dependence means that previous party preference has a causal effect on current party 
preference, rather than being influenced by the same (exogenous) factors. To 
distinguish individual heterogeneity and true state dependence, dynamic models 
typically include fixed effects or random effects for individuals: 
yit = a + b1yi,t-1 + b2xi,t + ui + eit  (8) 
                                                 
31
 But the use of a lagged dependent variable (Beck-Katz standard) is also debatable for time-series-
cross-national data (Keele and Kelly 2006). 
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Despite the control for unobserved heterogeneity, the problem of the initial condition 
remains. The lagged variable refers ultimately to the initial condition, which cannot be 
separated from the individual effect (unobserved heterogeneity) if the process has 
already been in observation at the first observation (Heckman 1981; Hsiao 2003, 208). 
Dynamic models thus have to assume that the first observation is exogenous. 
To obtain consistent estimators despite the endogeneity problem, several estimators 
have been developed (see, for example Baltagi (2008) or Wooldridge (2010)) and 
have been used to estimate the stability of party identification (Green and Yoon 2002; 
Wawro 2002). But these estimators assume continuous dependent variables, which is 
a problem for party preferences. The use of dynamic models is less well-established 
for categorical variables.  
So far, two main strategies have been applied to estimating dynamic non-linear 
models. The first is the Heckman approach (Heckman 1981) which assumes that the 
dynamic process is in equilibrium (see Contoyannis et al., 2004: p. 490). For party 
preferences, assuming that dynamics are time-invariant is clearly not appropriate. The 
second approach has been suggested by Wooldridge (2005) and applied by Kroh and 
Selb (2009) and Bartels et al. (2011) on stability of party preference. The distribution 
of the unobserved effect is modelled conditional on the initial value and any 
exogenous explanatory variables. A practical advantage of this approach is that it can 
be estimated using standard software. Although dynamic models are widely used and 
present a straight-forward way to study dynamics of party preference, we do not 
consider them as appropriate for our research question. Most importantly, we are not 
primarily interested in the true state dependence of party identification and do not 
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intend to add to the extensive literature opposing the traditional and revisionist models 
of party identification. As argued before, we think that we have to address volatility 
more fundamentally without assuming that one of the models is correct for everyone. 
Secondly, dynamic panel models are very sensitive to misspecification (Wooldridge 
2010; Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice 2004, 491; Wawro 2002), as they require strong 
assumption which are likely to be violated in the case of party preferences. For 
example, the models assume that there is no second order correlation of party 
preference, which is misleading if individuals are ambiguous between two or more 
parties. Using the Wooldridge approach, we would have to assume that the first party 
preference recorded captures the initial condition. Considering that the timing of the 
first panel wave is defined only by the survey design and not related to party 
preference, the interpretation of the first observation as an initial condition seems 
problematic. Thirdly, the dependent variable in dynamic models are parties, which 
require therefore many categories. The more categories there are, the more complex 
model estimation and interpretation becomes.
32
 Here, we are interested in dynamics 
more generally and do not intend to focus on particular parties. Grouping parties 
together (as would be necessary, particularly in Switzerland), means that the 
dynamics between these parties is ignored (see section 3.2).  
Grouping individual trajectories and sequence analysis 
The regression models for panel data discussed above (fixed effects, random effects, 
dynamic models, and event history models) use observations and not individuals as 
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 Convergence problems are non-negligible. So far, standard statistical software (e.g. SPSS, Stata) do 
not allow random effects models for more than two categories. Kroh and Selb (2009) considered five 
response categories in their dynamic model of Germany using gllamm software (Rabe-Hesketh, 
Skrondal, and Pickles 2004).  
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units of analysis (long format). They capture dynamics only to a limited extent. Fixed 
and random effects models do not model dynamics at all, but use the longitudinal 
structure to better estimate causal effects. Event history analysis detects duration 
dependence; dynamic models assess state dependence and individual heterogeneity. 
These approaches are well suited to studying the effects of explanatory variables on 
volatility. However, to study dynamic processes in more detail and to capture more 
complex patterns, it is better to focus on individuals as the units of analysis (wide 
format) and to look at trajectories over many panel waves. Because there are millions 
of different possible trajectories, they have to be grouped. For example, assuming five 
parties and ten waves, we would have 50 billion different possible sequences. 
Another possibility is to define the groups theoretically and to use statistical 
algorithms to attribute individuals to groups. There are several examples for this. 
(Clarke and McCutcheon 2009) distinguished stable party identifiers and changers. 
They used a Markov Mover-Stayer model and found that about half of the citizens 
belonged to the group of movers. (Neundorf, Stegmueller, and Scotto 2011) extended 
their analysis using the SOEP and distinguished support for CDU/CSU, support for 
SPD and changers. Similarly, and also using the SOEP, Arzheimer and Schoen (2005) 
distinguish CDU/CSU, SPD, PDS and other parties using latent transition analysis. 
(Hill and Kriesi 2001) looked at the trajectories of opinions on environmental 
policies. They distinguished stable individuals, vacillating changers and durable 
changers, and attributed individuals to one of these three groups using Finite Mixture 
Models with a Bayesian approach. 
To assess trajectories descriptively and in their complexity for our purpose (chapter 
5), we grouped individuals according to their trajectories. We defined groups 
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theoretically, according to different models on dynamics of party preferences. For two 
reasons, we did not use a statistical approach to attribute individuals to groups but 
assigned each individual according to specified coding criteria: first, statistical models 
require strong assumptions on dynamics and it is not practical to test the many 
different possibilities in a model. They are well suited to comparing a few alternatives 
but are blind for other patterns. Secondly, manual coding is much simpler and more 
transparent.  
All approaches based on grouping individuals have two main methodological 
disadvantages. First, the sample of individuals has to be restricted to long term 
respondents, because individuals are grouped according to their trajectories over 
many waves. This not only reduces sample size but also increases attrition bias (see 
section 4.2). The second methodological disadvantage of grouping individuals is that 
the groups should not be used as a dependent variable for further analysis, because the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption is violated.  
In multinomial logistic regression, the probability for each outcome is estimated 
relative to the base category independently of other outcomes. The IIA assumption 
requires that if a new alternative becomes available, odds between the other outcomes 
should not be affected. Multinomial models are not suited if the alternatives are 
similar, depend on each other, or if they are substitutes (Long 1997). The IIA 
assumption is violated if groups have been created in order to reduce complexity in 
the data, as we do for trajectories of party preference. The criteria, by (McFadden 
1973), that the outcome categories “can plausibly be assumed to be distinct and 





 To compare the groups, we will use descriptive approaches (mean 
for each group, cross tabulation). 
 Conclusions 4.4
In this section, we will summarise the advantages and difficulties of household panel 
data for political science in general and our research question in particular. We will 
also discuss the implications and strategies for analysis. 
First, household panels contain only a limited number of political variables. Many 
variables we would wish to have used are simply not available. However, these rich 
surveys allow the investigation of aspects not covered in electoral surveys. We 
focussed the analysis on topics where panel data is complementary to previous 
research and can add to existing literature.  
Secondly, household panels put a lot of effort into data collection, data preparation 
and data documentation and are of high quality. However, attrition is a particular 
problem for panel data. In general, political variables are strongly affected by non-
response and attrition. To limit bias, we used an unbalanced sample, which allows the 
inclusion of drop-outs and irregular participants in the analysis. However, for 
volatility between parties, attrition bias is very weak. If there is bias, we are likely to 
underestimate volatility. The weights provided by the survey did not correct for the 
bias in our specific case. We will therefore use the weights only for descriptive 
analysis in chapter 5, where different sampling probabilities are important. To control 
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 Different formal test have been proposed for the IIA assumption.  But  (Cheng and Long 2007) 




for panel participation, we will include the variable relative panel participation into 
the models as a control  
Thirdly, we discussed different methods for panel data and addressed advantages and 
disadvantages for our purpose. Depending on the topic, we will use different 
strategies. In chapter 5, we will look at the trajectories of individuals, grouping 
individuals into different types. This allows us to contrast different models on 
dynamics without having to impose strong assumptions. When we focus on 
explanatory factors of volatility, most previous studies used dynamic models. We do 
not follow this approach because we think that the (implicit) assumptions about the 
initial conditions are not fulfilled in the case of party preference. Furthermore, using 
parties as dependent variables would require ignoring or grouping small parties and 
therefore being blind for a potentially important type of change between parties. 
Instead of dynamic regression models, we will mainly use event history models.  
The dependent variable is binary and distinguishes change and no change. We will 
estimate these using the xtlogit command in Stata. Sometimes, we will additionally 
distinguish change within and between party blocks, which then presents a competing 
risk model. We will use the baysian mcmc-estimator of the mlwin-software (Rabash 
et al. 2009; Browne 2009).
34
 In chapter 10, when assessing the impact of changes in 
economic conditions, we will also apply fixed effects models. 
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 As a robustness check, we estimated some models using the adaptive quadrature estimator of the 
gllamm-software (Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2005). Although coefficient estimates are not identical, they are 
similar and give the same conclusions regarding significance levels and relative effect sizes. For 
practical reasons (time for convergence), we present results from the mlwin algorithm. 
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5 Descriptive Analysis: Capturing dynamics over many 
waves  
In this chapter, we test different models concerning the dynamics of party preferences. 
Although scholars increasingly address individual heterogeneity, previous research 
has neglected alternatives to the traditional and revisionist view of party 
identification, such as ambiguous preferences or stability within party blocks (see 
chapter 2). We will contrast the different models and then use descriptive approaches 
to study party preferences over eleven panel waves.  
 Contrasting theories on the dynamics of party preferences 5.1
In Chapter 2, we addressed the debate over the traditional and revisionist model of 
party identification. Regarding volatility, the traditional model expects that 
individuals have stable party identification. Observed changes should only be 
temporary. In the revisionist model, party identification is updated constantly and 
durable changes of party preference are not exceptional. We also briefly discussed the 
model of bounded party identification, which suggests that change occurs mainly in 
and out of party identification, but rarely between parties (see also section 3.2).  
An alternative to these models is Zaller’s model, which assumes that individuals are 
ambiguous in their opinions and have conflicting views on political issues and 
preferences. From this perspective, a survey response reflects opinion “off the top of 
the head”, in the moment the question is asked, and thus depends on randomness and 
circumstances. Zaller (1992) applies this model to several opinion issues, as well as to 
candidate support in elections. We can extend Zaller’s model relatively easily to party 
preferences. From this perspective, citizens may have considerations in favour of 
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different parties in parallel, instead of having a single preference. Party preferences 
are thus allowed to be ambiguous. Even though the preferences of ambiguous 
individuals do not change over time, responses in a panel survey may change. 
Ambiguity results in several switches between preferred parties.  
Although not directly linked to Zaller's theory, several scholars have addressed the 
idea of multiple party identifications. Weisberg (1980, 36) criticises the fact that the 
standard question wording on party identification does not allow for multiple 
identification. Van der Eijk and Niemoller (1983) tested multiple party identifications 
in the Netherlands. After asking about party identification, they explicitly asked 
respondents whether they feel attracted to any other party. About one third of 
respondents (and about half of those identifying with one party) named a second 
identification.  
This evidence has been criticised, because ambiguity may not arise naturally but may 
be provoked by the question. Schmitt (2002) tested for simultaneous preferences by 
allowing multiple preferences in a survey without explicitly asking about it. The study 
on fourteen European countries still found that about 10 % of respondents identified 
with more than one party. Other approaches measure the probability of voting for 
each of the main parties (party potential) or ask about positive and negative 
identification for all major parties. With the later approach, Garry (2007) found, for 
Northern Ireland, that 16 % of Protestants and 18 % of Catholics identified with the 
two parties on their side of the religious divide. 
A general critique of these measures of multiple party preferences is that they do not 
say anything about why one party has finally been chosen above another. If voters 
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always choose the same party in elections despite ambiguous preferences, then 
multiple preferences may simply be irrelevant for elections. Panel data offers a way to 
measure multiple party preferences not affected by this. By asking each year about 
party preference, we can exclude the possibility that multiple preferences are 
provoked by the question wording or that they are not relevant to the final party 
choice. Panel data therefore creates a new opportunity to assess simultaneous 
preferences in a more natural setting.  
Bartolini and Mair (1990) offer another hypothesis for dynamics which suggests that 
voters have stable preferences for a party block rather than for a single party (cf. 
section 3.3). While changes within a party block might occur frequently, changes 
between blocks should be rare. Using aggregate data from 1885 to 1985, Bartolini and 
Mair (1990) found high stability between party blocks. Similarly, van der Eijk and 
Niemoller (1983) suggest – particularly for Europe – that voters have ideological 
identification rather than party identification. They observed that multiple party 
identifications usually arise for parties which are ideologically close. The focus on 
party blocks improves the comparison of stability across countries, because it (partly) 
controls for the different party systems. 
Another model on dynamics is that party preferences are random, in line with 
Converse’s black and white model, stating that one group of voters has stable 
preferences and another group random preferences. In “the nature of belief systems”, 
Converse (1964) found that the majority of citizens do not have an ideological 
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framework or coherent opinions. He claims that most observed change is due to 
randomness or incoherent answers rather than meaningful change.
35
  
We looked at six different models for party preferences: the traditional model 
expecting temporary changes in preferences, the revisionist model allowing for 
durable change, bounded partisanship expecting change mainly in and out of party 
preference, stability between party blocks, ambiguity and random answers. These 
models are not mutually exclusive. We cannot expect that all individuals are stable or 
that all individuals are ambiguous. Rather, the different models may apply to different 
groups of voters. 
 Descriptive Results: Trajectories in party preferences  5.2
The different models for party preferences discussed cannot be tested in a single 
model. We applied several descriptive analyses on different subsamples of the panel 
to look at many different aspects of the trajectories.  
For the comparability of results across surveys, it is important to use the same number 
of waves and possibly the same time period. Because the SHP started in 1999 and the 
BHPS ended in 2008, we use a subsample of eleven waves from 1999 to 2009 for 
Switzerland and Germany, and from 1998 to 2008 for Great Britain for this chapter 
(Figure 5 is an exception).  
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 For some issues, Converse (1964: p. 243) suspects a third group, which shows meaningful change or 
conversion. But for mathematical reasons, he did not consider this third “gray” group in the empirical 
analysis. Hill and Kriesi (2001) did consider such a third group explicitly in their statistical model. 
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Transitions between two waves 
Maybe the most frequent approach to present the dynamics of party preferences are 
cross-tabulations of preferences at two time points (t-1, t). Typically, such turnover 
tables find relatively high stability rates. Pooling data over the waves from 1999 to 
2009 (or 1998 to 2008 for Great Britain) and looking at transitions from t-1 to t, this is 
also what we find for household panel data. In the SOEP, stability amounts to 77 % 
for the CDU/CSU and 71 % for the SPD. In the BHPS, stability is highest for the 
Conservatives with 77 %. In the SHP, the socialist party has the highest stability rate 
with 65 %.  
For better comparability between countries and surveys and because we are not 
interested in single parties, we have classed transitions into four categories. In Table 
6, we distinguish stability of party preferences (1), changes between parties (2), 
changes between having and not having a party preference (3), and no party 
preference in both waves (4). As discussed in section 3.1, the question wording for 
party preference differs between the surveys. The German data refer to party 
identification (PI), and the Swiss data to voting intention (VI). Great Britain shows 
results for both party identification (PI) and voting intention (VI) and we display these 
separately, to better assess the effect of the different wording of the questions. 
Stability rates between Switzerland and Germany cannot be directly compared. But 
we can compare Switzerland and Great Britain regarding voting intention and 
Germany and Great Britain regarding party identification.  
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Table 6: Transitions in party preferences between two waves in DE, GB and CH 
  DE (PI) GB (PI) GB (VI) CH (VI) 
Stability (same party)         33.7         54.0         62.9         42.6  
Change between parties           3.1           4.6         10.2         13.5  
Party - no party         20.0         25.0         19.0         23.6  
No party - no party         43.2         16.4           7.9         20.2  
Total        100.0        100.0        100.0        100.0  
n 173'066 57'637 57'637 50'519 
Note: PI: party identification, VI: voting intention. Source: SOEP (1999-2009), BHPS(1998-2008), 
SHP(1999-2009). 
From Table 6, we can see that stability between two parties is highest in Great Britain, 
regardless of the indicator of party preferences. But as mentioned before, the stability 
rates vary considerably between parties. We also can see that changes between a party 
and no preference are frequent and much more common than change between parties. 
No party preference in both waves is particularly frequent in Germany. In 
Switzerland, “no preference” also includes respondents who say they vote for 
candidates and not for parties. This is, because voters can select a mixture of 
candidates from many different parties on their ballot. 
Changes between two parties are most frequent in Switzerland, followed by Great 
Britain and finally Germany. It is rather surprising that changes are more frequent in 
Great Britain than in Germany, despite the more concentrated party system in Great 
Britain. The reason is the relatively high share of respondents without party 
identification in the SOEP, which is also higher than in comparable data sources in 
Germany (Neundorf et al., 2011, Arzheimer, 2006). More than half of the respondents 
do not have a party identification. Once we exclude respondents without party 
preference in both waves (no party – no party), the rate of party changers in Germany 
and Great Britain are about the same. Another reason for more frequent changes in 
Great Britain compared to Germany may be the government or opposition status of 
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the parties in the period of observation. In Great Britain, one of the two major parties 
was in the government role and the other the opposition role, whereas in Germany, the 
two major parties formed a coalition from 2005 to 2009.  
Most changes occur between ideologically close parties, such as the socialist and 
green parties in Switzerland and Germany, or between the two liberal parties in 
Switzerland (LPS and FDP, which merged in 2009). But in Great Britain, most 
changes occur between the large parties, even if they are not ideologically close. 
Among respondents who switched parties, 31.2 % switched between Labour and the 
Liberal Party, 21.7 % switched between Labour and the Conservatives, and 18.2 % 
between the Liberal Party and the Conservatives.  
Using transitions between two annual waves we find high stability rates. Most change 
occurs in and out of party preference and not between parties. Several scholars have 
therefore concluded that partisanship is bounded (e.g. Zuckerman and Kroh, 2006, 
Neundorf et al., 2011). But Fitzgerald and Curtis (2012) show that the stability rates 
in two-wave transitions drop with increasing time distance between the two waves. 
Party switches also become more visible, when we look at longer trajectories, which 
we will turn to now. 
Trajectories over many waves 
As a first step, we looked at the probability of switching parties by the number of 
observations (Figure 5). In contrast to other analysis in this chapter, we used data of 
all the available panel waves. Already, when analysing three observations per person 
instead of the transition between two waves, the share of party switches almost 
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doubled. This is because indirect changes (e.g. party A – no party – party B) are also 
captured. When we considered trajectories over ten waves, we find that about one 
quarter switched parties when measured on party identification (DE and GB) and 
nearly half switched parties when measured on voting intention. If we consider 25 
observations or more per person, which is only possible in Germany, 39 % of 
respondents have switched parties. These shares are far from marginal: changes 
between parties are thus not as rare as studies focusing on transitions suggest. We 
should also remember that through non-response and panel attrition, volatility is likely 
to be underestimated rather than overestimated. 
Figure 5: Probability of switching parties by length of trajectory in DE, GB and CH 
 
Note: PI: party identification, VI: voting intention. We analyse the first observations per individual. 
Source: SOEP (1984-2010), BHPS (1991-2008), SHP (1999-2010). 
A similar analysis by Clarke and McCutcheon (2009) used panel surveys of the 
British Election Study over three or four waves and also found considerable volatility. 

































In the next step, we investigated trajectories more fundamentally. As Figure 5 
illustrates, the amount of volatility depends strongly on the length of the trajectory 
considered. We therefore have to select individuals with the same or similar number 
of observations. But if we look at the balanced panel only (concerning respondents 
who participated in all eleven waves), we will have stronger selection bias and a much 
smaller sample than when we also consider respondents who did not participate in one 
or more of the waves. We have therefore selected individuals who participated at least 
ten times within the eleven waves of observations. This seemed a reasonable 
compromise, in order to have a rather long period of observation (at least ten waves of 
participation) but to limit selectivity bias, because individuals who did not participate 
in one of the waves are still included. This leaves us with 11’138 individuals in 
Germany (6’037 completed all 11 waves and 5’101 competed 10 waves), 5’259 
individuals in Great Britain (4’668 completed all 11 waves and 591 completed 10 
waves) and 2’282 individuals in Switzerland (1’789 completed all 11 waves and 493 
completed 10 waves).  
We grouped individuals into five groups: 
1. Stable party preference: the respondent named the same party in all waves. 
2. No party preference: the respondent never indicated a party preference but 
responded with any of the following in all waves: does not know, votes for no 
party, does not vote, votes for candidates and not for parties.
36
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 “Vote for candidates and not for parties”  is chosen relatively frequently in Switzerland. In elections, 
voters can choose and combine candidates of many different parties. 
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3. Bounded party preference: the respondent expressed at least once no party 
preference (see group 2) and at least once a party preference. Whenever he or 
she named a party preference, it was for the same party.  
4. Change between party blocks: respondents changed at least once between 
party blocks. Answers not containing a particular party (see group 2) were 
possible at any time.  
5. Change within party blocks: respondents switched parties, but remained 
within the same party block. Answers not containing a particular party (see 
group 2) were possible at any time. 
Table 7 presents the frequencies of each group occurring in the three countries 
studied. For Great Britain, we again display results for both party identification (PI, 
similar to Germany) and for voting intention (VI, similar to Switzerland).  
First of all, we see that the group of individuals who always name the same party in 
the ten or eleven waves ranges from 14 % in Switzerland, to 16 % in Germany to  
28 % (PI) or 33 % (VI) in Great Britain. The relatively high stability in Great Britain 
is most likely due to the party system with very few parties. The low stability in 
Switzerland is most likely due to the multitude of parties. In Germany, the stability is 
low compared to Great Britain. The impact of the question wording is clearly visible 
in the group of bounded partisans who move in and out of party preference. For Great 
Britain, their share is much larger if only party identifiers are taken into account than 




If we add together the two groups who have a party preference and do not switch 
parties (stable and bounded party preference, groups 1 and 3), this adds up to 39 % of 
individuals who remain stable in Switzerland and 59 % in Germany. In Great Britain, 
68 % remain stable for party identification and 57 % remain stable for voting 
intention. Overall, party identification is most stable in Great Britain and lowest in 
Switzerland, as would be expected due to the party systems and in line with literature 
on volatility on the aggregate level. 
Table 7: Trajectories of party preferences over eleven years by groups in DE, GB and 
CH 
  DE (PI) GB (PI) GB (VI)  CH (VI) 
Always Same party 15.9  27.8  33.1  13.7  
Weak stable (Party-no party) 42.5  39.7  23.4  25.2  
Change within block (3 blocks)  9.2  1.3  2.6  18.1  
Between block (3 blocks)  13.2  20.9  36.4  32.3  
No party 19.2  10.3  4.6  10.7  
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
n (individuals) 11'138  5'259  5'259  2'282  
Between 2 blocks 9.9  13.5  24.1  21.3  
Between flexible blocks 9.2  13.5  24.1  26.4  
 Note: PI: party identification, VI: voting intention. Sample: individuals with 10 or 11 observations; 
weighted statistics. Source: SOEP (1999-2009), BHPS (1998-2008), SHP (1999-2009). 
 
As for the transitions between two waves, the differences in the question wording are 
also reflected in the group who has never had a party preference, which, with 19 %, is 
by far largest in Germany. However, due to sample selection and attrition bias, it is 
likely that the share of respondents without party preferences is underestimated (see 
section 4.1).  
Together, the two groups of respondents who switch parties (within and between 
blocks, groups 4 and 5) amount to 50 % in Switzerland, 23 % in Germany and 22 % 
(PI) or 39 % (VI) in Great Britain. Again, the relatively high volatility in Switzerland 
can be explained by the fragmented party system. But also in Great Britain, the share 
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of voters who switch parties is remarkable, considering the dominance by two large 
parties. In Germany, we only have measurements for party identifiers, which results 
in a lower share of party changers. The amount of change is comparable to Great 
Britain for party identification. Overall, we clearly see that once a longer time-span at 
the individual level is taken into account, party preferences turn out to be rather 
volatile and do not support the model of bounded party identification. 
The focus on party blocks can also be seen as a control for the different number of 
parties in the countries, as we fixed the number of blocks in each country (see section 
3.3). Therefore the changes between party blocks are suited for between-country 
comparisons. Table 7 shows the percentage of change for both three party blocks and 
two party blocks. Of course, changes between three party blocks are more frequent 
than changes between two party blocks. In Switzerland, assuming three party blocks, 
32 % of all respondents change between blocks. With two party blocks, 21 % change 
between blocks and with flexible blocks, 26 %. In Germany, 13 % change between 
three party blocks, 10 % between two party blocks and 9 % between flexible party 
blocks (the two measures are equivalent, see section 3.3). In Great Britain, using 
voting intention, 36 % change between three party blocks and 24 % between two or 
flexible party blocks. This is similar to Switzerland. When looking only at party 
identifiers in Great Britain, 21 % change between party blocks and 14 % between two 
or flexible party blocks. Interestingly, with the control for party blocks, change is 
most frequent in Great Britain. This is because most of the change occurs between the 
main parties, which are mainly (and for Labour and the Conservatives, always) in 
different party blocks. In Great Britain, 30 % of the changers (or 11 % of all 
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individuals in the sample) have changed between the Conservatives and Labour 
between 1998 and 2008.  
But regardless of the definition of party blocks, between-block changes are far from 
marginal. We cannot explain the volatility of party preferences by the stability of 
party blocks. With three party blocks, between-block change is by far more frequent 
than within block change. Also, for two party blocks, between-block changes are far 
from negligible. We thus find no support for Bartolini and Mair’s hypotheses of stable 
party blocks.  
There are different explanations for our divergent findings to Bartolini and Mair 
(1990). First, Bartolini and Mair covered an earlier time span (1885-1985) than our 
analysis. It is possible that a de-ideologisation and dealignment has taken place since. 
However, the study by Lachat (2007) found no clear time-trend for volatility in 
Switzerland and Germany since the 1970s at the individual level. Secondly, Bartolini 
and Mair looked at aggregate data, which may hide volatility at the individual level. A 
third reason for divergent findings may be the different operationalisation of party 
blocks. However, this is unlikely, as many changes between parties occurred between 
new parties (particularly the Green parties) and socialist parties.  
Although these patterns give an idea on the trajectories of party preferences over time, 
the groups do not distinguish the theoretical models well. Switches between parties 
could be in line with the traditional model, the revisionist model or the ambiguous 
model. To be able to distinguish these models better, we have to look at those 
respondents who indicated a party preference several times. To facilitate the analysis 
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slightly, we will not consider party blocks and bounded party identification anymore, 
because they do not seem to generally explain the observed patterns.  
A closer look at party switchers 
To assess which of the hypotheses fits the observed trajectories of party switchers, we 
will focus on a different sub-sample than in the analysis above, but again taking panel 
waves from 1999 to 2009 (or, for GB, from 1998 to 2008). We will select citizens 
who reported a party preference at least five times. All observations with missing 
party preferences have been dropped. Of course, the selection of individuals who 
named a party at least five times is somewhat arbitrary. On the one hand, more party 
preferences per individual would be preferable for a better distinction of the different 
models. On the other, more party preferences per individual would reduce the sample 
size considerably and increase bias from panel attrition. Requiring at least five party 
preferences seems a reasonable compromise. In Switzerland, the selection of citizens 
with at least five party preferences leaves us with 3’434 individuals, of which 1’917 
switched parties. In Great Britain, we have 9’131 individuals (of which 3’907 
switched parties) for voting intention and 7’121 individuals (of which 1’868 switched 
parties) for party identifiers. In Germany, the sample amounts to 8’872 individuals, of 
which 2’551 switched parties.  
First, we looked at the number of party switches (among those who changed) and find 
that 74 % of respondents in Switzerland, 70 % in Great Britain and 65 % in Germany 
switched parties more than once. Party switches are thus rarely unique events. 
However, to see whether these multiple changes involve just two parties or many 
different parties, we additionally considered the number of parties that have been 
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named (cf. Figures 6). We so can directly check whether party switches occur back 
and forth between the same parties, as would be the case for ambiguous preferences 
or temporary changes. In Germany, switches back and forth between the same few 
parties are quite common. For example among the respondents who named two 
different parties, 56 % changed more than once between them. Among respondents 
naming 3 parties, 65 % changed more than twice, and so returned to a party 
previously named. In Switzerland and among respondents who named two parties, 59 
% switched several times between them, whereas 41 % changed their preference just 
once. Among respondents naming three parties, 70 % changed back and forth between 
the same parties. In Great Britain (for voting intention), the situation is similar. 
Among those who named two parties, 62 % go back and forth between these parties 
and with three parties even 73% go back and forth.  
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Figure 6: Changes between parties: number of changes by number of parties named  
 
 
Note: Reading example: Among German respondents who prefer two different parties over time, 41% 
changed only once, 39% twice, 11% three times between parties. Sample: Individuals who named a 
party in at least 5 waves and switched parties. Results for Great Britain refer to voting intention. 
Source: SOEP (1999-2009), BHPS (1998-2008), SHP (1999-2009). 
 
Although these analyses are a sign of ambiguity, we need to look even closer at 
changes. We can attribute the changers to five types, which are mutually exclusive. 
Coding criteria are presented in Figure 7. 
1. Temporary changers according to the traditional model: individuals who have 
a latent party preference (a dominant party), which they temporarily abandon. 
2. Durable changers according to the revisionist model: respondents update their 
party preference and remain with the newly preferred party. This group 
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three parties and changed twice, or named four parties and changed three 
times. 
3. Ambiguity model: respondents switch back and forth between preferred 
parties and do not have a dominant party.  
4. Random answers. 
5. Stability: whenever respondents named a party preference, it was for the same 
party. 
Figure 7 : Decision tree to attribute trajectories to types of switches 
  
Of course, the criteria used to discriminate between the groups illustrated in Figure 7 
are somewhat arbitrary. For example, the revisionist model excludes the possibility to 
return to a party preferred before. Another example is that of individuals who changed 
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previous preference in the future (temporary change) or will stay with the new party 
(durable change). We cannot know what happened before and what will happen after 
the observed time-span. In this example, the trajectory would be classed as durable 
change according to the revisionist model. Furthermore, responses also contain an 
unknown amount of measurement errors.  
Table 8 shows the frequencies of the four types of party switches plus the group with 
stable preferences. Stability is by far most frequent. We cannot directly compare these 
results with the groups from Table 7, because the analyses rely on a different sample 
of respondents and focus on different aspects. Here, we are interested in comparing 
different types of changers. Among changers, short term changers with latent stable 
party preference are the most frequent. Short-term change is in line with the 
traditional model of party identification. Taking stability and temporary change 
together, a vast majority can thus be seen to show stable latent preferences. But the 
other groups are non-negligible. Together, durable changers, ambiguity and random 
preference, amount to 18 % in Germany and 34 % in Switzerland. In Great Britain, 
the groups amount to 12 %, if only party identifiers are considered, which is lower 
than in Germany. Including voting intention, 17 % do not fit the traditional model. 
This confirms the previous finding that voters in Great Britain are the most stable. 
Overall, even by singling out short term changes, a considerable share of respondents 
do change between parties. We found a considerable amount of durable changes and, 
to a lesser extent, some ambiguity. Random patterns are observed only marginally, 
but this may be due to the coding criteria. However, none of the models can explain 
dynamics in general.  
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Table 8: Types of party switches in DE, GB and CH 
DE (PI) GB (PI) GB (VI) CH (VI)
Stable 71.2 75.8 59.4 44.7 
Short term changes 10.9 12.0 17.2 21.2 
Durable changers 12.1 7.6 13.9 19.2 
Ambiguity 5.3 4.4 8.2 10.5 
Random 0.4 0.2 1.3 4.4 
Total changers 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
n (individuals) 8985 7121 9131 3434  
Note: PI: party identification, VI: voting intention. Sample: individuals with party preferences in at 
least five waves. Source: SOEP (1999-2009), BHPS (1998-2008), SHP (1999-2009).  
 
 Conclusions 5.3
In this chapter, we discussed six theoretical models of dynamics: the traditional 
model, the revisionist model, bounded party preference, stability of party blocks, 
ambiguity and randomness. None of these explains the dynamics in general. Rather 
voters can be attributed to different types represented by these models.  
Although we did not focus primarily on the debate between the traditional and the 
revisionist view of party identification, we can interpret these findings with respect to 
the debate. Although stable party preference is the pattern most frequently observed, 
there is still a considerable amount of individuals who changed party preference and 
not just temporarily. Over eleven years, many have remained with the party they 
switched to. Others are ambiguous between two or three parties and switch back and 
forth between them. Because the size of these groups depends strongly on the sample 
selection and the question wording for party preference, it is difficult to quantify the 
size of the groups. But it becomes clear that party preference is more volatile than 
usually assumed in electoral research.  
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Furthermore, preferences are not stable when party blocks instead of single parties are 
considered. There is no evidence for stability within party blocks, as claimed by 
Bartolini and Mair. Our finding that there is a considerable amount of volatility does 
not imply that changes occur randomly or that citizens are inconsistent. Most 
frequently, citizens switch between a limited number of parties and most citizens have 
a dominant party.  
Despite differences in question wording, data sources and party systems, the 
conclusions outlined here are valid for all three countries studied. However, because 
both data and political context varies between the countries, it is difficult to interpret 
differences between these countries. Nevertheless the results clearly show that 
stability is strongest in Great Britain, which has the smallest number of parties. This is 
in line with findings from aggregate data. But when we look at between-block 
changers, which are more comparable between countries, Great Britain turned out to 
have the highest volatility.  
Although such descriptive approaches give interesting insights into the dynamics of 
party preferences at the individual level, two limitations of the data have to be kept in 
mind. First, the data is left and right censored. Even though individuals were followed 
over time and the data cover a longer time span than most other sources, we see only a 
sequence. Those who are classified as stable or who made temporary changes may 
have changed many times before the start of the survey or they may change their party 
preference in the future. Secondly, any pattern may also be the result of randomness 
or measurement error. However, the numerous analyses suggest that most trajectories 
are not the result of random answers but rather show clear patterns.  
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The fact that different models hold for different groups of citizens demonstrates the 
considerable heterogeneity between individuals regarding the dynamic processes. It is 
therefore straight forward to look more closely at explanatory factors that explain 
which individuals remain stable and which individuals change over time. 
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6 Reinforcement, life-cycle, cohorts and periods 
The analysis about volatility so far has revealed a considerable amount of change 
between parties and marked heterogeneity in the observed patterns and types of 
change. Rather than finding the right model to explain individual dynamics, we focus 
on different potential influences explaining why some citizens switch parties and 
others do not. In this chapter we will investigate the influence of life-cycles, cohorts, 
period and reinforcement on volatility in party preferences. These processes are 
related because they involve changes over time and cannot be easily distinguished. 
We will discuss each of them in turn and then test for them, empirically.  
 Life-cycle effects 6.1
Life-cycle effects arise from the idea that political preferences and opinions evolve 
over a person’s life span. Most important is the phase of adolescence and early 
adulthood, when individuals learn about and first experience the political world. 
Young adults learn what each party stands for and which parties to support (C. H. 
Franklin and Jackson 1983; Van Der Eijk and Franklin 2009, 19). During this phase 
of learning, citizens adapt their political positions and change party preferences 
relatively frequently. Several authors find the age range from about 18 to 26 to be 
crucial for forming political consciousness or for structuring political orientation 
(Mannheim 1952; Erikson 1968; Lambert 1972) but this period may be extended 
since the writings of these early authors. After this phase of learning, citizens develop 
a habit of voting, accumulate political experience and knowledge and change their 
positions less frequently (e.g. Jackson 1975; Markus 1979; Glenn 1980; Jennings and 
Niemi 1981; Sears 1983). In addition to getting to know the political world, changes 
in personal life may be a potential additional mechanism which increases volatility in 
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young age (Jennings and Niemi 1981, 7). Young adults move more frequently, change 
jobs more frequently, experience transitions to working, to living with a partner or to 
parenthood. Generally, they change their roles more often than older citizens. Usually, 
a life-cycle is measured by years of age. Another theory on life-cycle effects 
postulates that it is not years since birth that are relevant but rather the number of 
years of electoral eligibility, which accounts for the accumulation of political 
experience (Converse 1969). 
While some scholars argue that the level of stability remains at a similar level after 
young adulthood (Jennings and Markus 1984; Krosnick and Alwin 1989), others find 
that volatility decreases over the entire life-cycle (e.g. Sears 1981). Krosnick and 
Alwin (1989) identify lower capacity to incorporate new information, decreasing 
social engagement and increasing homogeneity of the environment as mechanisms for 
increasing persistence over the life-cycle.  
There are reasons to expect that life-cycle effects differ for change within and change 
between party blocks. Between-block change is more fundamental, because it 
involves a change in ideological position. Thus, older citizens, who have already 
formed their political or ideological positions, may switch party blocks less 
frequently. Because such ideological obstacles do not exist for within-block change, 
life cycle effects should be particularly strong for between-block change. However, 
another argument suggests that rather within-block change should be particularly 
affected by the life cycle. Within block change occurs often due to salient issues, 
candidates, or campaigns. Young adults are generally more open and may be more 
easily influenced by such short-term influences and therefore switch to a party within 
the same block more easily due to such short-term influences. Because there are 
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different arguments, it is not a priory clear whether life cycle effects differ strongly 
for changes within and between party blocks. But because a different mechanism is 
expected to link the life course to volatility within and between party blocks, it is 
important to test for them and see which one holds true.  
Similarly, life-cycle effects may not apply similarly to all the types of changers 
discussed in the previous chapter. Durable changes should be more strongly affected 
by the life-cycle, because such fundamental changes should be most frequent when 
political orientations are not yet fixed. But temporary changes may also decline over 
the life-cycle because, as for within-block changes, younger individuals may be more 
susceptible to short-term influences. We will therefore also look at age and the types 
of changes discussed in chapter 5. Van der Eijk and Franklin (2009) examined the 
relationship between age and ambiguous voting preferences in the Netherlands and 
found that younger voters were more frequently ambiguous than older voters. 
 Cohort effects and other effects of socialisation 6.2
Closely related to the learning phase in young age are cohort effects.
 
The key 
assumption of cohort effects is that the context in which an individual grows up and 
experiences their learning phase has a lasting influence on their entire life. As argued 
for life-cycle effects, young individuals are particularly vulnerable to outside 
influences (Jennings and Niemi 1981, 21) but in contrast to life-cycle effects, cohort 
effects remain over the course of a life. Events, salient issues and the historical 
context are crucial for shaping political characteristics. Van der Eijk and Franklin 
(2009, 17) argue that the particular election when individuals become eligible to vote 
shapes their political orientations or motivation for their entire life course. Therefore, 
individuals born around the same time share some political experiences and political 
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character, which may differ from that of other generations. While political generations 
have been important in early electoral research (A. Campbell et al. 1960; Nie, Verba, 
and Petrocik 1976), they have been neglected later on (Miller and Shanks 1996, 34f.; 
Van der Eijk and Franklin 2009). More recently, generations, particularly the effect of 
general replacement, are again being discussed in electoral studies, for example in the 
special symposium “Generational Differences in Electoral Behaviour” in the Journal 
of Electoral Studies from 2012 edited by Van der Brug and Kritzinger (2012). 
Turning from cohort effects in general to volatility, cohorts may differ with respect to 
their stability level. Many specific cohort effects can be imagined, due to events, 
issues, circumstances, elections or a referendum that occurred when citizens were 
young and marked them. Such effects may also vary between countries. It is difficult 
to speculate on any specific cohort effects a priori, but we allow such effects in our 
model.  
Cohort effects may be progressive, meaning that the birth year’s influence on 
volatility is more or less linear. Particularly, it has been claimed that younger 
generations are more volatile than older generations independently from age (Glenn 
1972; Abramson 1976; Abramson 1978; Abramson 1992; Dalton, McAllister, and 
Wattenberg 2000). A first reason for the increasing volatility of younger cohorts is the 
declining importance of traditional cleavages, which weakens predispositions of the 
population (van der Brug 2010). Related to this, pluralisation of society has increased 
over time. Numerous studies have shown that a heterogeneous environment causes 
cross-pressures; for example, if influences from the home, friends, schools, work or 
neighbourhood point in different directions. Cross-pressured individuals are more 
volatile than individuals living in a homogenous environment where influences are 
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mutually reinforcing. Because of the increasing heterogeneity, older cohorts are 
expected to be more stable than younger cohorts, independently of age. Another 
progressive cohort effect mentioned is educational expansion (Dalton 2000). 
If the period of socialisation is important for the formation of political preferences, 
other circumstances of socialisation should also have lasting influences, such as the 
place of socialisation. Particularly, it may matter whether someone has grown up in 
the current political system or not. Immigrants may be more volatile, because they 
have grown up in another country and lack the important stabilising effect of 
socialisation in the context they now live in. Germany presents a particularly good 
case to study the effects of place-socialisation. Not only immigrants but also the 
oldest cohorts and former citizens of the former GDR have been socialised in a 
different political system to the one they currently live in.  
Furthermore, the political system could impact individuals through intergenerational 
transmission. Converse (1969) claimed that the onset of democracy causes a 
forgetting process, which means that older generations have less party loyalty than 
equivalent younger generations who mature after democracy has been introduced.  
 Period effects and dealignment 6.3
Period effects are closely related to age and cohort effects. They occur if an entire 
electorate changes its mind or behaviour. In contrast to cohort effects, events not only 
impact young adults but the entire population. Usually, such events have to be 
dramatic, such as economic crises, a war or a nuclear accident (Van Der Eijk and 
Franklin 2009; Nardulli 1995).  
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Dealignment can be seen either as a period effect or as an effect of cohort 
replacement. Dealignment refers to the weakening attachment of voters to parties and 
has been covered by a large body of literature. An important consequence of 
dealignment is higher electoral volatility (Dalton 1984; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). 
There are several causes for dealignment: rising educational levels, growing social 
and geographic mobility, the transformation of the employment structure, the growing 
influence of media and interest groups, as well as the modernization of electoral 
campaigns (Lachat 2007). If dealignment is a period effect, it affects the entire 
electorate. If dealignment is a cohort effect, it occurs because younger cohorts are less 
affected by cleavages and are better educated. Recent studies found contrasting results 
as to whether or not dealignment is caused by cohort replacement. Tilley (2003) found 
that the decline in party identification in the 1970s (and to a lesser extent in 1997) can 
be explained by period rather than by generation effects. Other studies found evidence 
of cohort effects as well as period effects (van der Brug 2010; Walczak, van der Brug, 
and de Vries 2012).
 
 
Within this study, we cannot test for dealignment effects, since we cover a relatively 
short time period for this matter (from 1984 in Germany, 1991 in Great Britain, 1999 
in Switzerland). However, it is important to control for period effects in general. We 
do not consider single effects or elections, but discuss the effect of the electoral cycle 
in chapter 8. 
 Reinforcement effects 6.4
Finally, we consider reinforcement effects which are, again, related to life-cycle. Party 
identification stabilises over time. Once an individual has formed a party attachment, 
it serves as a lens through which politics is perceived (A. Campbell et al. 1960; 
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Converse 1969; Converse 1976). A partisan interprets an ambiguous event to the 
advantage of the adopted party and to the disadvantage of the opposite party (Lewis-
Beck, Nadeau, and Elias 2008, 148f.). Party preference increases selective exposure, 
selective acceptance and selective retention of information. The longer a party 
preference has been held, the more solid it should become. Butler and Stokes (1974) 
claimed that once an individual has voted three times for the same party, this person is 
immunised and would rarely change in the future. Immunisation arises through the 
affirmation of identities. Repeated affirmation of support for the same party 
eventually leads to a psychological identification with that party. Because young 
adults cannot be immunised yet, this process is related to the life-cycle. The process 
of immunisation also works in the absence of parental transmission of party 
identification, by way of peer-group influence, careful consideration of choice 
options, post rationalization of an impulsive choice, or other mechanisms (Miller and 
Shanks 1996, 131; Van Der Eijk and Franklin 2009, 50). 
According to several scholars, the reinforcement effect also explains why older 
citizens have generally stronger and therefore more stable party identifications than 
younger citizens (A. Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1969; Butler and Stokes 1971). 
But others find that life-cycle effects persist even once the reinforcement effect is 
controlled for (e.g. Schmitt-Beck, Weick, and Christoph 2006).  
 Methods and operationalisation 6.5
We will test hypotheses involving life-cycle, cohort, period and socialisation effects 
mostly by regression models with probability to switch parties as dependent variable. 
For this, we use all available waves from the panel (SOEP 1984-2010, BHPS 1991-
2008, SHP 1999-2010). For Great Britain, we present only the results which include 
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voting intention. Before presenting the coding of the different variables used, two 
measurement issues need to be discussed in more detail: the identification problem 
between age, cohort and period and the measurement of reinforcement.  
The identification problem 
The well-known identification problem of the variables age, cohort and period arises 
because period = cohort + age.
37 
Consequently, we cannot study one of these effects 
without consideration of the others. The three effects cannot be simultaneously 
estimated with conventional statistical analysis. Social sciences and biological 
sciences have long debated this problem and tried to find solutions (e.g. K. O. Mason 
et al. 1973; Glenn 1976; W. M. Mason and Wolfinger 2002; Yang et al. 2008).
38
  
The problem cannot be solved mathematically. For our analysis, we can illustrate the 
problem as follows. With cross-sectional data, we usually find that stability increases 
with age. From this, we cannot tell whether the relationship reflects life-cycle or 
cohort effects or even both. In cross-sectional data, age and cohort are perfectly 
correlated. To interpret results, theory and side information, which makes some 
explanations more plausible than others, are important (e.g. Converse 1976; Glenn 
2005). To reach identification, constraints can be introduced into the estimation, based 
on side information. Other approaches to addressing the problem involve nonlinear 
transformations, use of proxy variables, or an intrinsic estimator proposed by Yang 
and his colleagues (Yang, Fu, and Land 2004; Yang et al. 2008). 
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 Period refers to the time when the measurement was taken. Cohort refers to the time when an 
individual was born. Age refers to the amount of time passed since birth. 
38
 To make things even more complicated, there may be interactions between age, period and cohort 
effects. For example, period effects may have different effects among the different age groups. And 
some generations may experience the life-cycle differently (e.g. they may react differently to 
retirement). 
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With panel data, the identification problem presents itself differently (see Miyazaki 
and Raudenbush 2000; Yang 2007). Because we follow the same individuals over 
time, it is possible to separate age and cohort effects. The birth year remains constant 
for an individual, so that an individual’s changes can only be attributed to age. But 
period and age effects are indistinguishable in panel data. Often, period effects are 
assumed to be trivial and are therefore neglected in models, because panels typically 
cover a relative short time period (particularly compared with the age range). 
However, the period may be a concern for political variables, so we have to test for 
them.
  
We can break the linearity between age, period and cohort by grouping cohorts into 
ten-year periods according to birth year. This allows the simultaneous estimation of 
age, period and cohort effects. The assumption is that individuals born within a period 
of a few years have been exposed to more or less the same context. This procedure is 
relatively standard in literature. But even with cohort groups, difficulties arise due to 
multicollinearity between cohorts, period and age variables. In the data used here, the 
correlation between age and birth year depends on the duration of the panels. It is 
lowest in Germany with 0.91, followed by GB with 0.97 and Switzerland with 0.98.
 
Although the grouping decreases multicollinearity, the problem remains. 
Multicollinearity has two consequences. First, it inflates standard errors of regression 
coefficients, so that coefficients may not be significant even though there is a 
relationship between the independent and the dependent variable. Because the 
household panels are relatively large, this should not be a major concern. More 
important is the second consequence of multicollinearity. Models may become 
unstable because the influence of the collinear variables cannot be clearly separated. 
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Effect sizes may thus change considerably with different model specifications. In 
order to test the robustness of our models, we will test different specifications.  
Reinforcement effects: the problem with censoring 
To measure reinforcement effects, we use duration of party preference, referring to 
the time someone has kept the current party preference. The spell begins when a party 
preference is formed or when party preference has changed. The spell ends with a 
subsequent change in party preference. An individual may have several spells of party 
preference. Ideally, we would have observed individuals since they formed a party 
preference for the first time in their life and measured time until change. This is not 
possible in household panels. When individuals enter the panel, they may already 
have a party preference. The data is thus left-censored and we simply cannot measure 
duration of party preference.  
Another problem is that duration is strongly correlated with other variables. Only 
individuals who participate in the panel for a long time can have long durations. 
Similarly, long stability spells are not possible at the beginning of the panel survey 
and for the youngest respondents. Therefore, years of party preference reflects not 
only stability but also age, period and panel participation. Although we can include 
these variables as controls in the model when estimating the reinforcement effect, the 
reinforcement effect may be biased.
39
  
                                                 
39 The problem cannot be solved by using a balanced subsample, where all individuals have the same 
number of observations. This would increase selection and attrition bias and strongly reduce the sample 
size.  
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There are different possibilities on how to deal with left-censoring and correlation. 
Firstly, we can exclude left-censored spells, which implies excluding all respondents 
with stable party preferences and restrict analysis to those who have changed parties. 
Apart from this selection bias, excluding censored spells reduces the sample size 
enormously. A second possibility is to ignore censored spells and measure observed 
duration, as implemented by Schmitt-Beck et al. (2006).
40
 This is equivalent to 
assuming that respondents formed party preference in the first wave of observation. A 
third possibility is to include relative duration, which relates the number of years a 
party preference has been kept to potential duration, measured by the number of years 
of panel participation so far. The coding of relative duration is illustrated or for a 
(hypothetical) respondent in Table 9 (extension of Table 2 which illustrated the 
measurement of change). We divide the number of observations since the last change 
(column 4 in Table 9) by the number of observations since a party has been named for 
the first time during the panel (column 5 in Table 9). The relative duration varies 
between 0 and 1. 
Table 9: Measuring duration of party preferences 
wave Party Change 
(1=chang
e) 












1 No pref. . . .  
2 A . . .  
3 A 0 1 1 1/1=1 
4 B 1 2 2 2/2=1 
5 No pref. 0 1 3 1/3=0.33 
6 B 0 2 4 2/4=0.5 
7 A 1 3 5 3/5=0.66 
 
                                                 
40
 Additionally, results were checked for exclusion. 
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The concept of relative duration has advantages and disadvantages compared to the 
years of party preferences. The major drawback is that being stable one year is 
considered as equal to being stable 10 years. Similarly, the maximum stability (value 
of 1) is most frequently observed in the first panel waves. And once a party preference 
has been changed, a value of 1 cannot be reached any more (for the example in Table 
9, relative stability of 1 is not possible after wave 4). In fact, the measurement of 
relative stability implies that stability in earlier panel waves are given higher 
importance than stability in later panel waves, which is not justified theoretically. 
Another problem of the measure of relative duration is the first observation of each 
individual (wave 3 in Table 9). Relative duration is equal to 1 irrespectively of 
whether a change has occurred or not. Relative duration may thus wrongly suggest 
high stability. To take account of this, we could exclude the first observation of each 
individual, but this comes at the price of loss of sample size and more attrition bias, 
because we would exclude individuals with few observations from the sample. To 
take account of the first observation, we will rather add a binary variable indicating 
the first observation for each individual as a control. 
Having seen the major problems of a relative duration measure, we compare it to the 
standard way of measuring duration, which is years of duration. Table 10 shows the 
correlation of these two measures with key variables (panel participation, age, period). 
The correlation coefficients of relative duration are weaker than for years of party 
preference. Relative duration is almost independent from age. Besides taking account 
of censoring, the relative duration has therefore the advantage of being less collinear 
to other explanatory variables.
41
 At the same time, the correlation coefficients point to 
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 Top-coding the years of party preference alters the correlation only to a small extent. 
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the opposite direction for the two measures. Relative duration is negatively correlated 
with age, period and panel participation, while the correlation is positive for years of 
stability.  
Table 10 : Correlation between duration of party preferences and other variables 
Years of stability Relative duration 
  CH DE GB CH DE GB 
Panel participation (relative) .28 .23 .26 -.15 -.07 -.11 
Age .19 .25 .23 -.04 -.01 -.01 
Period (year of data collection) .36 .30 .43 -.28 -.11 -.21 
Change -.18 -.13 -.19 -.27 -.22 -.26 
Years of stability   .34 .27 .37 
 
Regarding the relationship between the duration measures and change in party 
preference, change is associated with short durations for both measures. The bivariate 
relationship is even stronger for relative duration than for years of party preference. 
But we will assess the variables in terms of model performance in the multivariate 
models in more detail.  
To sum up the discussion on the measurement of duration of party preference, we 
have two main variables: The years a party preference has been kept and relative party 
preference. Considering the drawbacks of both measures, the best strategy for the 
empirical model is not a priori evident. Rather, we will estimate different model 
specifications.   
Variables and statistical method 
We will look at three different dependent variables. The first is the dummy variable 
distinguishing change between parties and no change, as introduced in section 3.2. We 
estimate the probability to switch parties with a logistic random effect regression to 
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take account of the clustering of observations within individuals and partly control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. To do this, we used the xtlogit command of Stata. 
The second dependent variable further distinguishes change within party blocks and 
between party blocks. It has three outcomes: no change (base category), within-block 
change and between-block change. This is a competing risk model, which we 
estimated using the baysian mcmc-estimator of the mlwin-software (Rabash et al. 
2009; Browne 2009) and the runlmwin-command from Stata (Leckie and Charlton 
2011). 
The third dependent variable distinguishes the types of change discussed in the 
previous chapter: durable change, temporary change, ambiguity and randomness. This 
analysis has only one observation per individual (wide format) and is based on the 
same sample as used in chapter 5 (eleven waves of each survey, individuals who 
expressed at least five party preferences over time). We simply cross tabulated the 
types of change and age groups. We could not assess reinforcement effects or 
distinguish age and cohort effects, because there is only one observation per 
individual and therefore no variance within individuals. 
For the independent variables, we have two measures of duration for the 
reinforcement effect, as discussed above. Firstly we use the years a party preference 
as binary variables. Longer durations have been coded into the same category, as the 
change levels off altered after some years of duration. In the SOEP (27 waves in total) 
we grouped stability from 10 years and longer together (27% of observation), in the 
BHPS (17 waves in total) stability longer than 7 years and longer and in the SHP (12 
waves in total) stability from 6 years and longer (11%). The thresholds have been 
defined according to model performance. Findings are robust to alterations in these 
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thresholds. The second measure of duration is the years of stable party preference 
divided by the maximum duration that would have been possible at that point as 
discussed above (Table 9). This relative measure varies between 0 and 1. We add a 
dummy variable for the first observation to control for the problem that relative 
duration is always 1 at the first observation. 
Also for life-cycle effects we have two potential measures: years of age and years of 
voting eligibility. In contrast to the duration variable, we cannot include both 
measures at the same time. The correlation is strongest in GB (coefficient of 0.99), 
because there have been very few changes in enfranchisement. In Switzerland, the 
correlation amounts to 0.92. The most important changes in enfranchisement involved 
the right to vote for women in 1971 and the lowering of enfranchisement to 18 in 
1991. In Germany, correlation is lowest with 0.8. The current German system was 
only installed after the Second World War, so that older cohorts became eligible to 
vote later than younger cohorts. The former citizens of the German Democratic 
Republic only entered the electorate in 1990. Additionally, enfranchisement was 
lowered from 21 to 18 years of age in 1970. 
To test whether we should measure life-cycle effects rather by the years of age or 
years eligible to vote, we compare simple univariate models of these two variables 
(Table 11Table 11). For better readability of coefficients, years of age and years of 
eligibility to vote have been divided by ten. The comparison of the log likelihoods 
shows a very similar model performance. In Germany, where age and years eligible to 
vote can be distinguished best, the model for age is slightly better. Because age is 
more commonly used and more intuitive to interpret, we retained only years of age for 
multivariate models.  
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Table 11 : Measuring life cycle effect: bivariate models for age and years of eligibility 
on probability to switch parties in CH, DE and GB 
 
    b se log likelihood var re 
DE age -0.14*** (0.08) -51'535 1.52 
  eligible -0.15*** (0.01) -51'537 1.52 
GB age -0.12*** (0.08) -50'392 1.43 
  eligible -0.13*** (0.01) -50'391 1.43 
CH age -0.05*** (0.01) -19'417 1.33 
  eligible -0.05** (0.02) -19'420 1.33 
Note: Bivariate logistic random effect models. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if 
respondents switched parties since the last party preference named (base category: no change). 
Regression coefficients, se in parenthesis. Significant at *0.05, **0.01, ***0.001. Source: SOEP 1984-
2010 (n=230’4014 clustered in 25’269 individuals), BHPS 1991-2008 (n=149’984 clustered in 16’476 
individuals), SHP 1999-2010 (n=43’364 clustered in 8312 individuals). 
The operationalisation of the other independent variables is straight forward. Cohort 
effects are measured by the birth year. We grouped individuals into ten-year cohorts 
(1939 and before, 1940-1949, 1950-1959, 1960-1969, 1970-1979, 1980 and after). In 
Germany, we additionally distinguish the cohort 1929 and before. For Germany, this 
oldest cohort is theoretically important because of their socialisation before and 
during the 2
nd
 world war. And because the SOEP started already in 1984, there are 
enough observations to separate this cohort, in contrast to the BHPS and the SHP. 
Period effects are measured by the year of data collection and included as dummy 
variables to allow for non-linear effects. Finally, we included dummy variables for 
immigrants (born in another country) and former East Germans in Germany to test 
whether the political system of socialisation has an effect. To control for attrition, we 
included a variable for panel participation (number of waves of participation divided 
by the potential number of waves of participation, see section 4.1). Continuous 
variables have been centred for computational reasons and in order to reduce 
collinearity when squared terms are included in the model. Because we estimated non-
linear models, we will assess effect size by predicted probabilities. 
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 Results 6.6
We start by discussing the regression models on the probability to change parties. 
Table 12 presents the results of four logistic random effect models (1change, 0 no 
change). To compare model performances, we recorded not only the log-likelihood 
but also the Bayesian Information Criteria BIC, which takes account of the varying 
number of degrees of freedom and penalises complicated models. Model 1 does not 
control of duration of party preferences, while Model 2 includes years of party 
preference to test reinforcement effects and Model 3 adds the variable for relative 
duration (years of stability/years of observation) and a binary variable for the first 
observation. The inclusion of the years of party preference (M2) strongly improves 
the model and the addition of the relative duration (M3) improves model fit further.
42
 
Furthermore, the effects of period and age are more plausible once the relative 
duration measure has been included. We will refer to these differences when 
discussing the specific coefficients. Finally, Model 4 adds cohort effects. To avoid 
collinearity between period and cohort variables, period effects are included as a 
linear trend, as for example the youngest cohort cannot be observed before 1999. In 
all three countries, the inclusion of cohorts does not improve the model, which means 
that cohorts do not add substantially to the explanation of volatility. Apart for cohort 
effects, we will therefore refer to the results of Model 3 for the interpretation.  
We also estimated two competing-risk models, which distinguish change within party 
blocks and change between party blocks. They have been estimated as multinomial 
random effect regression. Model 5 includes period fixed effects but no birth cohorts. 
Model 6 includes birth cohorts and linear period effects. We organise the discussion 
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 Model performance of model 3 in Table 12 is also superior to a model including relative duration 
(and its square term) only. 
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of the results by type of effect (period, life-cycle, reinforcement, cohort, and 
socialisation). For each effect, we discuss first results from the binary model and then 
from the competing risk model. Estimation results for party blocks (Table 13) are 
presented together with the discussion on life-cycle effects. 
Table 12: Change between parties: Age, cohort, period and reinforcement in 
Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland 
Germany M1 M2 M3 M4
Age (/10, centered) -0.148*** (.01) -0.076*** (.01) -0.081*** (.01) -0.106*** (.03)
  Age squared 0.014** (.00) -0.004 (.00) 0.007* (.00) 0.012** (.00)
Cohort: Ref 1929 and older
  1930-1939 -0.003 (.06)
  1940-1949 0.025 (.08)
  1950-1959 -0.049 (.10)
  1960-1969 -0.104 (.12)
  1970-1979 -0.144 (.15)
  1980 and younger -0.028 (.18)
Immigrants -0.132 (.07) -0.187** (.06) -0.094* (.05) -0.100* (.05)
Former  East German citizen 0.185*** (.04) 0.068* (.03) 0.101*** (.02) 0.082*** (.02)
Duration: Ref. 1 year stable
  2 years stable -0.430*** (.03) -0.350*** (.03) -0.321*** (.03)
  3 years stable -0.704*** (.03) -0.579*** (.03) -0.470*** (.03)
  4 years stable -0.893*** (.04) -0.744*** (.04) -0.686*** (.04)
  5 years stable -1.012*** (.05) -0.775*** (.04) -0.700*** (.04)
  6 years stable -1.054*** (.05) -0.843*** (.05) -0.739*** (.04)
  7 years stable -1.224*** (.06) -0.893*** (.05) -0.835*** (.05)
  8 years stable -1.228*** (.06) -1.064*** (.06) -1.036*** (.06)
  9 years stable -1.197*** (.07) -1.064*** (.06) -1.036*** (.06)
  10 -26 years stable -1.417*** (.04) -1.322*** (.04) -1.254*** (.04)
Duration: relative -1.451*** (.04) -1.509*** (.04)
First observation 0.007 (.03) 0.029 (.03)
Panel participation -0.091 (.07) -0.023 (.06) -0.080 (.05) -0.056 (.05)
Constant -3.627*** (.09) -3.312*** (.08) -2.670*** (.07) -2.433*** (.07)
Variance constant 1.524 (.02)   1.113 (.02) 0.494 (.03) 0.484 (.03)
Log likelihood -55528 -51924 -50046 -50239
BIC 102944 101419 100492 100528  
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Great Britain M1 M2 M3 M4
Age (/10, centered) -0.118*** (.01) -0.050*** (.01) -0.058*** (.01) -0.118*** (.02)
  Age squared 0.025*** (.00) 0.007 (.00) 0.016*** (.00) 0.017*** (.00)
Cohort: Ref 1939 and older
  1940-1949 -0.130** (.05)
  1950-1959 -0.159* (.06)
  1960-1969 -0.263** (.08)
  1970-1979 -0.299** (.11)
  1980 and younger -0.295* (.14)
Immigrants 0.101 (.09) 0.096 (.07) 0.039 (.05) 0.043 (.05)
Duration: Ref. 1 year stable
  2 years stable -0.650*** (.03) -0.607*** (.03) -0.603*** (.03)
  3 years stable -0.947*** (.03) -0.844*** (.04) -0.828*** (.04)
  4 years stable -1.098*** (.04) -0.939*** (.04) -0.986*** (.04)
  5 years stable -1.254*** (.04) -1.056*** (.05) -1.103*** (.05)
  6 years stable -1.266*** (.05) -1.063*** (.05) -0.969*** (.05)
  7 years and longer stable -1.525*** (.04) -1.339*** (.05) -1.386*** (.05)
Duration: relative -1.303*** (.05) -1.252*** (.05)
First observation -0.226*** (.05) -0.282*** (.04)
Panel Participation -0.066 (.07) 0.316*** (.06) -0.125* (.05) -0.084 (.05)
Constant -2.537*** (.09) -2.560*** (.07) -1.436*** (.08) -1.257***
Variance constant 2.054 (.02) 0.925 (.02) 0.127 (.02)
Log l ikelihood -54266 -49039 -48540 -48707
BIC 100658 98412.1 97395 97609
Switzerland M1 M2 M3 M4
Age (/10, centered) -0.081*** (0.01) -0.031** (0.01) -0.041*** (0.01) -0.009 (0.04)
  Age squared 0.010 (0.01) -0.003 (0.01) 0.007 (0.00) 0.019* (0.01)
Cohort: Ref 1939 and older
  1940-1949 0.173* (0.08)
  1950-1959 0.204 (0.10)
  1960-1969 0.208 (0.14)
  1970-1979 0.222 (0.18)
  1980 and younger 0.206 (0.23)
Immigrants 0.065 (0.08) 0.024 (0.07) 0.047 (0.05) 0.049 (0.05)
Duration: Ref. 1 year s table
  2 years  s table -0.554*** (0.04) -0.571*** (0.05) -0.619*** (0.05)
  3 years  s table -0.777*** (0.05) -0.764*** (0.06) -0.742*** (0.06)
  4 years  s table -0.901*** (0.06) -0.883*** (0.07) -0.848*** (0.07)
  5 years  s table -1.100*** (0.08) -1.083*** (0.09) -1.171*** (0.09)
  6 years  and longer s table -1.255*** (0.07) -1.288*** (0.08) -1.321*** (0.08)
Duration: relative -1.146*** (0.09) -1.091*** (0.09)
Fi rs t observation -0.255*** (0.07) -0.350*** (0.06)
Panel  participation -0.375*** (0.09) -0.102 (0.08) -0.287*** (0.06) -0.257*** (0.06)
Constant -2.072*** (0.09) -1.992*** (0.08) -1.154*** (0.09) -1.321***
Variance constant 1.337 (0.03) 0.898 (0.03) 0.247*** (0.08) 0.251 (0.08)
Log l ikelihood -20404 -19185 -18772 -18861
BIC 38604 38118 37787 37921  
Note: Logistic random effect models. Base category: no change. Models include dummy variables for 
the period effects. Regression coefficients, se in parenthesis. Significant at *0.05, **0.01, ***0.001. 
Reference category: no change. Source: SOEP 1984-2010 (n=229’414, 25’269 individuals), BHPS 
1991-2008 (n=149’984, 16’476 individuals, SHP 1999-2010 (n=43’364, 8312 individuals). 
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Reinforcement effects 
We start by discussing to reinforcement effects, which we estimated through years of 
stability and the relative duration of party preference. As expected, we find that that 
the longer a party preference has been held, the more solid it becomes. Years of party 
preference is highly significant in (models 2 and 3) and contributes strongly to model 
performance. Also relative duration (model 3) reveals a significant reinforcement 
effect and improves the model. The effect of the years of stability in party preference 
on the probability to change is presented in Figure 98, which has been computed as in 
model 3 but without top-coding of the years of party preference. This illustrates that 
the effect of years of party preference is clearly non-linear. The longer a party 
preference has been held, the smaller is the effect of an additional year of stability. 
For example in Great Britain, at one year of stability, an additional year reduces the 
probability to switch parties by 6.5 percentage points, but less than one percentage 
point from three years of stability on. Generally and in all countries, volatility is not 
reduced further after five years of stability.  
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Figure 8 : Probability to switch parties by years of party preference in CH, GB, DE 
 
Also the relative measure of duration of party preference shows a strong 
reinforcement effect in model 3, which adds to the absolute duration effect. We do not 
show predicted probabilities for the relative duration of party preference as this 
measure is difficult to interpret, especially once duration in years is controlled for, and 
as the exact shape of the relationship depends on the model specifications.
43
 Besides 
improving the model, the inclusion of relative duration brings a better distinction of 
period and age effects and reduces the unobserved heterogeneity (comparing variance 
of constant in Model 2 and Model 3). For these reasons, we will refer to model 3, 
which includes both absolute and relative duration of party preference for the 
discussion of the other variables.   
We have underlined in the literature review that the contrasting results of previous 
studies can be mainly attributed to methodological issues. Our finding of strong 
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 In Model 3 in Table 12 we included relative duration only in its linear form. In an alternative model 
including relative stability and its square term but not duration in years, volatility declines steepest for 
short durations which is in line with findings for years of party preference. But if we include both 
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reinforcement effects is in line with the methodologically similar analysis by Schmitt-
Beck et al. (2006) based on the SOEP. But our findings counter the interpretation of 
Green and Yoon (2002), who argue that the stability of party identification is all 
attributable to stable individual effects and not to a strong auto-regressive process. 
Although we found that the inclusion of reinforcement effects indeed reduces 
unobserved heterogeneity strongly, our results show that there is more to 
reinforcement than unobserved heterogeneity. Given that all models rely on relatively 
strong assumptions, we are aware that our model cannot solve the issue on separating 
trait and reinforcement either. Nevertheless, there are several indications which 
suggest that stability in years reflects both a stable trait and reinforcement. Firstly, 
unobserved heterogeneity remains relatively high even after controlling for duration, 
which suggests the presence of a trait effect. Secondly, the age effect depends on 
whether and how duration of party preference is controlled for. Because a stable trait 
should not alter coefficients of time-varying variables strongly, duration cannot reflect 
only a stable trait. Finally, we often have several spells of party preference per person, 
meaning that also duration varies within person.  
Life cycle effects 
We next turn to life-cycle effects, measured by the age variable. The hypothesis of 
increasing stability over the life-cycle is clearly supported in all models. Figure 9 
shows predicted probabilities to assess effects sizes for models controlling and not 
controlling for duration of party preference (M1 and M3 in Table 12). We find a 
consistent pattern across countries and model specifications: Volatility is highest 
among the youngest citizens, up to about 30 years of age. The older citizens are, the 
less likely they are to change between parties, but the effect is not linear over their 
life-cycle. Although the age effect is reduced once we control for duration of party 
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preference, it remains clearly significant. Without controlling for duration, 20 year 
olds are 34% (Switzerland) to 58% (Germany) more volatile than 80 year olds. Once 
controlling for duration of party preference (absolute and relative), the difference 
between 20 and 80 year olds is much smaller (17 percent in Switzerland, 35 percent in 
Germany). But we can be quite sure that this remaining difference is driven by the 
life-cycle rather than by reinforcement as suggested by Converse (1969: p. 44). Our 
findings confirm the importance of young adulthood in shaping and stabilising 
political preferences. Even though most changes occur in young age, we still observe 
increasing persistence in later age. Party preferences stabilise increasingly up to the 
age of about 60, after which little further stabilisation of preferences is observed 
Figure 9: Predicted probabilities of switching parties by age in DE, GB and CH 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities calculated from Models 1 (left) and 3 (right) in Table 12. Other variables 
are held constant at their mean or mode (categorical variables), random effect of 0 assumed. 
 
In the next step, we distinguish within-block and between-block changes in a 
competing risk model (Table 13). Predicted probabilities in Figure 10 show for Great 
Britain and Germany that within-block change occurs manly among young voters. 
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block change than for between-block change. In Switzerland, party blocks are not 
relevant for life-cycle effects. In all three countries, age remains important for both 
types of change. We find thus support for the two arguments on the mechanism of 
life-cycle effects. Young voters are more likely to change between party blocks 
because they have less established ideological positions. And young voters are more 
likely to change within party blocks because they are more easily influenced by short-
term forces. But for between-block change, the stabilisation occurs more gradually 
over the entire life-cycle and the effect remains weaker than for within-block change.  
Figure 10: Predicted probabilities for switching parties by age and distinction of 
block in DE, GB and CH 
  
Note: Y-scales are not harmonised. Predicted probabilities calculated from M5 in Table 13. Other 























































Table 13 : Within-block and between-block change: age, period, cohort and 
reinforcement in DE, GB and CH 
M5 M6
Germany within between within between
Age (/10, centered) -0.225*** (.01) -0.009 (.01) -0.296*** (.05) -0.064* (.03)
  Age squared -0.000 (.01) 0.008 (.00) 0.028*** (.01) -0.000 (.01)
Cohort: Ref 1929 and older
  1930-1939 0.118 (.10) -0.116 (.06)
  1940-1949 0.188 (.13) -0.163* (.08)
  1950-1959 0.136 (.18) -0.330** (.10)
  1960-1969 -0.004 (.22) -0.394** (.13)
  1970-1979 -0.363 (.26) -0.280 (.16)
  1980 and younger -0.352 (.32) -0.177 (.19)
Immigrants -0.595*** (.10) 0.186** (.06) -0.572*** (.09) 0.160* (.06)
Former  East German citizen 0.392*** (.05) -0.084* (.04) 0.134 (.09) -0.123 (.07)
Duration: Ref. 1 year stable
  2 years stable -0.337*** (.03) -0.337*** (.03) -0.307*** (.03) -0.307*** (.03)
  3 years stable -0.552*** (.03) -0.552*** (.03) -0.444*** (.03) -0.444*** (.03)
  4 years stable -0.709*** (.04) -0.709*** (.04) -0.647*** (.04) -0.647*** (.04)
  5 years stable -0.725*** (.04) -0.725*** (.04) -0.653*** (.04) -0.653*** (.04)
  6 years stable -0.781*** (.05) -0.781*** (.05) -0.679*** (.05) -0.679*** (.05)
  7 years stable -0.826*** (.05) -0.826*** (.05) -0.765*** (.05) -0.765*** (.05)
  8 years stable -0.983*** (.06) -0.983*** (.06) -0.961*** (.06) -0.961*** (.06)
  9 years stable -0.978*** (.06) -0.978*** (.06) -0.950*** (.06) -0.950*** (.06)
  10 -26 years stable -1.198*** (.05) -1.198*** (.05) -1.139*** (.04) -1.139*** (.04)
Duration: relative -1.216*** (.06) -1.216*** (.06) -1.301*** (.06) -1.301*** (.06)
First observation 0.005 (.03) 0.005 (.03) 0.027 (.03) 0.027 (.03)
Panel participation 0.076 (.06) -0.138* (.07) 0.391*** (.04) -0.117** (.04)
Constant -4.795*** (.12) -3.439*** (.07) -4.152*** (.19) -3.026*** (.10)
Variance constant 1.918*** (0.10) 0.931*** (0.07) 1.854*** (0.11) 0.877*** (0.07)
Cov constant (within-between) -0.838*** (0.03) -0.860*** (0.04)
DIC 111917 112585  
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M5 M6
Great Britain within between within between
Age (/10, centered) -0.159*** (.02) -0.056*** (.01) -0.564*** (.11) -0.096*** (.02)
  Age squared 0.030* (.01) 0.016*** (.00) 0.061*** (.02) 0.015** (.00)
Cohort: Ref 1939 and older
  1940-1949 -0.612** (.23) -0.099* (.05)
  1950-1959 -0.708* (.30) -0.126* (.06)
  1960-1969 -1.460*** (.40) -0.189* (.08)
  1970-1979 -1.872*** (.52) -0.206 (.11)
  1980 and younger -2.263*** (.64) -0.185 (.14)
Immigrants -0.445 (.27) 0.071 (.05) 0.075 (.05) 0.075 (.05)
Duration: Ref. 1 year stable
  2 years stable -0.594*** (.03) -0.594*** (.03) -0.597*** (.03)
  3 years stable -0.825*** (.04) -0.825*** (.04) -0.816*** (.04)
  4 years stable -0.915*** (.04) -0.915*** (.04) -0.967*** (.04)
  5 years stable -1.028*** (.05) -1.028*** (.05) -1.080*** (.05)
  6 years stable -1.027*** (.06) -1.027*** (.06) -0.942*** (.05)
  7 years and longer stable -1.285*** (.05) -1.285*** (.05) -1.343*** (.05)
Duration: relative -1.281*** (.05) -1.281*** (.05) -1.217*** (.05)
First observation -0.215*** (.05) -0.215*** (.05) -0.283*** (.04)
Panel Participation 0.352 (.21) -0.166** (.05) -0.131* (.05) -0.131* (.05)
Constant -6.182*** (.16) -1.650*** (.06) -5.076*** (.27) -1.512*** (.06)
Variance constant 3.844*** (.22) 0.186*** (.03) 3.815*** (.23) 0.191*** (.02)
Cov constant (within-between) -0.287*** (.05) -0.293*** (.05)
DIC 103970 104312
M5 M6
Switzerland within between within between
Age (/10, centered) -0.047** (.01) -0.046*** (.01) -0.017 (.07) 0.032 (.07)
  Age squared 0.004 (.01) 0.009 (.01) 0.027 (.01) 0.014 (.01)
Cohort: Ref 1939 and older
  1940-1949 0.254* (.13) 0.217* (.11)
  1950-1959 0.302 (.18) 0.257 (.16)
  1960-1969 0.300 (.24) 0.312 (.21)
  1970-1979 0.290 (.31) 0.382 (.29)
  1980 and younger 0.166 (.40) 0.469 (.38)
Immigrants -0.037 (.09) 0.137 (.07) -0.032 (.09) 0.133 (.07)
Duration: Ref. 1 year s table
  2 years  s table 0.746*** (.06) 0.746*** (.06) 0.734*** (.06) 0.734*** (.06)
  3 years  s table 0.178*** (.05) 0.178*** (.05) 0.115* (.05) 0.115* (.05)
  4 years  s table -0.112 (.06) -0.112 (.06) -0.098 (.06) -0.098 (.06)
  5 years  s table -0.307*** (.08) -0.307*** (.08) -0.417*** (.08) -0.417*** (.08)
  6 years  and longer s table -0.491*** (.07) -0.491*** (.07) -0.556*** (.06) -0.556*** (.06)
Duration: relative -0.976*** (.09) -0.976*** (.09) -0.976*** (.08) -0.976*** (.08)
Firs t observation -0.272*** (.07) -0.272*** (.07) -0.362*** (.06) -0.362*** (.06)
Panel  participation -0.008 (.10) -0.483*** (.09) 0.079 (.10) -0.501*** (.09)
Constant -3.081*** (.08) -2.926*** (.08) -3.425*** (.15) -3.118*** (.14)
Variance constant 0.977*** (.09) 0.626*** (.07) 0.849*** (.06) 0.585*** (.06)
Cov constant (within-between) -0.564*** (.05) -0.594*** (.04)
DIC 46391 46663  
Note: Multinomial random effect models. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 for within-block 
party switches and the value of 2 for party switches between blocks (base category: no change). (Base 
category: no change). Regression coefficients, se in parenthesis. Significant at *0.05, **0.01, ***0.001. 
Reference category: no change. Var re: variance of random effect. Source: SOEP 1984-2010 
(n=204’145 clustered in 22’275 individuals), BHPS 1991-2008 (n=133’508 clustered in 15’207 
individuals, SHP 1999-2010 (n=35050 clustered in 7140 individuals). 
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Period effects 
Next, we discuss period effects, which are shown in Figure 11 as predicted 
probabilities (computed from Model 3 in Table 12)
44
. Period effects are significant in 
all three countries, which underlines that they cannot be ignored for this type of 
analysis. But the effects are not linear and vary strongly over years. Volatility peaks in 
election years, which we will address in detail in Chapter 8. The effect of elections 
was particularly strong for 1997 in Great Britain, 2009 in Germany and 2003 and 
2007 in Switzerland. More generally, the strong differences in volatility across years 
illustrates that there are important context effects specific, which we do not cover with 
our more general comparative approach here. Rather than explain particular effects 
for a country and year, we are interested in the more general time trend. Our results 
show that an increasing volatility over time as claimed by dealignment theories has 
occurred only in Switzerland. In Great Britain, volatility seems to decrease slightly 
and in Germany, volatility shows no clear trend. But even in Switzerland, the increase 
is more likely to reflect the transformation of the party system since the mid-1990s 
than dealignment process. The rise and transformation of the Swiss People’s Party 
(SVP) as well as new parties (BDP, Green liberals) are important aspects of this 
fundamental change. More detailed analysis show that respondents who support the 
SVP are indeed more volatile than supporters of other parties. But volatility for 
respondents preferring the SVP declined over time, probably because the 
transformation of the party has been mostly completed. The volatility increased over 
time for supporters of other parties. 
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 The period effect is similar in Model 1 and Model3. But in Model 2, which includes years of 
duration but not relative duration, volatility appears to increase more strongly over time in all three 
countries. The results of model 2 for period effects can be rather attributed to multicollinearity of 
absolute duration measure. 
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Figure 11 : Party switches: period effects in CH, GB and DE 
 
For period effects, the distinction of party blocks was revealed to be important. Figure 
12 shows the year-to-year volatility level, separately for within- and between-block 
change. In all three countries volatility within blocks increased.
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 In Great Britain, the 
increasing volatility within party blocks is due to the growing importance of small 
parties (regional parties from Scotland and Wales, and the Green party). Even though 
they still play a minor role, their share increased from 2.7 % in 1993 to 5.1 % in 2008. 
In contrast to within-block changes, the evolution of volatility between party blocks 
shows very different patterns across the countries: changes between party blocks 
became more important in Switzerland over time, decreased in Great Britain and 
remained stable in Germany (linear time trend in the model is not significant). In 
Switzerland, the high volatility level since 2007 observed in the binary model is thus 
due to both to within and between-block changes. In Great Britain, the overall decline 
of volatility is due to fewer changes between party blocks.  
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Figure 12 : Period effects and party blocks 
 
Cohort and socialisation effects 
Next, we discuss cohort effects, which are more difficult to interpret. Due to the 
problem of multicollinearity between cohort, age, period and duration, results are 
sensitive to model specifications. Besides the models presented in Table 12 we tested 
many other model specification (different coding for duration and period). We will 
refer to such alternative models if findings are not robust. In Switzerland, where the 
panel is shortest, age effects become insignificant once cohort variables are included 
into the model. The only cohort effect in Switzerland is the higher volatility of the 
cohort born between 1940 and 1949 compared to older cohorts. In Germany, with the 
longest running panel, cohort effects depend on the model specification. In M4 
presented in Table 12, the cohort variables are not significant. But without controlling 










































1940 and 1949 are more volatile than the other birth cohorts.
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 In Great Britain, the 
older cohorts appear generally more volatile. But rather than reflecting cohort effects, 
the instability of the coefficients of age suggest that this is likely to result from 
multicollinearity between age and cohort. Although we have to be cautious in 
interpreting results due to the instability of the models, it is striking that in both 
Switzerland and Germany the cohort born between 1940 and 1949, which is the “68 
cohort”, shows a relatively high volatility level. A potential explanation could be the 
highly politicised environment during the socialisation of this cohort. However, in 
Great Britain we could not find this pattern. A consistent result for all countries is that 
standard errors of regression coefficients for cohorts increase with cohort age. This 
means that younger cohorts are more heterogeneous than older cohorts in their 
stability level.  
The distinction of party blocks does not reveal clearer cohort effects. In Switzerland, 
cohorts are not significant and do not reveal meaningful effects in Great Britain. For 
Germany, we find only one effect: the oldest generation switches more often between 
party blocks than most younger cohorts. We here find limited support for stronger 
volatility of the pre-war generation as expected.  
In sum, cohort effects are not coherent and robust. Maybe our data does not cover a 
long enough time span to appropriately separate cohort and age effects. But 
considering that cohorts do not increase model performance in any of the three 
countries analysed, they seem to matter very little. The hypothesis of higher volatility 
of younger cohorts claimed by many authors is not supported in our models. 
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 While for the youngest cohort, the result could still be an age effect (we observe this cohort only at 
young age), the explanation for the cohort 1940-1959 could lie in its socialisation. It is the “68 cohort” 
socialised in after-war Germany. 
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Nevertheless, the weak or absent cohort effects mean that we can be confident that the 
age effects discovered reflect a true life-cycle effect. 
We next address the effect of citizens who grew up in another political system: 
immigrants and former East German citizens in Germany. We expected higher 
volatility for these groups. However, immigrants are not more volatile in any of the 
countries and models distinguishing change and no change. On the contrary, German 
immigrants seem even to be more stable than German-born citizens. In Switzerland 
and Great Britain, the migration background has no significant impact on volatility. 
But for former citizens of the GDR, we do find higher volatility than for other 
German citizens. 
Party blocks are important for the volatility of immigrants in Germany. While 
immigrants appeared to be less volatile in the overall model, a closer looks reveals 
that this is due to within-block change only. Immigrants change more frequently 
between party blocks than citizens born in Germany. In Switzerland and Great 
Britain, results for migration background remain insignificant once we distinguish 
party blocks. An interesting insight give models on migration background once we 
control for interest in politics (see results in Chapter 7). The result of higher between-
block volatility of immigrants to Germany is reinforced, and the immigration variable 
becomes significant for Switzerland. The different results in the different models are 
interesting because they reveal the underlying causalities. The higher between-block 
volatility of German immigrants cannot be explained by a lower interest in politics of 
immigrants. Rather, interest in politics masks somewhat the direct effect of political 
socialisation in another political system on between-block volatility in Switzerland 
and Germany. Because immigrants have, on average, a lower political interest than 
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citizens born in the country and because low political interest is related to lower 
volatility (as we will see in the next Chapter 7), the volatility-reducing effect of 
political interests offsets the volatility-increasing effects of socialisation partly or 
entirely. In Great Britain, immigrants change less within party blocks than citizens 
born in the country once we control for interest in politics. 
Surprisingly, the result for former citizens of the Germany Democratic Republic has 
the opposite pattern than for immigrants. The higher volatility of citizens who have 
lived in East Germany is uniquely due to within-block volatility. Former East German 
citizens do not change more frequently between party blocks than Former West 
German citizens. While former East-German citizens change more often within 
blocks, immigrants change more often between party blocks. Because both these 
groups have not been socialised in the current political system, our socialisation 
hypothesis cannot explain the results. We therefore have to look at the parties 
involved in these changes. For immigrants, the most frequent change occurred 
between SPD and CDU (47.8 % of all changes), whereas East Germans were more 
likely to choose little parties, particularly the Left party. 19 % of all changes occurred 
between the SPD and the left party and only 18.3 % between SPD and CDU. Overall, 
the hypothesis of higher volatility among citizens who have been socialised in another 
political system could not be supported by the empirical models.  
 135 
Age and types of changers 
We come back to the types of changes discussed in section 5.2: temporary change, 
durable change, ambiguity and random change. The focus here is not on comparing 
stable individuals and volatile changers as before, but on the differences between the 
groups of changers, which could not be addressed with regression analysis. As in 
section 5.2, the sample consists of individuals who named at least five parties during 
twelve waves of observations. However, the perspective and interpretation depends on 
whether we include the individuals with stable preferences in the frequency tables. 
Including stable individuals, we find that volatility declines over the life cycle which 
confirms our previous findings. But having compared changers and stable individuals 
already in detail in the multivariate models, it is more interesting to focus on the 
different types of volatility and thus look closer on the subsample individuals who 
change between parties by age groups.  Table 14 presents cross tabulations of types of 
changes by five age groups, excluding the majority individuals who keep the same 
party preference over all waves. Generally, results show that age not only impacts the 
probability for change, but also the type of change.  
Among young adults who change parties, durable change is relatively frequent in all 
three countries. This confirms that the years following electoral eligibility are indeed 
formative years, where individuals find their party position. The relatively low 
frequency of temporary change among young citizens underlines further that they 
rarely have an established party preference. The formative years do however not 
reveal a particular high level of ambiguous party preferences or random change.  
However, random changes differences over the life-cycle are hard to interpret for 
random change, as they are marginal. 
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In the oldest age group (65 years), temporary change is clearly the most important 
type of volatility. This suggests that older citizens are not only the least likely to 
change (as the previous analysis has shown), but if they change it is usually for a 
temporary departure from their latent party preference. Moreover, the oldest age 
group is also the least likely to have ambiguous preferences in Switzerland and 
Germany. 
For the intermediate age groups, the relationship between life cycle effects and type of 
change varies strongly between countries. In Switzerland, there is no difference 
between the three age groups between 30 and 64 years. In Great Britain, the 30 to 49 
year olds are similar to the youngest age group and the 50-64 year olds are similar to 
the oldest age group. In Germany, there are relatively continuous life-cycle effects for 
temporary change, while durable change shows relatively high volatility level up to 39 
years and relatively lower volatility levels after 40 years.    
 137 
Table 14: Types of party switches by age in DE, GB and CH 
DE 18-29 30-39 40-49 50-64 65+ Total n 
Temporary change 30.1 36.7 38.6 42.0 47.6 39.1 992
Durable change 48.7 44.1 39.0 37.6 38.0 41.1 1082
Ambiguity 19.1 18.9 20.1 17.3 12.9 17.9 463
Random change 2.2 0.3 2.3 3.1 1.5 2.0 40
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 8985
GB 18-29 30-39 40-49 50-64 65+ Total n 
Temporary change 38.7 38.7 43.7 45.9 46.1 42.5 1631
Durable change 37.0 36.6 37.0 30.5 31.1 34.4 1354
Ambiguity 21.3 21.4 16.1 20.0 21.0 20.0 788
Random change 2.9 3.3 3.3 3.6 1.8 3.0 134
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
CH 18-29 30-39 40-49 50-64 65+ Total n 
Temporary change 34.8 38.4 41.4 37.9 46.4 39.3 745
Durable change 37.8 33.9 34.3 34.3 28.5 34.1 655
Ambiguity 18.8 18.4 19.4 20.4 15.0 18.8 362
Random change 8.7 9.3 4.8 7.4 10.1 7.8 155
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  3434  
Sample: Individuals with party preferences in at least five waves and who changed party preference. 
Source: SOEP (1999-2009), BHPS (1998-2008), SHP (1999-2009).  
 Conclusions for age, cohort and period effects 6.1
To conclude this chapter, we briefly address age, reinforcement, cohort and period 
effects in turn. We found strong life-cycle effects showing stabilisation of party 
preferences with age. The effect is non-linear, as change is most frequent in young 
age groups until the age of about 30. From about 60 years of age, the volatility level 
remains constant or declines only little. This supports theories which argue that 
political characteristics are shaped in early adulthood in a learning phase and remain 
rather stable afterwards. However, change cannot be mainly attributed to socialisation. 
We found increasing persistence after these formative years over the entire life-cycle. 
Furthermore, the level of change remains considerable in later years. More detailed 
analyses of different types of change suggest that the life-cycle is more important for 
change within party blocks than for change between party blocks. The learning phase 
is thus not only about finding an ideological position but also a phase of openness and 
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stronger response to external influences. The important role of the formative years is 
further underlined by the distinction of the types of change. Young adults are 
particularly likely to change their party preference durably, whereas temporary 
departures from latent party preferences are more common for the elderly. Finally, the 
life-cycle effect remains robust, even if cohorts, period or reinforcement effects are 
controlled for. In contrast we found no consistent evidence for cohort effects. In 
particular, volatility of younger cohorts is not higher than for older cohorts, as would 
be expected by theories of dealignment.  
The evidence for reinforcement effects is impressive, so that we can almost talk about 
an immunisation process. The longer a party preference has been held, the less likely 
becomes a change to another party. Whether this reflects a true autroregressive 
process or a stable trait is controversial. Our results suggest that both contribute to 
stabilisation. 
For period effects, we found that volatility levels vary strongly over the years and 
peak at election years. Only Switzerland shows an increasing volatility over time, in 
particular since 2007. But once party blocks are distinguished, we found raising 
within-block volatility in all the three countries, which reflects the growing 
importance of small parties. Between block volatility however has evolved very 
differently in the three party systems: it decreased in Great Britain, increased in 
Switzerland and has not changed in Germany. As for cohorts, we find no support that 
dealignment causes higher volatility. The most plausible explanation for the trend in 
Switzerland is the transformation of the Swiss party system during this period of 
observation.  
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We have expected that socialisation outside the current party system causes a higher 
volatility level. However, we found only weak support for this. We have found 
immigrants to Germany to be more volatile between party blocks than citizens born in 
Germany. The same applies for Switzerland once we controlled for interest in politics. 
In Germany, former citizens of the German Democratic Republic are more likely to 
change within party blocks, because they often switch between the Left party (die 
Linke, PdS) and other left parties.  
In sum, we found very strong life-cycle and reinforcement effect in all three countries. 
Considering the different party systems, and particularly the different question 
wordings for party preference, the robustness of the findings is remarkable. For cohort 
and period effects, as well as the role of immigrants, results differ between countries, 
but these differences are likely to depend on the specific context, such as parties and 
events during the period of observation. 
7  
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Political awareness and predispositions 
 Political awareness 7.1
Political awareness is one of the key explanatory variables for opinion change and 
crucial for change in party preferences. Political awareness refers to individuals’ 
psychological involvement and skills, which help to understand and participate in the 
political world (e.g. Jennings and Niemi 1981). Many different aspects relate to 




Many theoretical approaches offer explanations for the effect of political awareness 
on opinion change. Psychological models on information processing are most 
prominent and can be applied to opinion formation or volatility of party preferences 
(e.g. Zaller 1992, Chapter 12, or Lachat 2007). Information processing includes 
individuals’ information reception, interpretation, storage, retrieval, selection and use 
in political decisions. Models relying on memory based processing assume that 
individuals have different considerations stored in memory. One of the most 
influential models in political science has been formulated by Zaller (1992). He 
argues that we have to look at and distinguish information reception and information 
acceptance when assessing information processing. 
We will first discuss information reception. The relationship between information 
reception and opinion change is ambiguous. Political awareness increases the 
                                                 
47
 Political awareness is also referred to as political sophistication and political expertise, or in the 
literature on dealignment, as cognitive mobilisation. Similar to political awareness, Converse (1964) 
refers to levels of conceptualisation, which measure the level of constraints in belief systems, or in 
other words, the ability to associate issues in a broader ideological framework. 
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probability of information reception, because highly aware citizens are more exposed 
and pay more attention to surrounding information. In Zaller’s model, information 
reception increases the probability to change. However, the opposite may also be true, 
because the highly aware should also receive more information in line with 
predispositions, thus reinforcing existing opinions. Selective exposure may even 
increase the reinforcement effect. We could therefore imagine different relationships 
between political sophistication and information reception.  
The effect of political sophistication on information acceptance is clearer. Individuals 
with low levels of political awareness are more responsive to information about 
parties than individuals with high levels of political awareness. Those who are less 
aware have fewer bases from which to form political judgements and to assess 
whether new information is in line with their predispositions or not. In contrast, 
highly aware individuals are able to assimilate new information to their 
predispositions and to counter argue it (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Zaller 1992). The 
highly aware may therefore be especially resistant to the influence of any single dose 
of information. For these reasons, political awareness should make change less likely. 
In Zaller’s model, the probability to change is the product of the probability to receive 
information and the probability to accept information. Moreover, the shape of the 
relationship depends on the familiarity of the issue, its intensity and the direction of 
information flow. For two-sided information flow, the relationship between political 
awareness and opinion change is non-linear. Citizens with intermediate levels of 
political awareness are most likely to change their preference. Voters who are less 
aware remain relatively stable because they do not receive information which might 
cause a preference change. Also highly interested voters are relatively stable. 
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Although they receive a lot of information, they are also more likely to reject 
information that contradicts their predispositions or values. Voters with intermediate 
levels of awareness are most volatile because they receive information through media 
or conversations and are likely to accept this information.  
However, if we assume a different effect of information reception, such as 
reinforcement effects, volatility would decline with political awareness. In 
experiments, the role of information reception is usually not assessed at all because 
information reception is almost always controlled by the experiment design. Studies 
based on experiments can therefore not be compared to real-world data, as they only 
reflect the effect of information acceptance and not the overall effect. 
Zaller’s theory has been applied to many circumstances, mainly to issue opinions (e.g. 
Krosnick and Brannon 1993; Kriesi 2002; Bützer and Marquis 2002; Sciarini and 
Kriesi 2003; Goren 2004; Dobrzynska and Blais 2008). Empirical evidence on 
Zaller’s model is mixed. It confirms that the effect of political awareness depends 
strongly on the context, notably on the intensity, familiarity and direction of 
information flow. But despite mixed findings and limited empirical support, Zaller’s 
model has been very powerful, also because it is parsimonious and gives clear testable 
hypothesis. There are two critical points we would like to discuss. The first is Zaller’s 
treatment of predispositions (see also Sciarini and Kriesi 2003; Goren 2004). Zaller 
uses predispositions only when assessing the direction of opinion change or direction 
of information flow, e.g. distinguishing effects for democrats and republicans, but he 
does not control for predisposition strength. We will discuss the role of predisposition 
in detail in the next section. Another critique applies to Zaller’s view of information 
flow. Information is seen as top-down, from elites via mass media to the public. The 
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model does not take account of interpersonal communication either. With internet and 
other new media, the assumption of elite controlled information flow has become a 
very strong simplification. 
An alternative to memory based information processing is on-line processing (Hastie 
and Park 1986; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989). People who are highly attentive to 
the flow of political news are likely to think a lot about political affairs and evaluate 
this information. Although they forget the specific information content, the evaluation 
of the information is stored in memory. When new relevant information is acquired, 
their evaluations or opinions are updated. Therefore, if asked about their voting 
intentions, these individuals retrieve and report their on-line evaluations. On-line 
evaluations are relatively stable, because they are based on large sets of previously 
acquired information; therefore new pieces of information only have small impact on 
them. Consequently, recent news media content should have relatively little effect on 
highly attentive citizens. In contrast, citizens who pay little attention to the flow of 
news are unlikely to have such general political evaluations stored in memory. When 
asked about their voting intention, they rather apply memory based processing and 
recall whatever they can about parties on the spot. Online processing thus presumes 
greater stability for highly aware citizens.  
Taken together, socio-psychological theories expect either a non-linear or a negative 
relationship between political awareness and change, depending on whether memory 
based or online based information processing is considered, and depending on the role 
of information reception. 
Also, dealignment theory discusses the relationship between awareness and volatility. 
The hypothesis of cognitive mobilisation sees increasing education, sophistication and 
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the easier availability of information as cause for the decline of party identification 
(Dalton 1984; Dalton 2000). But the causality between a more enlightened electorate 
and the decline of party identification has clearly been rejected by empirical analysis 
(Albright 2009).  
Although there are many studies which measure the effect of political awareness, 
almost all look at issue opinions. Only Lachat (2007) and Zaller (1992) focus on 
political awareness for the volatility of party preferences. Lachat studied Germany 
and Switzerland, which we also cover here. In Germany, political awareness had no 
significant effect on changes within party blocks, but had a non-linear effect on 
changes between party blocks. In Switzerland, the relation for within-block changes 
was non-linear. For between-block change in Switzerland, volatility increased with 
political awareness. Others studies included political interest or education among 
independent variables, but did not focus on the aspect and did not test for non-linear 
effects. Zuckerman, Dasovic and Fitzgerald (2007, 65) find that high levels of 
political interest generate “greater partisan consistency”, but do not address party 
switches. Schmitt-Beck, Weik and Christoph (2006) find that party switches become 
more frequent with political awareness in Germany. Green and Yoon (2002) find that 
the dynamic process of party identification does not differ for different levels of 
political awareness. Kuhn (2009) found non-linear effects for Switzerland, but 
differences for within and between-block changes.  
So far, empirical results on the relationship between political awareness and party 
switches have thus remained ambiguous. The contrasting results could be due to 
different research designs, different contexts, as well as a different operationalisation 
of political awareness and change. But it is striking that socio-psychological theories 
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expect low volatility for highly aware citizens, while none of the empirical studies has 
found that volatility declines with political awareness.   
The different theories result in different theoretical expectations. To apply Zaller’s 
RAS model, we first have to define the context regarding familiarity, intensity and 
direction of information flow. In contrast to other tests of his models, we do not focus 
on short time development but look at change in a longer and more general context. 
We cannot relate our data to precise information flow. Information flow depends on 
the party and the country, and varies over time. In chapter 8, we will look at the effect 
of the electoral cycle, which reflects density of information flow. Direction of 
information flow is not important for us because we are mainly interested in whether a 
change occurs or not. We assume that citizens are exposed to information flow that 
goes in various directions. Finally, we assume that party related information is 
relatively familiar. In this situation, with relative familiarity and two-sided (or multi 
sided) information, we expect a non-linear relationship between awareness and party 
change according to Zaller’s model. According to theories of online processing, we 
expect volatility to decline with political awareness. Both theories agree on the 
stronger stability of highly aware citizens.  
However, awareness may not have the same effect on all types of change. To develop 
more specific hypotheses, we come back to the separation of information reception 
and information acceptance. The probability to change is the product of the 
probability to receive information and the probability to accept information. We 
expect that information reception increases with political awareness, irrespective of 
the type of change. However, information acceptance differs between types of change. 
For between-block change, we expect decreasing probability to accept information, 
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while for within-block changes, acceptance should not depend on political awareness. 
Because parties are ideologically close, within-block changes do not go against 
predispositions. In contrast, between-block change implies a considerable change in 
the political space and may therefore be inconsistent with underlying predispositions 
of voters. As a result, according to Zaller’s model, we expect increasing probability 
for a within-block change with political awareness and a non-linear or decreasing 
probability for a between-block change. With online based memory processing, we 
except decreasing volatility with increasing political awareness for a between-block 
change.  
For the other types of change (durable change, temporary change, ambiguity and 
randomness) expectations are less clear. For random answers, we expect a negative 
relationship with political awareness.  
 Predisposition strength 7.2
Predispositions have always been a main explanation for stability of party 
preferences. In the Columbia studies (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948; Butler 
and Stokes 1971), socio-structural predispositions, first of all social class, play an 
important role for electoral choice. Because socio-structural predispositions are highly 
stable, electoral choice is also relatively stable. The link between social structure, the 
party system and stability of voting is made even more explicitly by cleavage theory 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Bartolini and Mair 1990), although stability refers more to 
party systems than to individual-level volatility. In the Michigan model, the stability 
arises mainly from psychological predispositions, in the form of party identification. 
Many recent studies underline the importance of predispositions in explaining 
stability (Miller and Shanks 1996; Clarke et al. 2004; Arzheimer and Schoen 2005). 
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Predispositions are also central in socio-psychological models of information 
processing. In Zaller’s theory, predispositions are interrelated with political 
awareness. Zaller argues that predispositions have no effect “unless the individual is 
sufficiently aware to possess the contextual information that enables resistance to 
uncongenial messages” (Zaller 1992, 137). Although in a later study on the case of 
Monica Lewinsky (Zaller 1998), he concluded that political predispositions may have 
a stabilising effect, independent from awareness. Moreover, predispositions are 
inherent in the resistance function in the RAS-model, although this interaction is more 
implicit. Only when information runs against predispositions is there a reason to reject 
it. Therefore, the resistance effect should increase with predisposition strength. This 
has implications for the study of political awareness. Even if predispositions are not 
explicitly controlled for in a statistical model, they will play a role, as they influence 
the acceptance of information.  
Despite the importance of predispositions, Zaller rarely includes predisposition 
strength in his models. If it is included, he only takes account of the direction, e.g. by 
separating democrats and republicans. Regarding the interaction between awareness 
and predisposition strength, Zaller argues that interaction effects introduce multi-
collinearity and do not increase model performance (Zaller 1992, 137f.). In contrast, 
Lachat (2007) tested systematically for interactions between political awareness and 
predisposition strength. He found that the interaction is significant, but does not assess 
overall model performance. Looking at issues, other authors found little support for 
such interaction effects (Feldman and Zaller 1992; Goren 2004; Dobrzynska and Blais 
2008).  
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The empirical influence of predisposition strength on volatility depends on the choice 
of indicators. Despite consensus on the importance of predispositions, there is a lack 
of a common conceptualisation. We will discuss frequently used indicators for 
predispositions to show what implications the choice of indicators may have on 
findings. A first criterion to evaluate the different indicators is the exogeneity to 
change. The more an indicator can be considered as exogenous, the more meaningful 
the explanation for stability of party preference. A second criterion is the relationship 
with political awareness.  
First we look at socio-structural predispositions, which involve, most importantly, 
social class and religion. In contrast to early electoral studies, socio-structural 
predispositions are, with the exception of Lachat (2007),
48
 rarely considered in recent 
studies on opinion change or party change. However, in cross-sectional studies on 
voting behaviour, social class remains relevant when divisions within the middle class 
are taken into (see Güveli and De Graaf 2007 for a review; Lachat 2007 for Germany 
and Switzerland). Similarly, religion remains significant for voting when not only 
religious denomination but also religious practise is considered (Kriesi and Trechsel 
2008). Therefore, if socio-structural characteristics impact electoral choice, they 
should also have a stabilising effect. For socio-structural predisposition, such as social 
class, religion, region or race, it is safe to assume exogeneity from party preferences. 
Socio-structural predispositions are highly stable individual characteristics and should 
not be strongly associated with political awareness.  
                                                 
48
 Lachat’s measure of predispositions mixes socio-structural and psychological predispositions in an 
additive index. 
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A second type of indictor for predispositions is psychological predispositions. 
Opinion strength, but also strength of party identification, are frequently used, 
particularly in studies on issue opinions (e.g. Dobrzynska and Blais 2008; Sciarini and 
Kriesi 2003). As we have argued repeatedly, the exogeneity assumption is 
problematic for strength of party identification. Explaining stability of party 
preferences with strength of party identification remains somewhat tautological (see 
also Selb et al. 2009). Apart from the limited explanatory power in terms of 
understanding underlying mechanisms, coefficients of other variables may be biased 
due to endogeneity.  
Psychological predispositions are linked to political awareness. Citizens can only 
express a party identification if they are conscious of their predisposition and thus 
have a certain level of political awareness. Empirical correlations between political 
awareness and strength of party identification confirm this. For example in the SOEP 
data, only one per cent of strong or very strong identifiers are not at all interested in 
politics. Or, in the BHPS data, the correlation coefficient between interest in politics 
and strength of party identification amounts to 0.5.  
Sciarini and Kriesi (2003) use opinion crystallisation, which measures the embedding 
of the opinion in an individual’s attitude structure, as an additional indicator for 
predisposition. Converse
 
(1964) has introduced levels of conceptualisation as an 
indicator for political awareness rather than a predisposition (see also Sniderman, 
Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Dalton 2000).
 
The fact that levels of conceptualisation are 
used both as an indicator for political awareness and an indicator for predisposition 
strength, clearly illustrates the connection of this indicator with both awareness and 
predisposition strength.  
 150 
Finally, we discuss an indicator, which has been derived from rational choice 
proximity models. The closer a party is to a citizen’s position, the more likely and the 
stronger the person's identification with that party will be (Downs 1957; C. H. 
Franklin and Jackson 1983, 959). From this perspective, we see an individual’s 
position in the political space as a predisposition and the distance between an 
individual and a party as an indicator for predisposition strength. Ideological positions 
or policy preferences are rarely considered in literature as a form of predisposition to 
explain volatility. This is in contrast to models on electoral choice, where policy 
preferences or issue positions are standard explanatory variables.  
With ideological position, the problem of endogeneity should be less serious than for 
strength of party identification, but it remains to some extent. There is evidence that 
citizens adapt issue positions to be in line with their preferred party (Carsey and 
Layman 2006; Lenz 2009). We can expect that highly aware citizens are better able to 
match their ideological position to the parties. If there is an association between 
political awareness and predisposition strength, it is political awareness which 
influences predisposition strength. 
Considering the different measures of predisposition strength as well as their 
endogeneity and association with political awareness, it is not surprising that 
empirical results on the effect of awareness on volatility are mixed. In particular, 
strength of party identification is endogenous and related to political awareness. 
Furthermore, the interaction between political awareness and predisposition strength 
is of a different nature when socio-structural predispositions or psychological 
predispositions are considered. For our model, we expect that predisposition strength 
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increases stability. However, it is important to distinguish different types of 
predispositions and look closely at the interaction with political awareness. 
 Methods and operationalisation 7.3
As in chapter 6, we will first analyse volatility using a competing-risk model (change 
within block, change between block).
49
 The reference category is no change. We will 
use all available panel waves. Afterwards, we will distinguish the other types of 
change: durable change, temporary change, random change and ambiguity. By 
looking at cross tabulations, we will test how they relate to political awareness.  
Political awareness is measured through interest in politics.
50
 In the SOEP and BHPS, 
political interest is measured as an ordinal variable with four categories. In 
Switzerland, political interest is measured on a scale from 0 (not at all interested) to 
10 (very interested). We do not adjust these different scales, in order not to lose 
information, and because there are no good a priori reasons on how to recode the 
scales. For example, assuming a continuous variable of interest in the SOEP and the 
BHPS imposes strong assumptions and, if we want to measure nonlinear effects, we 
would gain only one degree of freedom. Missing values in the interest in politics have 
been imputed using values from previous waves of the same person where possible.
51
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 We distinguish three party blocks (see section 3.3). 
50
 The most widely used indicator of political awareness is political knowledge, which is not available 
in the data at hand. But there is also a substantial argument for relying on political interest instead of 
political knowledge. Several studies have shown that political knowledge varies over the electoral cycle 
(e.g. Andersen, Tilley and Heath, 2005, Fridkin et al., 2007, Lenz, 2009). For our analysis, political 
awareness should be independent from the electoral cycle. 
51
 In the BHPS, political interest has not been collected in 4 waves. We therefore also imputed political 
interest from later waves of the same person if necessary. By imputing these values, we assume that 
political interest remains relatively stable. This is preferable to excluding these values from analysis, 
which would assume that political interest is completely missing at random. Imputing values reduces 
the share of missing values for political interest in the BHPS from 22.7 % to 1.7 %. 
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As a second measure for political awareness, we control for educational levels. In 
each country, three educational levels are distinguished: low educational level and 
incomplete education (1), intermediate educational level (2), and high educational 
level (tertiary education) (3). While political interest captures the motivation, 
education better captures the ability aspect of political awareness.  
For predisposition strength, we will focus first of all on socio-structural 
predispositions. We will test whether socio-structural characteristics still have the 
stabilising effect suggested by cleavage theory and sociological models of voting. The 
crucial point is that strength of socio-structural predispositions varies among 
individuals. While some groups may have strong ties to particular parties, others have 
no clear predisposition. The stronger socio-structural predispositions are, the stronger 
the probability to prefer a particular party is. Because predispositions are stable, 
stability in voting intention increases with strength of socio-structural predispositions, 
to the extent that predispositions influence voting choice. Because parties in the same 
block usually do not differ in their positions along the main cleavage lines, cleavages 
should affect changes between party blocks, but not changes within party blocks 
(Bartolini and Mair 1990, 36). However, with the transformed class cleavage, this 
may not necessarily be the case anymore. Moreover, the religious cleavage cuts across 
the centre-right block in Switzerland, and could therefore also affect within-block 
change in Switzerland. To measure the strength of socio-structural predispositions, we 
largely follow the approach presented by Lachat (2007: pp. 201ff.). As a first step we 
regress the different parties on social class, region (rural vs. urban) and religion. 
Additionally, we include age and sex as control variables. Secondly, for each 
individual, we calculate predicted probabilities to vote for each of the parties. Thirdly, 
for each individual we keep the highest predicted probability of indicating 
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predisposition strength, irrespective of which party has the highest value. Finally, we 
recode these maximum probabilities into the 0 to 1 range.
52
 
The measurement of socio-structural predispositions of social class, religion and 
region differs slightly between the data sets used, as we do not always have all 
necessary information available. We will briefly discuss each variable. The most 
complicated task is the measurement of social class, as class schemes distinguishing 
the middle class are not readily available in the panel data, but have to be constructed 
from ISCO codes (4 digits).
53
  
We apply the class concept and coding-scheme developed by Kriesi (1989) and 
adopted by Lachat (2007), which distinguishes the following classes: self-employed 
farmers and other self-employed workers, unskilled workers, skilled workers, routine 
non-manual employees, managers and administrative specialists, technical specialists 
and social-cultural specialists. Furthermore, class should be assigned to a maximum 
number of respondents and not only to the economically active. Social class is 
preferably assigned on an individual level and not on a household level using 
information from household heads. For individuals out of employment, we take 
classifications from their last job. Unfortunately, ISCO-codes from the last job are not 
available in the SOEP data. We imputed social class of the last job in the SOEP using 
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 This approach differs in a few small points from the one chosen by Lachat (2007). First, we do not 
include labour market status into the regression in order to be sure to measure the effect of socio-
structural predispositions. Secondly, and for a similar reason, we do not include psychological 
predispositions, such as the strength of party identification into the model. Only by including socio-
structural and psychological predispositions separately in our model, can we disentangle the effect of 
these two different kinds of predispositions. Also, we can assess model estimates without the potential 
problematic influence of party identification with its problem of endogeneity.  
53
 Oesch (2006) has done this for his own class scheme with the data from different household panels. 
However, his analysis did only involve one wave and has been restricted to economically active 
citizens. Therefore, we cannot make use of this class here, as we would lose too much information and 
want to use all waves of the panel and also include individuals who not economically active. 
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information on job position (blue collar, white collar, self-employed), educational 
level and industry branch (from the nace code) with a regression approach. In all three 
panels, individuals who did not indicate a last job, mainly because they were not 
economically active, have been assigned the partner’s or parents’ social position as a 
proxy in order to assign a social class to the maximum of respondents (Güveli and De 
Graaf 2007; Müller 1999, 153; Knutsen 2006). If social class was still missing and 
respondents were under 30 years of age, social class has been assigned according to 
the social class from the social origin information (questionnaire on situation when 
respondents were about 15). With this approach, 4 % of respondents in Switzerland,  
9 % in Germany and 3 % in Great Britain have not been assigned to a class.  
For religion, literature has shown that not only denomination but also religious 
practice is important. We included the following dummy variables: catholic 
denomination and attendance of religious services at least once a month, catholic 
denomination and religious participation less than once a month, protestant 
denomination (in GB: Anglican) and attendance of religious services at least once a 
month, protestant denomination (in GB: Anglican) and religious participation less 
than once a month and all others (reference category).  
The region is measured in Switzerland by distinguishing rural and other communities 
based on the community typology of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. For 
Germany, we used the variable distance to the next centre. In the BHPS, no 
corresponding variable has been available.  
For psychological predispositions, we include strength of party identification, which 
is measured in the SOEP and the BHPS. For two reasons, we refer to the strength of 
party identification from the last party named. First, we have predisposition strength 
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for respondents with no party preference in the current wave and secondly, we limit 
the endogeneity of predisposition strength, as predisposition strength precedes party 
switches.   
In Switzerland, we do not have a measure on the strength of party identification (since 
respondents are not asked about party identification but about voting intention). 
Instead, the SHP contains various issue opinions which allow the positioning of each 
individual in the two dimensional political space. We can therefore measure the 
ideological distance between a party and the last party preferred. We have already 
constructed political space in Switzerland for the construction of party blocks using 
issue positions from the SHP (see section 3.3). We can therefore simply compute the 
distance between an individual's position and the position of the last preferred party. 
We have multiplied the distance by -1 so that higher values refer to closeness to the 
party, in order to have an indicator for predisposition strength. We additionally 
rescaled the variable to fit into the range from 0 to 1. The closer an individual is to the 
preferred party, a change from that party to another is less likely. If the preferred party 
in the past does not match individual position well, we expect a high probability for a 
change between party blocks. With ideological positions, there should be less of an 
endogeneity problem than with strength of party identification.  
Additionally, we control for panel participation (see section 4.1), as well as for age, 
migration background, former East Germans (in the SOEP), survey year and duration 
of party preference. In contrast to chapter 5 on reinforcement and life-cycle effects, 
we do not include squared terms for age and duration of party preference, in order to 
limit model complexity and because we are not primarily interested in these variables 
here. For reinforcement effect (duration of party preference) we constrain the 
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parameter to be equal for between and within block change, because duration refers to 
the last change irrespective of party blocks. 
 Empirical results and discussion 7.4
Competing risk models for within and between block change 
The results of the event-history models, excluding (Model 1) and including (Model 2) 
predispositions strength, are presented in Table 15. Firstly, we will discuss the effect 
of predispositions of Model 2 and then turn to political awareness in Models 1 and 2. 
As expected, strong predispositions stabilise party preference. But the effect depends 
on the measurement of predisposition and model specifications. Socio-structural 
predispositions only play a minor role. In line with Bartolini and Mair (1990), we 
expected that cleavages align individuals to party blocks rather than to single parties. 
However, the strength of socio-structural predispositions reduces the volatility 
between party blocks only in Switzerland. In Great-Britain and Germany, socio-
structural predisposition reduces within-block volatility and not between-block 
volatility. Although we find that the class cleavage and the religious cleavage still link 
citizens to parties and have a stabilising effect, the effect is relatively small compared 
to other variables.  
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Table 15: Within-block and between-block change: political awareness and 
predisposition strength in CH, DE, and GB 
M1 within M2 within
DE coeff. sd coeff. sd coeff. sd coeff. sd
Interest: 2 0.597***(.070)0.780***(.073)0.638*** (.078) 0.831*** (.064)
  Interest: 3 1.057***(.073)1.073***(.078)1.134*** (.079) 1.209*** (.064)
  Interest: 4 1.169***(.082)0.980***(.088)1.281*** (.089) 1.201*** (.074)
Education: intermediary 0.263***(.046) -0.068 (.037)0.235*** (.045) -0.058 (.035)
  Education: tertiary 0.307***(.053)-0.147***(.044)0.227*** (.056) -0.117** (.045)
Socio-struct. Predispositions -0.994***(.119) 0.199* (.092)
Strength party idententification -0.140***(.023) -0.315*** (.016)
Immigrants -0.474***(.102) 0.207** (.068)-0.422***0.114 0.181** (.068)
East 0.260***(.049) -0.004 (.040) 0.310***0.052 -0.009 (.040)
Constant -4.846***(.109)-3.809***(.108)-4.244***(.124) -3.274*** (.092)
var cons 1.675***(.122)0.846***(.069)1.760*** (.103) 0.894*** (.046)
cov (within-between) -0.692***(.043) -0.668***(.035)
DIC 101405 100869
GB coeff. sd coeff. sd coeff. sd coeff. sd
Interest: 2 0.062 (.096)0.257***(.026) 0.165 (.099) 0.358*** (.026)
  Interest: 3 0.252* (.100)0.132***(.027)0.489*** (.103) 0.390*** (.029)
  Interest: 4 0.491***(.138) 0.062 (.042)0.864*** (.146) 0.458*** (.045)
Education: intermediary  0.282** (.090) -0.021 (.023) 0.281** (.089)-0.064* (.024)
  Education: tertiary  0.459** (.112) 0.027 (.031)0.432*** (.118)-0.021 (.033)
Socio-struct. Predispositions -0.387 (.209) 0.008 (.050)
Strength party idententification -1.738***(.140)-0.376*** (.040)
Immigrants -0.512* (.256) 0.047 (.056)-0.580* (.264) 0.044 (.056)
Constant -7.486***(.194)-2.919***(.061)-5.617***(.211) -1.440*** (.066)
var cons 3.751***(.255)0.205***(.025)3.643*** (.235) 0.209*** (.027)
cov (within-between) -0.294***(.043) -0.341***(.047)
DIC 99826 98435
M1 within M2 within
CH coeff. sd coeff. sd coeff. sd coeff. sd
Interest  0.140***(.018) 0.149***(.024) 0.085** (.033) 0.140*** (.020)
  Interest squared -0.008***(.002)-0.016***(.003)-0.004 (.002) -0.015*** (.002)
Education: intermediary  0.059 (.086)-0.117* (.062) 0.037 (.076) -0.128* (0.063)
  Education: tertiary  0.392***(.090)-0.173** (.073)0.363*** (.088) -0.154* (.072)
Socio-struct. Predispositions -0.023 (.105) -0.377*** (.104)
Closeness to last  party 0.447*** (.130) -1.603*** (.113)
Immigrants -0.073 (.087) 0.133* (.071) -0.074 (.083) 0.140* (.068)
Constant -3.175***(.13) -2.464***(.128)-3.261***(.133) -1.130*** (.137)
var cons 0.858***(.073)0.562***(.039) 1.340***(.108) 0.178*** (.050)
cov (within-between) -0.604***(.034) -0.279***(.063)
DIC 46420 46261
M1 between M2 between
M1 within M2 within
M1 between M2 between
M1 between M2 between
 
Note: Multinomial random effect models. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 for within-block 
party switches and the value of 2 for party switches between blocks (base category: no change). 
Regression coefficients, se in parenthesis. Significant at *0.05, **0.01, ***0.001. The model includes 
age, migration background, former East Germans (in the SOEP), survey year and panel participation as 
controls. Since the effects of the control variables are not relevant here, these effects are not presented. 
Source: SOEP 1984-2010 (n=206’527 clustered in 20’936 individuals), BHPS 1991-2008 (n=143’379 
clustered in 15’537 individuals), SHP 1999-2010 (n=42’726 clustered in 8185 individuals). 
 
 158 
In contrast, the psychological measures of predispositions have a strong impact, 
which is in line with previous research. It comes as no surprise that strength of party 
identification stabilises party preferences. The finding that those with a strong 
attachment to a party are much less likely to change parties is somewhat tautological 
and does not really explain why individuals are stable or strongly identify with a 
party. However, we can say that those who feel close to a party are much harder to 
convince to support another party.  
In Switzerland, we could not measure strength of party preference, but tested the 
impact of the ideological closeness between parties and individuals in the two-
dimensional political space on volatility. The closer an individual is to the last 
preferred party, the less likely is a change between party blocks. Ideological 
predispositions thus have a strong stabilising effect on party blocks. This does not 
apply to single parties, the effect for within-block change even point to the opposite 
direction. Voters who are ideologically close to the party supporter have a higher 
probability to switch to a party within the same block than voters less close to the 
party supported. The proximity hypothesis is thus supported for party blocks. The 
observed behaviour is consistent with rational voters, who improve the match between 
their ideological position and their party by switching party blocks.   
We now turn to the effect of political awareness and will first discuss the model 
without predisposition strength (M1 in Table 17). Predicted probabilities for change 
are shown in Figure 13 and show the importance of party blocks in all three countries.  
Political awareness increases volatility within party blocks, both for interest in politics 
and the educational level. The most interested and the highly educated citizens change 
most often within party blocks. This is in line with Zaller’s model: information 
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rejection does not play a role for within-block changes, so that the influence of 
political awareness reflects information reception. 
 
Figure 13: Predicted probabilities for switching parties by interest in politics (without 
control for predisposition strength in DE, GB and CH 
 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities calculated from M1 in Table 15.Other variables are held constant at their 
mean or mode (categorical variables), random effect of 0 assumed. 
For changes between party blocks, we find a non-linear relationship between interest 
in politics and volatility, which is also in line with Zaller’s model. Non-linearity is 
clearly evident in Switzerland and Great Britain, but in all countries, individuals with 
intermediate levels of political interest change most frequently between party blocks. 
The relationship reflects the product of information reception and information 
acceptance. Moderately interested citizens change more often between blocks than 
highly interested citizens, because they accept information more easily. But in 
Germany, volatility of the most interested is not significantly lower than volatility for 















































question wording for party preference, because party preferences of the non-
identifiers are not recorded. When we estimate the same model for the BHPS for 
identifiers only, we also find no difference between intermediate and high interest in 
politics. A probable explanation for this will be offered below when discussing model 
2.  
For education and between-block volatility, coefficients point to lower volatility for 
higher educated citizens in Germany and Switzerland.
54
 There are no significant 
differences by educational levels for between-block change in Great Britain. 
Education and interest in politics therefore do not show the same effects. Both play 
independent roles, and controlling for one variable does not affect the influence of the 
other.  
The pattern for political awareness becomes more nuanced once we include 
predisposition strength into the model (M2 in Table 15, Figure 14). Controlling for 
socio-structural predispositions (all countries) and controlling for ideological 
closeness (Switzerland) does not alter the conclusions from model 1. However, the 
non-linear relationship between awareness and volatility disappears in Great Britain 
once strength of party identification is added to the model. In Germany, the control 
for predisposition strength barely impacts the result, but this might again be due to the 
questionnaire. We already controlled for predisposition strength implicitly in model 1, 
as we only capture preferences for individuals with some party predisposition. Taken 
this consideration together, it seems that the non-linear relationship between 
awareness and volatility disappears once we control for strength of party 
                                                 
54
 This holds true only when controlling for duration of party preference, otherwise the effect is not 
significant. 
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identification. In Switzerland, we do not have information on strength of party 
preference, so that we cannot test whether this variables alters the relationship. 
Figure 14: Predicted probabilities for switching parties by interest in politics 
controlling for predisposition strength in DE, GB and CH. 
 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities calculated from M2 in Table 14. Other variables are held constant at their 
mean or mode (categorical variables). 
While the effect of political awareness on volatility depends on type of change 
(within-block or between-block) and control for predisposition strength, none of the 
different specifications suggested that political awareness has a stabilising effect. 
Rather, the little interested are the least volatile citizens, which goes against most 
theories. And once we control for strength of party identification (possible in 
Germany and Great Britain), we find that volatility increases with interest in politics. 
So how should we interpret these patterns?  
An easy answer is to dismiss models controlling for predisposition strength as biased, 
because strength of party preference is endogenous to volatility. However, a more 















































awareness and volatility. For this, we focus on the interaction between political 
awareness and predisposition strength. Firstly, political awareness and strength of 
party identification are positively correlated. Secondly, we argued that predisposition 
strength is inherent in the acceptance of information of the RAS model. The rejection 
of information due to the inconsistency of predispositions requires that there are 
predispositions, and rejection should increase with predisposition strength. The 
decreasing volatility of the highly aware in model 1 can thus be explained by the 
stronger predispositions of these individuals. Strength of party identification drives 
information rejection of highly aware citizens.
55
 When we control for strength of party 
identification (in Model 2), we remove the reason to reject information, and control 
for information acceptance. The resulting relationship between political awareness 
and volatility in Model 2 reflects thus only the reception of information.  
This explanation is also useful to interpret the different results in model 1 in 
Germany. If party preferences are measured by a question on party identification, we 
have a selection of higher interested individuals, with stronger predispositions, if not 
they would not be party identifiers.
56
 Predisposition strength is already partly 
controlled for in the model and the relationship with political awareness reflects the 
reception function.  
                                                 
55
 We tried to test whether the mixed results of other studies can be explained by the control for 
predisposition strength. However, due to the different research designs this does not work so well. For 
example, previous studies did not control for unobserved heterogeneity and did not test for non-linear 
effects or distinguish party blocks.  
56
 Using the BHPS, we can confirm that the subsample using party leaning is, on average, more 
interested in politics and has stronger predispositions than the subsample using voting intention. 
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Groups of changers 
We will look again at the types of change (temporary changes, durable changes, 
ambiguity and random changes) to investigate the effect of political awareness and 
predispositions more closely. As for life-cycle effects, we will use 11 waves from 
each panel (1999-2009 in CH and DE, 1998-2008 in GB) and look at individuals who 
named at least 5 party preferences. To separate differences among types of change 
from differences between stable and volatile individuals, we focus again on the 
subsample of individuals who changed between parties. We distinguish four types of 
change: temporary change, durable change, ambiguity and random patterns. In 
contrast to the event history models, units of analysis are individuals (and not 
observations clustered in individuals). We will cross tabulate the types of change with 
awareness and predisposition. We will use mean interest in politics and predisposition 
(over all observations) for each individual.  
Cross-tabulation between the groups and political awareness are shown in Table 16. 
The data show a very weak relationship between political awareness and types of 
change. Only political interest in Switzerland and education in Germany show 
significant differences. Nevertheless, there are some results worth pointing out. 
We assumed that low political awareness is associated with random change and 
ambiguity, because these types of change unclear preferences rather than rational 
decision. Only educational level in Germany and political interest in Switzerland 
show weak support for random change. In Germany, most random change occurs 
among low educated citizens even if we have to be careful in interpreting the very few 
cases. In Switzerland, little interested citizens tend to change randomly more often 
more often those with high or very high political interest. Ambiguity in contrast is not 
 164 
related to political awareness with the exception of the very low interested in 
Switzerland. 
For temporary and durable change there are only little differences between different 
levels of political awareness. The highly interested in Germany are the most likely to 
change durably and the least likely to change temporarily. This suggests that durable 
change reflect an underlying cognitive process. Education in contract is not associated 
with temporary and durable change. In Switzerland, the effect is different. Durable 
change is most likely among intermediate levels of interest and thus in line with 
Zaller’s models. The highly interested in Switzerland are the most likely to change 
temporarily. In Great Britain, the political awareness does not impact type of change 
at all, for all levels of political interest and educational levels, temporary change is the 
most common type of change.  
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Table 16: Types of party switches by interest in politics and education in DE, GB and 
CH 
   education interest in politics 
DE low med. high   
very 
low low high 
very 
high Total 
Temporary change 41.0 36.7 40.1 40.5 38.7 41.0 35.5 39.1 
Durable change 40.1 41.2 42.1 40.5 39.9 39.9 44.6 41.1 
Ambiguity 14.6 21.1 17.3 16.6 19.1 18.0 17.8 17.9 
Random change 4.3 1.0 0.5   2.4 2.3 1.2 2.1   2.0 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  
  
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
n 719 1022 836 651 638 662 626 
  
GB low med. high   
very 
low low high 
very 
high Total 
Temporary change 44.8 44.3 40.9 42.6 43.1 42.4 42.0 42.5 
Durable change 32.8 31.9 36.4 34.3 34.1 34.0 35.3 34.4 
Ambiguity 20.6 20.1 19.7 20.0 19.4 20.7 19.9 20.0 
Random change 1.8 3.7 3.0   3.4 3.4 2.6 3.0   3.0 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  
  
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
n 660 1099 2110 1002 974 988 943 
  
CH low med. high   
very 
low low high 
very 
high Total 
Temporary change 44.1 43.2 41.2 37.3 35.6 37.3 43.0 38.2 
Durable change 33.4 33.9 35.5 31.2 36.3 38.2 33.4 34.8 
Ambiguity 20.5 20.0 19.7 23.4 17.8 17.6 17.2 19.0 
Random change 2.1 3.0 3.5   8.2 10.3 6.9 6.4   8.0 
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  
 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
n 749 4642 1476 485 480 474 478 
 
Sample: Individuals with party preferences in at least five waves. Source: SOEP (1999-2009), BHPS 
(1998-2008), SHP (1999-2009). 
While political awareness hardly affects the type of volatility, the predispositions have 
an impact on the type of change as shows Table 17. There is a significant influence of 
psychological predispositions on types of change in Germany and Great Britain. As 
expected by the traditional model on party identification, citizens with strong party 
attachment (or ideological closeness to a party in Switzerland) are most likely to 
depart only temporarily from their preferred party. More surprisingly, citizens with 
strong predispositions are also overrepresented among the durable changers in Great 
Britain and Switzerland. This holds not true for Germany, where the weakest 
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predispositions are the most likely to change durably. Furthermore, individuals with 
strong psychological predisposition are unlikely to show random patterns or 
ambiguity in all countries. 
Socio-structural predispositions only seem to matter in Germany. As for the 
psychological predispositions, those with the strongest predispositions are most likely 
to switch to another party only on the short term, while those with weaker socio-
structural predispositions are most likely to switch durably to another party. But 
ambiguous and random changes do not seem to depend on the strength of socio-
structural party preferences. 
Overall, the distinction of types of change gives only little additional insights to the 
findings from the event history models. This is surely also due to data limitation, as 
there is no sharp difference between the different types of change, and as only 
individuals with a long panel participation could be analysed. Nevertheless the 
distinction of types of change has revealed two important points:  Firstly, high 
political awareness increases volatility not for one particular type of change, apart 
from durable change in Germany and temporary change in Switzerland. Neither 
political interest nor education is decisive for the type of change. Secondly, the 
findings differ between the countries. For a better understanding and interpretation of 
these country differences, an analysis for parties would be necessary, which presents a 
different approach as followed here. Secondly and less surprisingly, psychological are 
influential on the type of change. Citizens with weak predispositions are more likely 
to have ambiguous preferences or random patterns of change, whereas citizens with 
strong predispositions are more likely to depart from their preferred party temporarily. 
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But this hols true only for psychological but not for socio-structural predispositions, 
apart from a small effect in Germany.  
 
Table 17: Types of party switches by predisposition strength 
psychological predispositions socio-strctural predispositions 
DE v. low low high v. high v. low low high v. high
Temporary change 32.5 37.9 43.4 43.4 39.3     32.2     40.2     44.3     
Durable change 44.5 40.8 38.9 39.7 40.6     46.8     42.4     34.1     
Ambiguity 20.3 18.4 16.1 16.3 18.7     19.9     15.4     17.8     
Random change 2.7 2.9 1.6 0.7 1.4       1.1       2.0       3.7       
Total 100.0  100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   
n 712 577 652 636 560 559 559 559
GB very low low high very high very low low high very high
Temporary change 35.9 41.2 46.1 46.5 44.3 40.4 42 44.2
Durable change 30.4 34.8 35.4 37 33.1 37.7 34 34.3
Ambiguity 28.3 20 17.3 14.8 21.8 18.6 21.3 18.1
Random change 5.4 4 1.2 1.7 2.8 3.3 2.7 3.4
Total 100.0  100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   
n 1019 989 979 920 961 961 961 961
CH very low low high very high very low low high very high
Temporary change 33.4 37.3 42.4 40.1 37 38.3 40.8 36.6
Durable change 35.9 33.3 32.9 37.1 34.2 35.4 33.9 35.5
Ambiguity 21.4 20.2 17.3 17.2 19.4 19.6 17.6 19.7
Random change 9.3 9.3 7.5 5.7 9.5 6.7 7.7 8.2
Total 100.0  100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   
n 480 479 479 479 859 858 859 858
Sample: individuals with party preferences in at least five waves. Source: SOEP (1999-2009), BHPS 
(1998-2008), SHP (1999-2009).  
 Conclusions for awareness and predispositions 7.5
In this chapter, we assessed the effect of political awareness and predispositions on 
the volatility of party preferences. Political awareness and predispositions are two key 
variables in public opinion research and in socio-psychological approaches. For 
predisposition strength, we distinguished socio-structural and psychological 
predispositions. Socio-structural predispositions, which mainly consist of the effect of 
social class and religion, still have a stabilising effect on voting behaviour, but the 
effect is small compared to other variables. In contrast, psychological predispositions 
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have a very large stabilising effect, both when measured as ideological closeness 
between individuals and their preferred party (CH) and as strength of party 
identification (DE and GB). The result for ideological closeness also shows that 
changes between block tend to be rational, in the sense that voters minimise the 
distance between their position and the preferred party by switching parties. 
However, psychological predispositions, particularly strength of party identification 
are endogenous. Those with strong party identifications tend to be more stable. 
Therefore, the effect should not simply be interpreted as causality, but rather as a 
strong correlation. For socio-structural predispositions, we can be sure to measure a 
causal effect.  
For political awareness, findings generally support the extended RAS model by 
Zaller. The distinction of within and between party blocks has shown to be crucial. 
Changes within party blocks increase with political awareness. The highly aware – 
both measured by political interest and education – are those who change most 
frequently within party blocks. This reflects information reception which increases 
with political awareness. Because the parties in the same party block are ideologically 
close, information resistance does not play a role. For changes between party blocks, 
those with intermediate levels of interest in politics are most likely to switch parties. 
Here, not only information reception, but also information acceptance plays a role. 
However, we have also seen that information acceptance is conditional on 
predisposition strength. Once we control for strength of party identification, also 
between-block volatility increases with political awareness. Because political 
awareness and predisposition strength are correlated and because the resistance to 
information is conditional on predisposition, political awareness mainly reflects 
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information reception once predisposition strength is controlled for. When controlling 
for strength of party identification, volatility increases with political awareness for 
within-and between block changes. For education, we found that volatility decreases 
with education for between-block changes in Germany and Switzerland. 
Regarding the other types of change considered – durable change, temporary change, 
ambiguity and random change – we did not find a strong and consistent influence of 
political interest. For psychological predispositions, we found that citizens with strong 
predispositions are more likely to depart temporarily from their party, whereas 
citizens with weak predispositions are more likely to have ambiguous preferences or a 
random pattern of change. Socio-structural predispositions play a very small role. 
Considering that the influence of political sophistication varies between indicators 
(interest in politics vs. education), whether a change occurs within or between party 
blocks and whether and how predisposition strength is controlled for, mixed results in 
previous literature are not surprising. However, because our empirical results were 
mainly consistent across the three countries, we think that the patterns discovered for 
political awareness are not restricted to a specific context, as they apply to very 
different party systems.  
Our findings show that change is not a priori concentrated among an unsophisticated 
or highly enlightened electorate. Taking our findings to a more normative level, 
volatility is not a random noise of uninformed and unaware citizens and not a danger 
for the stability of democracies. Volatility rather seems to reflect parties’ ideological 
positions and is considerable among enlightened voters. Although we do not explicitly 
take the political offer into account, it seems plausible that the volatility of individuals 
reacts to the political offer. 
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8 Campaign effects 
 Introduction 8.1
Numerous studies have demonstrated that campaigns and media coverage matter for 
elections. Campaigns have different effects. First of all, campaigns activate existing 
predispositions. Activation mobilises citizens to vote and reinforces their voting 
intention. Moreover, activation may cause citizens to return to their latent party 
preference, if they have temporarily changed to another party. Recent studies on 
activation include (Andersen, Tilley, and Heath 2005; G. A. Huber and Arceneaux 
2007; Kaplan, Park, and Gelman 2012). In contrast to this well-documented activation 
effect, academics have, for a long time, disagreed on persuasion. More recently, 
several studies, mainly on US presidential campaigns, found that campaigns do 
persuade voters to switch parties (Hillygus and Jackman 2003; Fridkin et al. 2007; 
Richard Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson 2004; Franz and Ridout 2010; G. A. Huber 
and Arceneaux 2007; J. E. Campbell 2000; Wlezien and Erikson 2002). Brandenburg 
and Van Egmond (2012) provide empirical evidence for persuasion effects in a few 
other contexts.  
Despite these recent articles on persuasion, the widely cited critique by Gelman and 
King (1993) still applies to most studies. It states that many presumed persuasion 
effects may actually be due to activation. Campaigns inform voters, strengthen the 
associations between interests and vote choice, and bring them back to the party or 
candidate which is in line with their predisposition, or - in the words of Gelman and 
King - can be predicted on the basis of fundamental variables. On closer inspection 
therefore, persuasion effects are often activation effects.  
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At the individual level, (Andersen, Tilley, and Heath 2005) assessed the 
enlightenment hypothesis over the electoral cycle in Great Britain, and confirm that a 
lot of the change which occurs during campaigns reflects levels of information and 
knowledge. Similarly, Claassen (2011, 221) concludes for his analysis of persuasion 
effects that “it is not entirely clear whether attitude changes lead to altered vote 
choices or whether attitude change is the mechanism less aware voters use to bring 
their attitude and votes into alignment”. Finally, the recent study by Kaplan, Park and 
Gelman (2012) confirms the increasing importance of fundamentals over the 
campaign and doubts that there are true persuasion effects. 
Although not particularly designed to study campaign effects, household panels offer 
a unique opportunity to contribute to existing research. Using household panel data, 
we are able to make a clear distinction between activation and persuasion, as will be 
argued in more detail later. However, household panels offer additional insights into 
the literature on campaign effects. We can study individual dynamics over the 
electoral cycle, a research field which has barely been explored (Wlezien and Erikson 
2002; Andersen, Tilley, and Heath 2005). Electoral panels stretching over a campaign 
miss the frequent changes occurring before the start of the official campaign (Iyengar 
and Simon, 2000). 
Additionally, through the survey designs and the comparative perspective, we cover 
several electoral cycles and countries with very different electoral systems, so that 
results should point to campaign effects beyond a specific election. Previous studies 
on campaign effects have focused on single elections and mainly on the USA.  
Finally, panel conditioning effects should be lower in household panels than in 
electoral panels. Panel conditioning effects arise because electoral surveys increase 
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the attentiveness to politics and campaigns (see Bartels 2000; 2006 for panel 
conditioning effects). There are two reasons why these effects should be weaker in 
household panels. Firstly, the intervals between interviews are much longer, so that it 
is less likely that the last interview affects survey responses. Secondly, household 
panels are not primarily electoral surveys. As the proportion of interview questions 
relating to politics is relatively low, panel conditioning for political questions is less 
likely (see also Hillygus and Jackman 2003). 
Increasingly, research on campaigns looks at which individuals are affected by 
campaigns, rather than whether campaigns matter. Here, we refer to campaign effects 
as the sum of campaign activities from advertisement, media coverage or other 
information related to elections. We do not study specific campaign events or 
advertisements and assume that the intensity and influence of campaign activities 
increases leading up to elections. 
 Household panels data as a complement  8.2
Several different strategies have been applied to study campaign effects: experiments, 
rolling cross sections, electoral panels and aggregate analyses of U.S. electoral polls. 
Experiments usually test for the influence of particular campaign characteristics while 
controlling for other potential influences. However, because of their weak external 
validity, experiments cannot assess the actual influence of campaigns on elections 
(Chong and Druckman, 2007; Shaw, 1999; Goldstein and Ridout, 2004; Kinder, 2007; 
Iyengar and Simon, 2000). This holds particularly true for electoral campaigns, 
because they present a chaotic environment with multiple streams of conflicting and 
complicated information of varying intensity (Fridkin et al. 2007, 771). The 
complexity is further increased by different information sources involved in 
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campaigns and by differences in individuals’ exposure. In experiments, information 
reception is usually controlled for. Because campaign environments are so different 
from experimental settings, studies from the field – mainly relying on surveys – are 
important to complement experimental research.  
Another popular research design to study campaign effects are rolling cross sections 
(Dobrzynska, Blais, and Nadeau 2003). Similar to experiments, they aim to capture 
the influence of particular campaign events, while holding other influences constant. 
Usually, these studies test whether such events change aggregate opinion, but cannot 
assess individual dynamics. 
Also electoral panels, which follow the same individuals over the electoral campaign, 
are a popular instrument for studying campaign effects (Finkel 1993; Bartels 2006; 
Lachat 2007; Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2001; Brandenburg and Van Egmond 2012). 
Normally, the first wave takes place at the beginning of the campaign and the last 
wave is carried out after elections. With electoral panels, it is difficult to distinguish 
activation and persuasion effects. To distinguish between the two, it is crucial whether 
voting intention is in line with predispositions. Changes in voting intention represent 
activation if the new voting intention is in line with predispositions. Changes in voting 
intention represent persuasion if the new voting intention counters predispositions. 
The measurement of predispositions is, therefore, crucial for distinguishing between 
activation and persuasion. In electoral panels, predispositions are usually measured at 
the beginning of the campaign (Finkel 1993; Bartels 2006). However, predispositions 
measured at the beginning of the campaign may be unreliable, because predispositions 
are not activated (Gelman and King 1993). When asked about predispositions, 
individuals may not be aware of them and may not be able to indicate them. Thus, the 
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measurement of predispositions at the beginning of a campaign may be misleading. 
This problem can be overcome in household panel studies, because they cover entire 
electoral cycles. Instead of measuring predispositions at the beginning of a campaign, 
we can measure predispositions around the previous elections, where predispositions 
should be activated. Household panels thus enable a good distinction between 
activation and persuasion.  
To understand campaign effects, we also need to assess whether campaigns affect 
different people differently (e.g. Hillygus and Jackman 2003; Fournier 2006) and 
understand underlying psychological mechanisms. Attention has mainly centred on 
awareness and predispositions as key moderators, which we discussed in Chapter 7. 
Here, we focus on volatility in a specific context. National elections are characterized 
by high competition, familiarity of issues and intensity.  
Previous studies on political awareness as a moderator of campaign effects have 
remained ambiguous. Claassen (2011) has made a strong point that we have to make a 
distinction between different campaign effects. First of all, we address the effect of 
political awareness on persuasion. Highly aware citizens are more likely to reject 
messages that are inconsistent with their predispositions. Because information flow in 
national campaigns is dense, all citizens should receive information, therefore 
information reception plays no role or only a small role (Zaller 1992, 275; Beck et al. 
2002; Claassen 2011). Indeed, many empirical studies investigating persuasion have 
found the greatest effects among citizens who are less aware (see Claassen 2011, 219 
for an overview). Also, assuming online-updating for information processing, we 
expect stronger persuasion among citizens who are less aware.  
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Also for activation, we expect stronger effects for those who are less aware. 
Activation means bringing party preference in line with predispositions. Assuming 
that the highly aware already have preferences consistent with their predispositions, 
activation should mainly affect citizens with low levels of political awareness.  
As before, we will also test and control for the effect of predisposition strength. 
Strong predispositions should stabilize party preferences, which means that 
deactivation and persuasion should be less likely for strong identifiers.  
 Model specification 8.3
We are interested in whether the sum of campaign related information, which includes 
advertisement, communication and media coverage, makes citizens switch parties. 
The closer elections are, the more intense and frequent the flow of such information 
is. If campaigns have activation effects, activation should become more frequent and 
deactivation less frequent as elections draw nearer. 
In our model, we test whether campaigns affect the probability of being persuaded or 
activated. Persuasion and activation refer to transitions in party preference since the 
last national election. If the party preference has changed to another party since the 
last election, a persuasion has occurred. If respondents have changed between having 
and not having a party preference, an activation or deactivation has occurred.  
To measure campaign effects, we measure the party preference close to the last 
election. We use the preference reported within 365 days of the election date.
57
The 
dependent variable distinguishes four categories: stable party preference since the last 
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 We do not consider party blocks here, in order not to complicate the analysis further with an 
additional response category. Party blocks are less important for the specific question of campaign, 
because national elections are primarily about single parties and not about party blocks. 
 176 
election (reference category), activation, deactivation and persuasion. For deactivation 
and persuasion we compare the current party preference to party preference in the last 
election. The coding follows the same logic as the change variable introduced in 
section 3.3, but refers to party preference around the last election instead of at the last 
observation with a party preference. For activation, respondents did not indicate a 
party preference at the last election, which complicates the coding. We consider 
observations as activation if a respondent did not name a party preference around the 
last election and changed from no preference to a party preference.  
Table 18 presents descriptive statistics of the dependent variable. Reinforcement is by 
far most frequent. However, changes since the last election (persuasion) is far from 
marginal, similarly to the more general volatility measure used in the previous 
chapters. In Germany, 7 % of observations prefer another party than in the last 
election, in Great Britain this amounts to 14 % and in Switzerland to 18 %. The party 
preferred at the last election has been abandoned in between 12 % (GB) and 19 % 
(DE) of observations. Activation has occurred in between 9 % (GB) and 23 % (DE) of 
cases. We see again, that change in and out of party preference is most frequent in 
Germany, because respondents were asked about party identification and not about 
voting intention. However, we only observe campaign effects if changes are related to 
campaign activities. For this, we have to estimate a regression model.  
Respondents without a party preference, both at the last election and at the current 
observations, as well as respondents who were not eligible for survey participation 
around the time of the last election, have been excluded for analysis.  
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Table 18: Transitions since the last election (dependent variable for campaign effects 
models) 
 
Transition Last election Current obs. DE GB CH 
No preference. No preference excluded excluded 
 
excluded 
Reinforcement (1) Party preference  same party        51.0         65.4         51.9  
Activation (2) No peference Party preference 22.9         9.2 14.3 
Deactivation (3) Party preference   no party        19.6         11.5         16.3  
Persuasion (4) Party preference  other party         6.5         14.0         17.5  
  Total        100.0       100.0       100.0  
N observations 147'285 122'132 35'223 
N individuals 19'924 14'327 7'438 
 Source: SOEP 1984-2010, BHPS 1991-2008, SHP 1999-2010. 
 
The main explanatory variable, which captures campaign effects, is closeness to 
elections. It is measured through the time lapse in days between the interview date and 
the closest national election. Over the electoral cycle, the intensity of information 
flow varies, so that the variable closeness to election is an indirect measure of 
campaign density. For Switzerland and Germany, we additionally consider closeness 
to regional elections (cantons and Länder).  
There are two options to define the closest election. Closeness may either refer to the 
next future election or to the closest election in the past or in the future. There are 
theoretical justifications for both approaches. Because electoral campaigns take place 
before elections, the distance to the next election seems a natural solution. But media 
coverage and attention is also high after elections: the electoral outcome is analysed, 
coalitions and governments have to be formed and policies and policy changes are 
communicated and commented on. In this perspective, attention is lowest in the 
middle of the electoral cycle when both the past and the next election are relatively 
distant. We tested both measures of closeness to elections empirically. Closeness to 
the past or future election clearly performed better. Therefore, closeness to an election 
in the models refers to either the past or the next election, whichever is closer. The 
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distance in days between the interview and the election has been divided by 365 so 
that the measure captures the distance in years. Additionally, it has been multiplied by 
-1, to ease the interpretation of regression coefficients, so that higher values 
correspond to closer elections.  
Political awareness is measured through the interest in politics, as in chapter 7. We 
also include a series of control variables: educational level, age, a time trend and 
panel participation.
58
 To test whether campaign effects vary among levels of political 
awareness, we have to combine closeness to elections and political awareness. 
To assess the effect of political awareness correctly, it is important to control for 
predisposition strength (see e.g. Chong and Druckman 2007; Lachat 2007). As in 
chapter 7, we will do this in a separate model to take account of potential endogeneity 
problems or indirect effects. We will use the same variables for predisposition 
strength as in the previous chapter: strength of socio-structural predisposition, 
closeness between respondent and party in the issue space (Switzerland), and strength 
of party identification (Germany, Great Britain).  
 Results and discussion 8.4
Regression coefficients for Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland for campaign 
effect are presented in Table 19. But to see effect size, we look at predicted 
probabilities. Figure 115 presents predicted probabilities for activation, deactivation 
and persuasion in model 1, which does not control for political awareness and 
predisposition strength. Because of the indicators for party preferences (party 
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 Because we have a rather different design than in other chapters (reference to last election, inclusion 
of individuals without previous party preference), we do not include duration of party preference. 
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identification in Germany, voting intention in Great Britain and Switzerland), absolute 
values cannot be compared directly between countries.  
Table 19 : Activation, deactivation and persuasion in DE, GB and CH (Model 1) 
Model 1 
DE Activation   Deactivation Persuasion   
Closeness national election  0.516*** (0.02)  -0.082*** (0.02)   0.145*** (0.03)  
Closeness regional election  0.0023 (0.01) -0.076*** (0.01)  0.035 (0.02) 
Constant -0.429*** (0.03) -0.991*** (0.03) -2.832*** (0.05) 
variance random effect  6.645*** (0.15)  5.091*** (0.10)  5.585*** (0.15) 
cov (activation-deactivation)  5.114*** (0.11) 
cov(activation-persuasion)  3.132*** (0.11) 
cov(deactivation-persuasion)  3.297*** (0.10)         
DIC 263'668           
GB Activation   Deactivation Persuasion   
Closeness nat. elect. -0.017  (0.02) -0.085*** (0.02)  0.064*** (0.02) 
Constant -4.556*** (0.06) -2.556*** (0.03) -2.298*** (0.04) 
variance random effect 19.292*** (0.51)  6.271*** (0.16)  5.142*** (0.14) 
cov (activation-deactivation)  9.716*** (0.24) 
cov(activation-persuasion)  4.616*** (0.20) 
cov(deactivation-persuasion)  3.552*** (0.11)         
DIC 175'629       
CH Activation   Deactivation Persuasion   
Closeness national election  0.368*** (0.04) -0.158*** (0.03)  0.135*** (0.03) 
Closeness cantonal election  0.076 (0.05)  0.032 (0.04)  -0.015 (0.03) 
Constant -2.024*** (0.18) -0.281* (0.12) -1.616*** (0.13) 
variance random effect 29.874*** (1.52)  8.205*** (0.39)   5.028*** (0.22) 
cov (activation-deactivation)  4.195*** (0.22) 
cov(activation-persuasion) 12.983*** (0.60) 
cov(deactivation-persuasion)  5.919*** (0.37)         
DIC 59'120 
 
Note: Multinomial random effect models on change since last election. Dependent variable: see Table 
17. Base category: Reinforcement. Regression coefficients, se in parenthesis. Significant at *0.05, 
**0.01, ***0.001. The model includes age, survey year and panel participation as controls. Since the 
effects of the control variables are not relevant here, these effects are not presented. Source: SOEP 
1984-2010 (n=147’285 clustered in 19’924 individuals), BHPS 1991-2008 (n=122’465 clustered in 
14’322 individuals), SHP 1999-2010 (n=35’223 clustered in 7438 individuals). 
 
In line with previous research (e.g. Gelman and King 1993; Andersen, Tilley, and 
Heath 2005; Selb et al. 2009) there is strong evidence for activation effects. In 
Germany and Switzerland, the closeness to national elections makes activation more 
likely and deactivation less likely. In Great Britain, the deactivation effect is weaker 
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and the activation effect absent. It seems that those who did not indicate a party 
preference at the last election in Great Britain are not sensitive to the electoral cycle. 
This result for activation does not necessarily contradict studies on activation effects 
in Great Britain. Citizens without preference at the beginning of a campaign, which 
are usually looked at in literature, may differ to citizens without preference around 
national elections, which we use here.
59
 
Results show strong evidence for persuasion effects in all three countries studied. The 
closer national elections are, the more frequent changes between parties are. As 
mentioned before, this should not reflect an activation effect, because we measured 
predisposition at a point, where predisposition were activated. 
 
Figure 15 : Predicted probabilities for activation, deactivation and persuasion in DE, 
GB and CH  
 
Note: Predicted probabilities calculated from M1 in Table 19. Other variables are held constant at their 
mean or mode (categorical variables), random effect of 0 assumed. 
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 In Switzerland and Germany, we find activation effects of campaign; because observations without 
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Results for regional elections are more ambiguous. In Switzerland, cantonal elections 
are not significant. Considering strong federalism in Switzerland, the weak effect of 
cantonal elections may be surprising. However, it confirms the nationalisation of 
electoral politics and that cantonal elections are perceived as secondary. In Germany, 
regional elections (Bundesländer) are significant for deactivation but not for 
activation and persuasion.   
We will now look at the role of political awareness for campaign effects, which has 
been estimated in model 2 shown in Table 20. We included an interaction between 
closeness to elections and interest in politics. Looking at the DIC measure, we see that 
political awareness improves model performance in Germany and Great Britain but 
not in Switzerland (compared to Model 1). 
In Model 2 (and also Model3), the coefficients of the closeness to elections become 
mostly insignificant. This holds true for deactivation in all three countries, activation 
in Great Britain and persuasion in Germany. However, we cannot interpret main 
effects and interaction effects of nonlinear models separately. Effect size, significance 
level and even the direction may be misleading (Ai and Norton 2003), because effects 
are conditional on the value of all other variables. Rather we look at predicted 
probabilities to interpret the model.  
Because coefficients and their significance level may be misleading for interaction 
effects in non-linear models, we will look at predicted probabilities. We first address 
deactivation, which is presented in Figure 16. First of all, the model confirms that the 
least interested are most likely to abandon their party preference. It reflects the well-
established finding of research on participation, that party support and electoral 
participation are strongly related to interest in politics and education. However, to 
assess campaign effects, we have to look at the interaction between awareness and 
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closeness to an election. In Figure 16, campaign effects are represented by the vertical 
distance of the two lines. The less aware seem to react more strongly to campaigns in 
Germany and Great Britain, but the effect is very weak. There is no clear effect for 
Switzerland. 
 
Figure 16: Predicted probabilities for deactivation by interest in politics in DE, GB 
and CH  
 
Note: Predicted probabilities calculated from Model 2 in Table 20. Other variables are held constant at 
their mean or mode (categorical variables), random effect of 0 assumed. 
 183 
Table 20: Activation, deactivation and persuasion by political awareness in DE, GB and CH (Model 2 and Model 3) 
Model 2 Model 3 
DE Activation   Deactivation Persuasion Activation   Deactivation Persuasion 
Closeness national election  0.481*** (0.05)  0.035 (0.06)  0.149 (0.10)  0.398*** (0.05)  0.013 (0.05)  0.158 (0.11) 
Closeness regional election  0.005 (0.01) -0.073*** (0.01)  0.034 (0.02)  0.009 (0.01) -0.068*** (0.01)  0.034* (0.02) 
Interest: 2 -0.523*** (0.04) -1.657*** (0.05) -0.239** (0.08) -0.435*** (0.05) -1.649*** (0.05) -0.250* (0.10) 
  Interest: 3 -0.901*** (0.05) -2.667*** (0.07) -0.188* (0.09) -0.625*** (0.06) -2.600*** (0.07) -0.161 (0.13) 
  Interest: 4 -1.164*** (0.06) -3.043*** (0.09) -0.229 (0.12) -0.727*** (0.09) -2.925*** (0.09) -0.173 (0.17) 
Closeness*interest   0.021 (0.01) -0.039 (0.02) -0.001 (0.04)  0.059** (0.02) -0.031 (0.02) -0.005 (0.04) 
Education: intermed. -0.263*** (0.04) -0.131*** (0.04)  0.247*** (0.05) -0.148*** (0.04) -0.099* (0.04)  0.259*** (0.06) 
  Education: tertiary -0.766*** (0.05) -0.565*** (0.04)  0.105 (0.06) -0.549*** (0.05) -0.516*** (0.05)  0.131 (0.07) 
Socio-structural Predispositions  0.000 (0.10) -0.442*** (0.09) -0.269* (0.11) 
Psych. Predispositions -5.052*** (0.06) -2.203*** (0.07) -1.428*** (0.11) 
Constant  0.507*** (0.07)  1.161*** (0.06) -2.732*** (0.10)  3.387*** (0.07)  2.641*** (0.08) -1.761*** (0.16) 
variance random effect  6.153*** (0.12)  4.473*** (0.09)  5.519*** (0.16)  4.366*** (0.09)  3.865*** (0.09)  5.262*** (0.15) 
cov (activation-deactivation)  4.525*** (0.09)  3.545*** (0.08) 
cov (activation-persuasion)  3.029*** (0.10)  2.433*** (0.09) 
cov (deactivation-persuasion)  3.221*** (0.09)          2.828*** (0.09)         
DIC 259'707 253'030 
  Model 2           Model 3          
GB Activation   Deactivation Persuasion Activation   Deactivation Persuasion 
Closeness nat. elect. -0.002 (0.03) -0.053 (0.03)  0.115*** (0.03)   0.006 (0.04) -0.045 (0.03)  0.051* (0.03)    
Interest: 2 -0.661*** (0.05) -1.257*** (0.04) -0.276*** (0.04) -0.622*** (0.05) -1.212*** (0.04)   -0.234*** (0.05)   
  Interest: 3 -1.189*** (0.07) -1.827*** (0.06) -0.498*** (0.05) -1.078*** (0.08) -1.695*** (0.06) -0.337*** (0.06)  
  Interest: 4 -1.355*** (0.13) -1.938*** (0.10)  -0.437*** (0.08) -1.161*** (0.13) -1.710*** (0.10)  -0.270*** (0.09)     
Closeness*interest  -0.009 (0.02) -0.036 (0.02) -0.038* (0.02) -0.018 (0.03) -0.042* (0.02)     -0.015 (0.02) 
Education: intermed.  0.180** (0.06)  0.106* (0.05)  0.060 (0.04)  0.215*** (0.06)  0.104* (0.04)  0.022 (0.05)    
  Education: tertiary -0.518*** (0.09) -0.244*** (0.06)  0.181** (0.06) -0.475*** (0.12) -0.261*** (0.07)   0.255*** (0.08)  
Socio-structural Predispositions  0.261* (0.13) -0.146  (0.09) -0.014 (0.08)  
Psych. Pred. -0.981*** (0.03) -0.763*** (0.03) -1.330*** (0.06)  
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Constant -3.606*** (0.08) -1.257*** (0.05) -2.003*** (0.05) -2.526*** (0.11) -0.264** (0.08) -1.666*** (0.07) 
variance random effect 17.230*** (0.58)  5.400*** (0.15)  5.078*** (0.14) 15.492*** -0.46  4.591*** (0.13)  4.645*** (0.13) 
cov (activation-deactivation)  8.359*** (0.24)  7.194*** (0.20) 
cov (activation-persuasion)  4.316*** (0.18)  3.519*** (0.16) 
cov (deactivation-persuasion)  3.372*** (0.11)          2.814*** (0.09)         
DIC 174'599 174'159 
  Model 2           Model 3           
CH Activation   Deactivation Persuasion Activation   Deactivation Persuasion 
Closeness national election  0.525*** (0.13) -0.015 (0.09)  0.193* (0.10)  0.496*** (0.10) -0.055 (0.07)  0.138 (0.10) 
Closeness cantonal election  0.070  (0.05)   0.025 (0.04) -0.020 (0.03)  0.081 (0.05)  0.034 (0.04) -0.024 (0.03) 
Interest -0.293*** (0.04) -0.364*** (0.03) -0.003 (0.03) -0.242*** (0.02) -0.357*** (0.03)  0.013 (0.03) 
Interest squared  0.005 (0.00)  0.013*** (0.00) -0.005* (0.00)  0.001 (0.00)  0.013*** (0.00) -0.005* (0.00) 
Closeness*interest -0.027 (0.02) -0.025 (0.01) -0.009  (0.01) -0.022 (0.01) -0.017 (0.01) -0.000 (0.01) 
Education: intermed. -0.368 (0.21) -0.338** (0.12)  -0.951*** (0.14) -0.430* (0.17) -0.342*** (0.10) -0.225* (0.10) 
  Education: tertiary -0.736** (0.26) -0.621*** (0.13)  -0.110 (0.11) -0.804*** (0.21) -0.607*** (0.12) -0.101 (0.11) 
Socio-structural Predispositions -0.124 (0.20) -0.555*** (0.14) -0.338** (0.13) 
Psych. Predispositions -0.734*** (0.18) -0.633*** (0.14)  -0.476*** (0.14) 
Constant -0.397 (0.30)  1.513*** (0.21) -1.260*** (0.21)  0.252 (0.26)  2.199*** (0.20) -0.909** (0.28) 
variance random effect 27.769*** (1.52)  7.335*** (0.35)  5.006*** (0.24) 27.539*** (1.51) 7.186*** (0.29)  4.905*** (0.23) 
cov (activation-deactivation) 5.528*** (0.45)  5.325*** (0.42) 
cov (activation-persuasion) 11.582*** (0.24) 11.417*** (0.56) 
cov (deactivation-persuasion)  3.968*** (0.24)          3.815*** (0.20)         
DIC 59129 59119 
 
Note: Multinomial random effect models on change since last election.  Dependent variable: see Table 17. Base category: same preference as around last election.  
Regression coefficients, se in parenthesis. Significant at *0.05, **0.01, ***0.001. The model includes age, survey year and panel participation as controls. Since the effects of 
the control variables are not relevant here, these effects are not presented. Source: SOEP 1984-2010 (n=147’285 clustered in 19’924 individuals), BHPS 1991-2008 
(n=122’465 clustered in 14’322 individuals), SHP 1999-2010 (n=35’223 clustered in 7438 individuals). 
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By looking at predicted probabilities for activation (Figure 17) the effect of political 
awareness is not evident. If we look at regression coefficients, we see that activated 
individuals have lower political awareness than stable individuals, which represents 
the base category. But again, we are mainly interested in campaign effects represented 
by the interaction. We only see an effect in Switzerland, where the little aware are 
most likely to be activated. Again, the effects for activation are weak because it refers 
to individuals who had not been activated at the previous campaign (they did not have 
a party preference), but are activated later on. Overall, activation and deactivation 
effects of campaigns seem to impact the less aware the most. However, the effects are 
weak and only visible in some of the cases studied.  
 
Figure 17 : Predicted probabilities for activation by interest in politics in DE, GB and 
CH  
 
Note: Predicted probabilities calculated from Model 2 in Table 20. Other variables are held constant at 
their mean or mode (categorical variables), random effect of 0 assumed. 
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To look at the role of political awareness for persuasion, we computed again predicted 
probabilities (cf. Figure 18). The probability for persuasion (a change from the party 
preferred at the time of the last election) hardly depends on interest in politics.
60
 
However, our interest is in the interaction between campaign activities (measured by 
closeness to an election) and political awareness. The interaction coefficient is only 
significant in Great Britain, where the less aware seem to be persuaded through 




Figure 18: Predicted probabilities for persuasion by interest in politics in CH, DE, 
GB.  
 
Note: Predicted probabilities calculated from Model 2 in Table 20.Other variables are held constant at 
their mean or mode (categorical variables), random effect of 0 assumed. 
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 At first sight, this seems to contradict the negative coefficients of the regression model, which 
suggests decreasing persuasion. This is because coefficients compare persuasion to reinforcement (the 
base category), whereas predicted probabilities also take account of the possibility of deactivation and 
activation. 
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 In Germany, predicted probabilities suggest that the highly aware are more likely to be persuaded, 
but this depends on the sample. Comparing stability and persuasion, the most aware are less likely to be 
persuaded (regression coefficients), but also taking account of deactivation and activation (which are 
least frequent for the highly aware), persuasion seems more important for the highly aware. 
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In model 3, we additionally included predisposition strength as a control. As before, 
predispositions have a strong stabilising effect. Psychological predispositions have a 
strong impact on activation, deactivation and persuasion. In contrast, socio-structural 
predispositions are only sometimes significant.
62
 Controlling for predisposition 
strength slightly affects the conclusions from model 2 (predicted probabilities not 
shown). For persuasion, we find again strongest effects for the least aware in Great 
Britain, but the effect is weaker. However, for deactivation, the stronger effect for the 
little aware disappear in Great Britain but remain in Germany. For activation, we find 
stronger campaign effects for the little aware once we control for predisposition 
strength.  
Overall, we find only weak and inconsistent evidence for the moderating effect of 
political awareness. But if we effects, they point to stronger campaign effects for little 
aware citizens.  
 Conclusions for campaign effects 8.5
Using the property household panels of interviews over the whole electoral cycle, we 
find strong evidence for activation and persuasion effects of electoral campaigns. 
These findings for persuasion cannot be dismissed with the argument that observed 
changes bring voting intention in line with latent predispositions. The resemblance of 
the results from Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland, covering several elections 
makes us even more confident that campaigns do increase persuasion. Persuasion 
effects occur in very different electoral party systems and are not restricted to specific 
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 The direction of the effect depends on which categories we compare. Comparing activation and 
reinforcement (as regression coefficients) strong socio-structural predispositions decrease the 
probability for activation in Germany and Switzerland, but increase the probability for activation in 
Great Britain. But contrasting activation and persuasion, strong socio-structural predispositions 
increase the probability for activation in all countries. 
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elections. However, results are also remarkable considering the differences in the 
wording of questions on party preferences. Party identification and voting intention 
react similarly to the electoral cycle, since there are also relatively strong activation 
and persuasion effects for Germany, where party identification is asked about in the 
survey. In line with previous research, we find strong activation and deactivation 
effects of the electoral cycle. 
Results are less clear for political awareness as a moderator of campaign effects. The 
few effects we found suggest that campaigns affect the less aware more strongly. 
Overall, campaign effects are not conditional on the level of political awareness. 
Again, we have found strong stabilising effects of psychological predispositions and, 
to a lesser extent, for socio-structural predispositions.  
Although this study found that campaigns persuade voters, it cannot say how and in 
which direction. The measure used to capture campaign effect is very general and 
cannot be connected to any specific campaign activities and campaign events. The 
contribution that household panels can make to research on campaigns should be seen 
as a complement to conventional research designs using electoral panels, rolling cross 
sections or experimental data. The use of household panels has clearly shown that 
electoral campaigns not only activate predispositions but also persuade voters and that 
volatility is strongly affected by the electoral cycle. 
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9 Interpersonal influence 
 Theoretical and empirical background 9.1
Interpersonal communication impact attitudes and behaviour in different ways 
(Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006). Firstly, communication with others helps citizens to 
learn about political issues and to understand them better. Secondly, and related to 
learning, discussions enhance the quality of opinions. Thirdly, interpersonal 
communication may change or reinforce attitudes. Finally, communication is 
important for political participation.  
Interpersonal influence should be particularly strong within households. Household 
members usually fulfil conditions for strong interpersonal influence (Huckfeldt and 
Sprague, 1995): they share time and space, have frequent contact and are intimate. 
Another criterion is the frequency of exchange of political content. It is an established 
result of research on neighbourhood effects that “people who talk together, vote 
together” (Pattie and Johnston 2000). 
Household panels are an excellent basis on which to study interpersonal influence, 
because members of a household are interviewed separately. We therefore do not have 
to rely on a second-hand perception of the preferences of others, which have shown to 
be biased because respondents project their own views for their partner (Huckfeldt 
and Sprague, 1995). Many studies have used household panel data to assess intra-
household influences. They agree that there is a strong similarity regarding political 
preferences among household members. These similarities cannot be explained by 
selection effects (for partners) or a similar context alone (e.g. socio-economic 
characteristics). Studies also agree that interpersonal influence is an important aspect 
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of understanding opinion formation and political behaviour. Mostly, studies compare 
political attitudes of individuals. Two studies (Schmitt-Beck, Weick, and Christoph 
2006; Kuhn 2009) have looked at volatility. Disagreement has been found to increase 
volatility and agreement to stabilise preferences. 
Whereas media mainly generates one-way communication, interpersonal influence 
results from interaction. Several studies compared the relative influence of different 
household members. For partners, results are contradictory. Some found a stronger 
influence of women on men (Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007 for Great 
Britain), others a stronger influence of men on women (Wernli 2006 for Switzerland; 
Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007 for Germany) or a symmetrical influence 
(Kan and Heath 2006). For parental transmission, studies typically find that mothers 
have a stronger influence than fathers on their children (Beck and Jennings 1975; 
Wernli 2007; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007; Coffé and Voorpostel 2010). 
Overall, mothers seem to take a central role in intra-household influence (Zuckerman, 
Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007). However, this general role has recently been 
questioned. Fitzgerald (2012) found that for rising, “new politics” parties, fathers and 
children take a central role in transmitting preferences. They embrace new 
developments and then pass it on to mothers. The results suggest that families have 
multiplying effects on electoral shifts and should not be seen exclusively as stabilising 
factors. For mainstream parties, the central role of mothers has been confirmed.  
A critique of traditional socialisation theory is that it ignores potential reciprocal 
relationships. For parents and children in particular, the reciprocal effect is rarely 
considered. Household panels present an excellent basis to assess reciprocal effects 
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from children to parents, influence between siblings or between any other current or 
former household members. 
We will test the influence between household members empirically. In contrast to 
most studies, we do not only focus on influence between partners and from parents to 
children, we also take account of impacts from children on parents and of the 
influence between siblings. By looking at three different contexts with the same 
approach, we can test whether the same patterns apply to different contexts. Another 
contribution to literature is the focus on political discussions for these different dyads.  
Another topic in literature on interpersonal influence focuses on the mechanism of 
transmission and moderating effects. Apart from frequency of contact, closeness of 
the relationship and trust, these include clarity and consistency of cues, salience of the 
topic, respect for cue-givers’ knowledge and media coverage (Fitzgerald, 2011).   
Here, we will focus on the role of political discussion, which is a central component 
of deliberate theories and is considered vital for legitimacy in democracies. Political 
discussions have been found to improve argument quality and increase political 
participation and knowledge (see Lee 2009 for references). Many studies looked at 
political discussion as a dependent variable. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) found that 
political discussion mainly occurs among people from the social network. The choice 
of discussion partners is therefore restricted. Although people tend to discuss politics 
with people they agree with and try to avoid conflict, the relationship between 
agreement and political discussion is not strong. It is common to disagree with some 
discussion partners, and that disagreement persists. 
Here, we focus on the role of other household members and political discussions on 
volatility. New information has the potential to alter or update someone’s preferences 
 192 
or opinions. Political discussion should thus increase volatility. But the effect of 
discussion should depend on whether discussion partners agree or disagree. 
Discussions among like-minded people should rather reinforce opinions. However, if 
discussion partners disagree, volatility increases (Ron Johnston and Pattie 2000). 
Fitzgerald (2011) tested indirectly for the effect of political discussion. In some but 
not all of the models, interpersonal influence became stronger in election years, when 
individuals are highly interested in politics and when they live in the same household. 
 Model specifications 9.2
We are again using pooled data from all available panel waves and event history 
analysis to assess interpersonal influence on volatility. Again, the dependent variable 
is change in party preference, as introduced in section 3.2. We distinguish change 
between parties and no change (base category). We do not distinguish party blocks, 
because we have no a priori reasons to suspect differences. Having a binary dependent 
variable and clustered data (several observations per person), we estimate models 
using logistic random effect regression using the xtlogit command of Stata. We run 
different models: firstly, a model for all individuals, secondly, separate models for 
men and women and thirdly, an analysis of the impact of political discussion, using 
data from the SHP only.  
The independent variables in the model refer to party preferences of other household 
members. In line with previous research, we expect that disagreement among 
household members increases the probability for party switches and agreement 
decreases the probability for party switches. We measure the party preferences of 
others with two separate dummy variables, indicating agreement and disagreement 
with the respondents at the last observation and therefore, before a change. For 
example, for partners, we include a dummy variable for agreement and a dummy 
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variable for disagreement in party preferences in the past. The reference category 
contains respondents not living with a partner, or where one of the partners did not 
have a party preference.
63
 For mothers and fathers, we use the same procedure.  
The coding for children and siblings is more complicated, because there may be 
several children or siblings living in the same household. In order to keep the analysis 
simple and to have comparable variables, we also construct dummy variables for 
siblings and children. If there is only one child (over 18 years of age) or one adult in 
the household, the measure is equivalent to those for partners and parents. If there are 
several children, we count the number of children with the same preference and the 
number with different preferences. If more children disagreed than agreed, we code 
this as different party preferences. If more children agreed than disagreed, we code 
this as the same party preference. In all other cases, both dummy variables are set to 0. 
The same rules apply to siblings.  
To measure frequency of political discussion, we use a question from the SHP asked 
in 2011: “How often do you discuss politics with anyone living in your household, if 
0 means “never” and 10 “often?”. As in previous models, we control for age, interest 
in politics, period effects (time trend), duration of party preference and panel 
participation. 
Before presenting and interpreting the results of the models, we have to address 
endogeneity, which is a serious issue for the study of interpersonal influence. An 
initial problem is the distinction between selection and interpersonal influence, which 
is relevant mainly for partners. Do partners have similar preferences because they 
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 More precisely, the reference category contains the following cases:  respondent did not live with a 
partner at the last observation (1), preference of partner unknown, because partner did not participate in 
the survey (2), partner had no party preference in last observation (3), respondent had no party 
preference in last observation (4), respondent has stopped living with partner from last wave (5). 
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choose partners who are similar to them or because they adapt to each other? Previous 
research shows that both processes are important (e.g. Zuckerman, Dasovic, and 
Fitzgerald 2007). A second problem is that household members may be influenced by 
the same factors (e.g. social background, social class, and social network), so that 
similarity is not the result of interpersonal influence within the household. More 
recent studies have taken account of endogeneity. Strategies include instrumental 
variable approaches (Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007; Fitzgerald 2011), 
inclusion of lagged dependent variables (Fitzgerald 2011) or fixed effects models 
(Kohler 2005). 
Using event history models (change as the dependent variable), endogeneity should 
not be a problem, because selection effects and (stable) other impacts cannot affect 
regression coefficients. By focusing on change as the dependent variable, we also 
avoid potential bias from including lagged dependent variables at the right hand side 
of the regression (see section 4.3 on dynamic models). Using the longitudinal 
structure, we can also take account of reciprocal relationships and compare relative 
influence between household members. For instance, we do not assume that influence 
is from parents to children, but allow for reciprocity. 
 Results and discussion 9.3
We started with a general model, to see how agreement and disagreement with 
household members impacts change between parties (cf. Table 21). Because the 
variables are equally scaled, we can compare effect size within a model even though 
the model is non-linear. However, we cannot compare effects between different 
countries. To illustrate effects better, we computed average marginal effects (cf. 
Figure 19). Marginal effects show how much the probability of switching party 
increases or decreases, if household members agree or disagree on party preferences 
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(compared to the reference category). The reference category refers to respondents 
who are not part of the dyad studied (do not live with partner, father, mother, siblings 
or children) or if one of the dyad does not have a party preference.
 64
   
Looking at the results, we see strong and significant intra-household influence in all 
three countries. Among them, partners are the most important and have a strong 
effect. Having a partner with the same party preference decreases the probability of 
switching parties by 7.3 percentage points in Switzerland, by 4.2 percentage points in 
Great Britain and by 2.1 percentage points in Germany (marginal effects in Figure 
19). In relative terms (probability for same preference / probability of reference 
category), volatility decreases by 58 % in Switzerland and by 61 % in Great Britain, if 
partners share a party preference. The destabilising effect if the partner prefers another 
party is not as strong, but significant (in relative terms, volatility increases by 30 % in 
Switzerland and Great Britain and by 58 % in Germany).  
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 In contrast to previous chapters, we calculate average predicted probabilities instead of conditional 
probabilities. The reason is that conditional probabilities depend strongly on other dyads in the 
household. Using average probabilities or marginal effects, we do not have to impose the same 
household configuration for everyone but take account of actual values of household members. All 
variables other than the dyad studied are held constant at their true value. 
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Table 21 : Change between parties:  intra-household influence in DE, GB, CH  
DE GB CH 
Partner different  0.503*** (0.03)  0.313*** (0.03)  0.344*** (0.04) 
same -0.563*** (0.03) -0.568*** (0.03) -0.652*** (0.04) 
Father different  0.118  (0.07)  0.375*** (0.08)  0.288**  (0.09) 
same -0.510*** (0.07) -0.222** (0.08) -0.220 (0.11) 
Mother different  0.148* (0.07)  0.338*** (0.07)  0.257** (0.09) 
same -0.324*** (0.07) -0.421*** (0.07) -0.290** (0.10) 
Children different  0.234*** (0.06)  0.170** (0.07)  0.091 (0.07) 
same -0.476*** (0.06) -0.449*** (0.06) -0.303*** (0.09) 
Siblings different  0.321* (0.12)  0.263* (0.11)  0.187  (0.11) 
same -0.311** (0.12) -0.278** (0.11) -0.382** (0.14) 
Constant   -1.554*** (0.08)  0.484*** (0.08) -0.017  (0.11) 
variance random effect 0.907     0.688     0.727   
log likelihood intercept only -54572 -49643 -22283 
log likelihood -52773     -47864     -21582   
Note: Logistic random effect models on change between parties (base category: no change). Regression 
coefficients, se in parenthesis. Significant at *0.05, **0.01, ***0.001. The model includes duration of 
party preference, age, survey year and panel participation as controls (not shown). Source: SOEP 1984-
2010 (n=240’430 clustered in 27’153 individuals), BHPS 1991-2008 (n=147’432 clustered in 15’918 
individuals), SHP 1999-2010 (n=48’696 clustered in 8’652 individuals). 
 
Looking at parental influence on children, we also see strong effects. If the mother or 
father have the same preference as their child, the child’s probability to switch parties 
decreases by 1.3 percentage points (mothers in Germany) to 3.5 percentage points 
(mothers in Switzerland). If the mother or father has a different party preference to 
their child, the child’s probability for switching parties increases by 0.6 to 4.1 
percentage points. In contrast to most previous studies, but in line with Fitzgerald’s 
study on Switzerland (2011), we do not find that the mother’s influence on children is 
stronger than the father’s influence. Rather, influence of mothers and fathers is 
similar. This raises the question on why we find divergent results, even though most 
other studies used the same data. Because our result is consistent for the three 
countries, we cannot explain the contrast for a specific context, e.g. a Swiss 
peculiarity. Neither can the changing role of women and mothers in society explain 
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the result. Yet another possibility is that the role of mothers is different for new or 
rising parties than for traditional parties as suggested by Fitzgerald (2011). However, 
also a methodological explanation is probable. Studies finding a central role for 
mothers did not control for previous party preference, and usually did not test for 
reciprocal influence from children on mothers. As we will see below, mothers are 
more influenced by their children than fathers, which might have been misinterpreted 
as mother’s transmission of political preferences. 
Figure 19 : Intra-household influence: average marginal effects on the probability of 
switching parties in DE, GB and CH. 
 
 
Notes: Average marginal effects calculated from Table 21. Reference category: Not living with other 
household member (partner, father, mother, child, or sibling) or one of dyad had no party preference or 
preference is not known; Reading example for Germany: Having a partner with a different party 
preference, the probability of switching parties increases by 2.9 percentage points compared to having 
no partner. Probabilities for party switches for the reference categories are about 5% in Germany, 10 % 
in Great Britain, and 19 % in Switzerland.  
 
The model clearly shows that influence is not restricted to partners and parental 
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children to impact their parents’ preferences significantly. As for partners, the 
stabilising effect of agreement is generally stronger than the destabilising effect of 
disagreement. In Switzerland, the effect of disagreement is not significant for 
children. But overall, results clearly show that the focus on parental transmission is 
not justified. Transmission from parents to children is strong, but it is not 
fundamentally different to other within-household influence, particularly in Germany, 
where respondents are asked about party identification. The strong impact of children 
on parents is striking, as it contradicts (once again) the idea that party identification is 
shaped in young adulthood and resists external influence in later life.
65
 But we have to 
take into account that we only analyse adults with the right to vote. It is possible that 
parental influence is stronger for younger children.  
Finally, we look at influence between siblings living in the same household. Siblings 
are indeed important with regards to volatility. In Germany, they are more important 
than the influence from parents and in Switzerland effects are of about the same 
magnitude. 
To look at differences between men and women, we estimate the same model for men 
and women separately (Table 22). Because we cannot compare coefficients across 
models, we again computed average marginal effects, but for presentational reasons 
show it in a table and not graphically ( 
Table 23). We will first address gender differences for partners. In all three countries, 
women are slightly more influenced by their partner than men, but the difference is 
only small. Also, when we looked at the effect from children on parents, mothers are 
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 Joint parental influence is not visible from the regression models, because we look at mothers and 
fathers separately. Coding parents’ preference jointly (as for children and siblings), results in slightly 
stronger effects for predicted probabilities than for mothers or fathers alone. But this does not affect 
conclusions. In Germany, children affect parents as strongly as parents affect children.  
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more influenced by children than fathers. A possible interpretation is that mothers 
spend more time at home and have therefore more frequent interactions and 
discussions than fathers. But we cannot generalise that women are more easily 
influenced than men, as this does not hold true for the younger generation. In 
Germany and GB, mothers have a stronger impact on their daughters, in Switzerland 
mothers have a stronger impact on their sons. In Germany and Great Britain, Fathers 
have a stronger influence on their sons and in Switzerland, fathers have a stronger 
impact on their daughters. Overall, sons and daughters seem to be influenced by their 
parents in a similar way. Also among siblings, the results suggest a similar influence 
between men and women. 
Table 22: Change between parties: intra-household influence by sex in DE, GB, CH 
DE GB CH 
    men women men women men women 
Partner different pref.  0.412***  0.585***  0.210***  0.404***  0.385***  0.322*** 
same pref. -0.578*** -0.549*** -0.590*** -0.551*** -0.561*** -0.720*** 
Father different pref.  0.122  0.108  0.386***  0.344**  0.231  0.349* 
same pref. -0.577*** -0.403*** -0.337** -0.074 -0.197 -0.239 
Mother different pref.  0.161  0.127  0.190*  0.538***  0.402***  0.057 
same pref. -0.186 -0.532*** -0.349*** -0.547*** -0.336* -0.258 
Children different pref.  0.167  0.307***  0.120  0.212** -0.015  0.177 
same pref. -0.358*** -0.595*** -0.401*** -0.475*** -0.292* -0.311** 
Siblings different pref.  0.158  0.632**  0.332*  0.164  0.216  0.124 
same pref. -0.460** -0.080 -0.185 -0.434* -0.439* -0.322 
Constant -1.508*** -1.605***  0.516***  0.480***  0.295 -0.226 
variance random effect 0.934 0.871  0.740 0.638 0.663 0.711 
log likelihood intercept only -28126 -26432 -23080 -26557 -101678 -12115 
log likelihood -27269 -25487 -22291 -25546 -9841 -11727 
n observations  118’586 121’844 79’937  67’495 22’236 26’460 
n individuals    13’631   13’522    8476     7442    4145    4507 
Note: Logistic random effect models on change between parties (base category: no change). Regression 
coefficients, se not shown. Significant at *0.05, **0.01, ***0.001. The model includes duration of 
party preference, age, survey year, and panel participation as controls. Since the effects of the control 
variables are not relevant here, these effects are not presented. Source: SOEP 1984-2010, BHPS 1991-
2008, SHP 1999-2011. 
 
Among siblings, there is a particularly strong effect if there are divergent party 
preferences. For young adults, disagreement with sisters and brothers are generally 
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more influential than disagreements with parents in terms of party change. This 
reflects the generally higher volatility and persuability of young adults, but could also 
point out the impact of a politicised environment which includes political discussions. 
 
Table 23 : Average marginal effects of intra-household influence on the probability of 
switching parties by sex in DE, GB and CH. 
  men   women 
    
same 
pref. diff. pref. 
same 
pref. diff. pref. 
CH Parnter -6.5 5.9 -7.9 4.9 
Father -2.5 3.3 -2.9 5.1 
Mother -4.0 6.0 -3.2 0.8 
Children -3.6 -0.1 -3.7 2.6 
  Siblings -5.1 3.1 -3.8 1.7 
GB Parnter -4.5 2.1 -4.0 4.1 
Father -2.6 3.8 -0.6 3.2 
Mother 0.0 4.4 -3.8 5.5 
Children -3.0 1.1 -3.4 1.9 
  Siblings -1.5 3.2 -3.1 1.5 
DE Parnter -2.2 2.4 -1.9 3.4 
Father -2.1 0.6 -1.4 0.5 
Mother -0.8 0.8 -1.8 0.6 
Children -1.4 0.4 -2.0 2.0 
Siblings -1.8 0.8 -0.3 3.5 
Note: Average marginal effects from model in Table 22. Difference to reference category in percentage 
points.   
 
Finally, we looked at the effect of political discussions. Because information on 
frequency of political s in the household is only available for Switzerland in 2011, we 
have a smaller sample and no comparative results. We only observed one observation 
per individual (transition to 2011) and therefore estimated the model using logistic 
regression. We estimated separate models for partners, fathers, mothers, children and 
siblings (cf. Table 24) using only the subsample of individuals who live with the 
household member analysed in the model (e.g. only individuals living with a partner). 
Independent variables in the model (preference of other household members at the last 
observation, age, interest in politics, duration of party preference and relative panel 
participation) are equivalent to previous models.  
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Table 24: Change between parties: intra-household influence and political 
discussions in CH 
  partner father mother children siblings 
Discussion  .029  .111  .083  .052  .120 
Different. pref. -.309 -.231 -.834 -.175  .669 
 Discussion*different -.006 -.026  .025 -.082 -.349 
Same pref.  .272  1.252*  .917  .087  .073 
 Discussion*same  .028 -.101 -.028  .027 -.003 
Constant  .864**  .449  1.952  1.628  .883 
log likelihood intercept only -1549 -253 -340 -374 -151 
log likelihood -1416 -239 -308 -337 -138 
n individuals 2'792 419 564 677 232 
Note: Logistic models on change between parties (base category: no change). Regression coefficients, 
se not shown. Significant at *0.05, **0.01, ***0.001. The model includes duration of party preference, 
age, a time trend and panel participation as controls. Since the effects of the control variables are not 
relevant here, these effects are not presented. Source: SHP 1999-2011. 
 
In non-linear models, interaction terms are complicated to interpret because all effects 
are conditional on other variables. Because of the interaction terms and the small 
sample, the single coefficients are not statistically significant. To be able to interpret 
interaction effects and see effect sizes, we again computed predicted probabilities (cf. 
Figure 20).
66
 Predicted probabilities show that the effect of political discussion differs 
between the dyads. Furthermore, agreement and disagreement do not have the same 
impact. If others have different preferences, political discussion increases volatility. 
The stabilising effect of shared preference is less evident.  
The most interesting finding is that parental influence on children shows a rather 
different pattern than the other dyads. For parental transmission, discussion does not 
play a role. In contrast, the influence among siblings and influence from children on 
parents seems conditional on political discussion. In the absence of political 
                                                 
66
 Predicted probabilities are computed using marginal effects. We also tested the inteff command in 
Stata, which computes interaction effects as proposed by Ai and Norton (2003), but did not find other 
conclusions. 
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discussion, there is no interpersonal influence. For siblings, political discussions 
explain indeed the strong volatility of young adults when their siblings have a 
divergent party preference. For partners, discussions increase volatility in the case of 
divergent preferences, but have no effect in the case of agreement. These differences 
between dyads suggest that another mechanism is at work for parental transmission 
than for other interpersonal influences. Processes of socialisation seem to occur 
through more implicit and subtle channels rather than explicit political discussion. 
This finding supports the interpretation by Fitzgerald (2011) that transmission from 
children (but also from fathers) occurs through political discussion and persuasion, 
whereas mothers pass preferences for mainstream parties through more implicit 
channels. Also for partners, political discussions can only explain a part of 
interpersonal influence. Here, both implicit mechanisms and political discussions 
seem to drive influence.  
Although results on political discussion seem plausible, we have to take account that 
this evidence is only based on Switzerland and on rather small samples. The 
interaction effects are not significant, which is not surprising considering the small 
data size. However, results remain suggestive and should be validated using other 
surveys or future waves of the SHP.  
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Figure 20: Intra-household influence: predicted probabilities for switching parties by 
frequency of political discussion 
 
Notes: Average predicted probabilities calculated from Table 24. 
 Conclusions for interpersonal influence 9.4
In this chapter we addressed intra-household influence. The results confirm the 
important role of communication between persons on opinion formation and political 
behaviour. Whether individuals switch parties depends strongly on whether they agree 
or disagree with others.  
The influence between partners is well documented in literature. The approach used 
here proofs that not only the selection of a partner explains similar preferences, but 
that partners adapt to each other. The volatility is higher if the partner has a divergent 
party preference. But the stabilising effect of agreement is even stronger. Also in line 
with previous research is the strong effect of parents on their children, which 
underlines the importance of socialisation. But while previous studies focused 

















































look at influence between siblings and from children on their parents. Because also 
these impacts are considerable, we do not agree with studies which dismiss these 
impacts as marginal or secondary. For young adults and divergent party preference, 
the influence of siblings is even stronger than the influence of the parents. Comparing 
the interpersonal influence of different dyads, parental transmission of preferences 
does not stand out. 
The data on Switzerland enables investigating the mechanism of the influence, in 
particular the role of political discussions. Here, the parental influence stands out in 
comparison to other dyads. Parental transmission of political preference is not 
moderated by political discussion, but seems to take more implicit channels, for 
example by passing on identification or values to children. In contrast, political 
discussions are responsible for influences from children on their parents and influence 
between siblings. For partners, interpersonal influence seems to take both implicit 
forms and moderation by political discussions.  
There is no general difference between men and women. Women and men seem to be 
influenced similarly by partners, siblings and parents. But mothers are more 
influenced by their children than fathers. This suggests that the difference between 
men and women is not a direct influence of gender, but rather due to the fact that 
women on average spend more time at home than men. Because fathers are equally 
important in passing their political views onto children, we do not confirm the 
frequent finding regarding the central role of mothers. The finding of previous studies 
could reflect problems of endogeneity, because the strong influence of children on 
mothers has not been taken into account. 
 
 205 
10 The economic situation 
In this chapter, we look at the influence of the personal economic situation on changes 
in party preferences (pocketbook voting). Two different theoretical approaches link 
income and voting. Theories of economic voting postulate that voters hold parties 
accountable for economic conditions. The traditional economic voting hypothesis is 
that voters tend to support government parties if economic conditions are good, and 
support opposition parties if economic conditions are bad. The second theory linking 
income and voting at is the proximity model by Downs (1957) according to which 
voters support the party with the highest utility for them. Voters are motivated by self-
interest and support the party whose policies profits them most. The personal financial 
situation is linked to the economic left-right axis. We will look at both theories more 
closely to develop testable hypotheses on dynamics of party preference. 
 Economic voting 10.1
Egocentric economic voting  
Economic voting literature has used three types of measures for the economic 
situation. The first are a nation’s (or region’s) objective economic conditions such as 
inflation, unemployment, and economic growth. They have shown to be influential in 
aggregate level studies, which however are problematic for ecological fallacy. But the 
use of objective economic measures for individual level data is difficult because of the 
limited variance between individuals. However, by pooling data from different time 
points and many countries, objective economic indicators have been successfully used 
for individual level analysis of economic voting (Van der Brug, Van der Eijk, and 
Franklin 2007; Nadeau, Lewis-Beck, and Bélanger 2012).  
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The second measure for economic conditions is individuals’ perceptions on the state 
of the economy. These subjective indicators show strong effects on economic voting 
(Lewis-Beck 1988; Duch and Stevenson 2008), but are increasingly criticised to be 
plagued by endogeneity (e.g. Nannestad and Paldam 1994; Van der Brug, Van der 
Eijk, and Franklin 2007). The third type is personal economic conditions, which is 
referred to as egocentric economic voting. We will look at it more closely here, 
because this is the measure available in our data. While some studies have found 
effects of egocentric economic voting (Sanders and Brynin 1999; Gomez and Wilson 
2003; Richter 2006), the review by Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007) concluded that 
if egocentric voting has an effect, this effect is small. 
The theoretical basis for egocentric economic voting is less convincing than for socio-
tropic voting. Egocentric voting has to assume that individuals hold the government 
responsible for their personal financial situation. For example, it is unlikely that 
individuals would hold the government responsible for income increases after 
completion of an education or after a promotion. Feldman (1982) showed indeed that 
people perceive most change in their personal finances as their own responsibility. 
But in contrast to perceptions of the state’s economy, there is no endogeneity problem 
for egocentric voting, as it is unlikely that party preferences affect the personal 
financial situation. If we find evidence of egocentric voting, we can be confident 
about causality. However, if we find no influence of the personal economic situation, 
it does not prove that economic situation does not matter, as the influence may be 
sociotropic.  
Three different contributions have assessed pocketbook voting using the BHPS data. 
Johnston and his colleagues (Ron Johnston and Pattie 1999; Ron Johnston et al. 2005) 
found for the 1990s, that the Conservative party (the government party) got most 
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support from those feeling well off while the Labour party (the main opposition party) 
was mostly supported by those feeling less well off. These results were interpreted as 
support for traditional economic voting. But in other aspects, results contradicted 
economic voting theory.
67
 Overall, these studies found no or limited effect of 
pocketbook voting in Great Britain. 
However, the relationship between income and support for the conservatives and 
Labour could also be due to ideological positions of the parties rather than their 
government or opposition status. Indeed, Sanders and Brynin (1999) who also 
analysed BHPS data of the 1990s, confirmed that there are two effects of pocketbook 
voting. First, changes in economic perceptions have weak direct effects on support for 
the government or opposition party. Secondly, high income and improvement in 
economic perceptions are related to shifts to the right in ideological terms. Low 
income and deteriorating economic perceptions are related to shift to the left in 
ideological terms. Because the ideological position has a strong effect on voting 
intentions, economic conditions have a rather strong indirect effect on party 
preferences.  
Cross-national differences in economic voting 
Results in the extensive literature on economic voting remained inconsistent. The 
nature and size of the effect of economic voting varies strongly from one study to the 
next, between countries and over time. Increasing efforts are made to understand 
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 Johnston et al. (2005) found the opposite effect as expected for the vote in 2001 (the better off still 
preferred the conservative party and thus the main opposition party). Johnston and Pattie (1999)  found 
that the reward-punishment model applied only asymmetrically (those worse off were likely to abandon 
the conservative party, but those feeling better off were not likely to abandon the Labour party). 
Neither did the model show significant effects for strength of party identification. 
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differences in the importance of economic voting using comparative individual-level 
study designs (Lewis-Beck 1988; Van der Brug, Van der Eijk, and Franklin 2007; 
Duch and Stevenson 2008).  
The strength of economic voting depends on the extent to which voters hold parties 
responsible for economic conditions or policies. An important moderating factor for 
economic voting is the “clarity of responsibility” (Powell and Whitten 1993). In 
institutional settings where policy responsibility can be clearly attributed to a party, 
economic voting should be strong. In contrast, economic voting should be weak if 
responsibly for policy-making is divided or fragmented. Powell and Whitten used five 
indicators to measure clarity of responsibility: the voting cohesion of the major 
parties, legislative committee systems that accommodate opposition party power 
sharing, bicameralism, coalition governments, and minority governments. The 
importance of the “clarity of responsibility” has been supported by several empirical 
studies (Anderson 2000; Van der Brug, Van der Eijk, and Franklin 2007; Duch and 
Stevenson 2008). 
Van der Brug et al. (2007) found that economic voting is different in high clarity and 
low clarity countries. In high clarity countries, the traditional economic voting model 
distinguishing government and opposition parties works well. But in low 
responsibility countries, rather the size of parties than the government status was 
important. Party size serves as a proxy for voters, telling them which parties are 
players in the policymaking process. Large government parties are in a much better 
position to affect government policies than small government parties are. They control 
important ministries, attract more media attention, and consequently their 
responsibility is more visible to the public (Van der Brug, Van der Eijk, and Franklin 
2007, 92). 
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The clarity of responsibility hypothesis gives clear theoretical expectations for the 
three countries studied here. Great Britain is a prototype for clear responsibility. The 
majority system with two dominant parties makes the distinction between governing 
and opposition parties particularly relevant. There is little separation of powers, weak 
federalism, and rare episodes of divided government. Empirical studies confirm the 
importance of economic voting in Great Britain. In several studies, Britain showed the 
highest level of economic voting in rank-orderings of countries (Lewis-Beck 1988, 
Anderson 1995, Duch and Stevenson 2008).  
In contrast, Germany is a country with moderate or low clarity of responsibility, 
because it has a rather proportional electoral system, bicamerism, but strong cohesion 
of the major governing party. The (large) opposition parties have a significant weight 
in shaping policies. 
Switzerland as a consensual democracy is an extreme case for low-clarity of 
responsibility. It has a strongly proportional electoral system, strong federalism, direct 
democracy, a large government coalition and low party cohesion. This makes it 
difficult for voters to attribute responsibility for the state of the economy to single 
parties. The lack of clear opposition and government roles of parties complicates 
economic voting in Switzerland further. For example in referendum votes, the largest 
parties (the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) and the Socialist Party (SP)) frequently take 
opposition roles, even though they are part of the government coalition. It is therefore 
not surprising that the economic voting hypothesis, to my knowledge, has so far not 
been tested in Switzerland. 
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 Proximity model 10.2
The second potential explanation for pocketbook voting is the proximity model 
proposed by Downs, postulating that voters support the party which maximises their 
“utility income”. Utility is understood as self-interest, in the sense that voters choose 
parties according to expected policies. There is an extensive literature on interest 
voting, but it has remained disconnected from economic voting theory. 
There are many ways in which self-interest and proximity can be understood and 
applied (Enelow and Hinich 1984). In the simplest case, parties compete along one 
dimension, typically the left-right axis. But looking at voters, two-dimensional spatial 
models are more appropriate (cf. section 3.2). For income, the relevant dimension is 
the traditional left-right axis, which we referred to as the economic dimension 
(opposed to the cultural dimension) in section 3.2. It opposes extensive social state 
and high income redistribution on the left side and market economy and little 
government spending and income redistribution on the right side. 
Also for the proximity model, the influence of pocketbook voting may vary between 
countries. In two-party systems, parties usually take positions close to the median 
voter. In multi-party systems, the ideological profile should be more important. 
Proximity models using the left-right axis should therefore be important in 
Switzerland and Germany, but less so in Great Britain.  
 Model specification 10.3
Economic voting and the proximity model both assume that voters choose the party 
that gives them the highest utility. But the theories differ in the relevant criteria to 
assess parties. While economic voting theory focuses on the incumbency status, the 
proximity model focuses on the left-right dimension.  
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We will investigate the role of personal economic conditions for volatility of party 
preferences from different perspectives. In a first step, we are interested whether 
changes in the personal economic situation cause party switches. In a second step we 
focus on the different possible links between income change and party preferences. In 
a first model, we investigate whether income change affects support for government 
and opposition parties. We test whether citizens hold the government (partly) 
responsible for their situation. If citizens become better off, support for government 
parties should increase. If the personal situation deteriorates, citizens should rather 
support the opposition party. According to clarity of responsibility hypothesis, this 
effect should be particularly strong in Great Britain. In a second model, we test the 
effect of income change on support for large or small parties. According to Van der 
Brug et al. (2007), citizens in low clarity countries hold large parties (rather than 
government parties) responsible for the economic conditions. This effect should thus 
apply to Germany and Switzerland. In the third model, we test whether change in the 
economic conditions have an influence on support for economic right-wing or left-
wing parties, as presumed by the proximity model and interest theory. If incomes 
increase, citizens should switch to more (economically) right parties. If incomes 
decrease, citizens should switch to more (economically) left parties. The ideological 
profile of parties should be particularly relevant in multi-party systems, and thus in 
Germany and Switzerland.  
Dependent variables and methods of analysis 
To test the different possibilities, we look at the effect of an income change at five 
different dependent variables (one only for Switzerland), which we present in turn. 
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First of all, we will apply the same design as in previous chapters with the binary 
variable change in party preference (opposed to no change) as a dependent variable. 
We will use an event history models and estimate a logistic random effects model 
using the xtlogit command in Stata. The second dependent variable is a binary 
variable distinguishing government and opposition parties, which is the standard 
dependent variable in economic voting literature. The third dependent variable is the 
size of the preferred party, to test whether large parties are held more responsible than 
small parties. We use the vote share of the previous national election as an indicator.  
As a fourth dependent variable, we will use the position of the preferred party on the 
economic left-right axis. For Germany and Great Britain, we rely on positions of the 
Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES). We already aligned parties along the economic 
and cultural dimensions for the construction of party blocks (see section 3.2, in 
particular Figure 2).
68
 Also for Switzerland, we apply a similar approach as for the 
construction of party blocks. Because the CHES data do not cover Switzerland, we 
use two variables on issue opinions collected in the SHP, which are related to the 
economic left-right position: a question on social spending (increase or decrease) and 
a question on taxes on high income (increase or decrease).
69
 The variables have three 
response categories: in favour of an increase, in favour of a decrease, neither increase 
nor decrease. To obtain the economic left-right positions of individuals, we simply 
add the two variables, which results in 5 point scale. This is our fifth dependent 
variables, which we apply for Switzerland only. For left-right positions of parties, we 
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 For split-ticket voting in Germany, we use the average of the two parties mentioned. 
69
Translated into English, the questions are: “Are you in favour of a diminution or in favour of an 
increase of the Confederation social spending?” “Are you in favour on an increase or in favour of a 
decrease of the tax on high incomes?” 
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compute the average over all individuals supporting that party. We rescaled all 
variables on the left-right positions to fit into the range from 0 (left) to 100 (right).  
For these dependent variables (government vs opposition, party size, left-right 
position), we will use fixed effects regression (see section 4.3). Fixed effects models 
analyse only the variance of individuals over time. Because we are interested in the 
effect of income change rather than contrasting rich and poor individuals, fixed effects 
model are very well suited. Furthermore, fixed effects models have the important 
methodological advantage of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, if 
we find evidence for pocketbook voting using fixed effect models, we can be quite 
confident that we measure a causal impact, rather than an endogenous relationship. 
Party size and left-right positions are continuous variables, linear fixed effects models 
can be used. But the distinction of government and opposition parties is a binary 
variable, which means that we have to use a conditional logistic model to assess fixed 
effects (see section 4.3). Because we can only measure effects for individuals who 
vary in the dependent variable only individuals who changed between government 
and opposition parties are included in the subsample. For the left-right position, 
individuals who never switched parties are excluded from the analysis, because we 
fixed the parties’ position over the years of observation (see section 3.2). 
Independent variables 
We will use two different measures for income: household income and perception of 
economic conditions. For sociotropic voting, voting literature has found that the 
perception is more important than the objective measures. For the personal situation, 
both objective and subjective income measures are well covered in household panel 
studies, so that the effect of both can be tested. 
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To estimate the effect of an income change, event history models and fixed effects 
models require different independent variables. In event history models (change as the 
dependent variable), we have to include indicators for income change as independent 
variables. In fixed effects models, we do not include income change but the current 
situation, because within variance is used in the estimation.  
For the objective personal income, we use total gross household income. To limit the 
influence of outliers, we use top- and bottom coding for the per cent with the lowest 
and highest income.
70
 To take account of inflation, we use real income. For fixed 
effects model, we include gross household income in the national currency into the 
model. For better readability of results we divided income by 1000. For event history 
analysis, we need to construct a measure for income change. For this, we first group 
individuals into income quintiles. We consider moves between non-neighbouring 
income quintiles (e.g. from the bottom quintile to the middle quintile, or from the 
middle quintile to the highest quintile) as (important) income increase or decrease.
71
 
For example in Great Britain, 3.7 % of individuals experienced such an increase in 
income, and 4.5 % of individuals have undergone a decrease in household income. 
For the subjective personal economic situation, indicators differ slightly between 
surveys due to availability of (annual) variables. They are presented in Table 25. For 
event history models, we use two dummy variables to indicate improvement or 
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 This means the highest possible value is the income of the 99 percentile. The one per cent of 
individuals with the highest income were all assigned to this amount. The lowest possible value is the 
income of the 1 percentile. The one per cent of individuals with the lowest income were assigned to 
this amount. 
71
 There are several reasons for choosing this measure over many other possible measures on income 
change. By not considering changes to the neighbouring quintile, we do not code movements around 
the quintile limit as an important change. By using dummy variables, we can separate increase and 
decrease of income. Alternative measures tested include absolute and relative difference in income 
since the last wave. Results using alternative measures show similar or weaker effects for pocketbook 
voting. 
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deterioration for event history models. For the fixed effects models, we recoded the 
scales into the range from 0 to 1. 
Table 25 : Operationalisation of the perceived personal economic situation 
Survey Model Question Indicator 
SOEP Fixed 
effects  
Satisfaction with personal income 
measured on a scale from 0 to 10. 
 
11 point scale, recoded 
to the range of 0 to 1. 
 Event 
history 
Satisfaction with personal income (scale 
from 0 to 10). We code changes of 3 
points or more between two waves as 
income change. 






“How well would you say you yourself 
are managing financially these days?” 
Answer categories (showcard): “Living 
comfortably”, “Doing alright”, “Just 
about getting by”, “Finding it quite 
difficult”, and “Finding it very difficult”. 
5 point scale, recoded 
to the range of 0 t 1. 
 Event 
history  
“Would you say that you yourself are 
better off or worse off financially than 
you were a year ago?” 
Dummy variable for 
improvement ( “better 




Satisfaction with personal income (on a 
scale from 0 to 10) 
11 point scale, recoded 
to the range of 0 to 1. 
 Event 
history 
Question from the household 
questionnaire: “Since last year, did your 
standard of living improve or worsen? 0 
means greatly worsened” and 10 “greatly 
improved”. We code values from 0 to 3 
as deterioration and values from 7 to 10 
as improvement.  





We include the following control variables: age, survey year, interest in politics, panel 
participation (as introduced in section 4.1), and duration of party preference. In the 
fixed effects model, panel participation is not included because there is no within 
variation. Because survey year is perfectly collinear with age, we removed period 
effects.  
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 Results and discussion 10.4
Change between parties 
To test whether change in economic conditions causes volatility between party 
preference, we estimate an event history model, with change in party preferences as 
the dependent variable (1 change, 0 no change). This is the same approach as in 
previous chapters. For each country we estimate a model for household income and a 
model for perceived economic conditions. Results of the logistic random effect 
regression are shown in Table 26.  
We first address results for important changes in gross household income. Only in 
Germany, a change in the income position increases volatility. In particular, a rise in 
income may cause a switch between parties. The fact that results are significant only 
in Germany is somewhat surprising, as party preferences in this country are measured 
by party identification and should therefore be less responsive to external influence 
than voting intention.  
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Table 26 : Change between parties: income improvement and deterioration in DE, 
GB and CH 
SOEP     
hh-income: improvement  0.144**  (0.05) 
hh-income: deterioration  0.100*  (0.05) 
subj. situation: better   0.139*** (0.03) 
subj. situation: worse   0.096** (0.03) 
constant 17.748*** (0.05)  17.157*** (3.11) 
variance random effect -0.176** (0.05)  -0.185*** (0.06) 
log likelihood intercept only -51'676 -51'676 
log likeihood -50'490   -50'484   
BHPS         
hh-income: improvement   0.030  (0.04) 
hh-income: deterioration   0.046  (0.04) 
subj. situation: better  0.085*** (0.02) 
subj. situation: worse  0.095*** (0.02) 
constant -1.963*** (0.04) -2.001*** (0.04) 
variance random effect -0.638***  (0.06) -0.645*** (0.06) 
log likelihood intercept only -50'497 -50'497 
log likeihood -48'501   -48'490   
SHP         
hh-income: improvement   0.076   (0.07) 
hh-income: deterioration  -0.022  (0.07) 
subj. situation: better  0.120*  (0.05) 
subj. situation: worse  0.043 (0.07) 
constant -1.885*** (0.07) -1.889*** (0.07) 
variance random effect -0.592*** (0.10)  -0.599*** (0.10) 
log likelihood intercept only -19’424 -19’424 
log likeihood -19’066 -19’063 
Note: Logistic random effect models on change between parties (base category: no change). Regression 
coefficients, se in parenthesis. Significant at *0.05, **0.01, ***0.001. The model includes duration of 
party preference, age, survey year and panel participation as controls. Since the effects of the control 
variables are not relevant here, these effects are not presented. Source: SOEP 1984-2010 (n=229’909 
clustered in 25’263 individuals), BHPS 1991-2008 (n=147’432 clustered in 15’918 individuals), SHP 
1999-2010 (n=43’364 clustered in 8312 individuals). 
 
Looking at the perceived improvement of economic condition, we find effects of 
pocketbook voting in all countries. In predicted probabilities, the probability of 
switching parties increases from 4.6 % to 5.2 % in Germany (compared to similar 
economic situation in the last year). In Great Britain, the probability increases from 
9.3 % to 10.0 % and in Switzerland from 15.6 to 17.0 %. The deterioration is only 
significant in Germany and Great Britain and of similar (Great Britain) or slightly 
lower magnitude (Germany) than for improved perceptions.  
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In line with findings for sociotropic economic voting, it seems that the subjective 
situation rather than the actual income matters for pocketbook voting. But although 
the model shows that there is pocketbook voting, it does not explain why or how 
income affects party preferences. This is why we turn to fixed effects model. 
Fixed effects models 
With fixed effects models, we test three different theories regarding pocketbook 
voting: the classic economic voting hypothesis on the accountability of government 
parties (model 1), an alternative for accountability of large parties (model 2), and a 
model for the economic left-right position (model 3 and 4).  
We start with the classic economic voting hypothesis, expecting that income change 
affects preference for government or opposition parties. Results of the conditional 
logistic model are shown in 
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Table 27. In Great Britain, we find significant effects for both household income and 
perceptions. If the financial situation improves, individuals become more likely to 
support the government. This effect is considerable: The probability for supporting 
the government party increases from 47.7 % to 53.9 % if a household moves from the 
10
th
 percentile of the income distribution (about 6000 £ per year) to the 90
th
 percentile 
of the income distribution (about 45000 £ per year). For a maximal move in 
perception (from “finding financial situation quite difficult” to “living comfortably”), 
the probability to supporting the government party increases from 46.8 % to 59.3 %. 
This shows that voters hold the government party not only accountable for the 
nation’s economic situation, but also at least partly for their personal economic 
situation.  
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Table 27 : Income change: effect on preference for government party in DE, GB and 
CH 
  M1 (conditional logistic model) 
DE government party   
household income (/1000) -0.003*** (0.00) 
subj. economic conditions -0.124** (0.04) 
constant         
log likelihood -74'682   -73'685   
n observations 168619   166581   
n individuals  13682    13601   
GB government party   
household income (/1000)  0.007*** (0.00) 
subj. economic conditions  0.553*** (0.04) 
constant         
log likelihood -48501   -48490   
n observations 83152 83076 
n individuals 7673   7672   
CH government party 
household income (/1000) -0.002* (0.00) 
subj. economic conditions  -0.022 (0.19) 
constant         
log likelihood -3388   -3383   
n observations 9702  9674 
n individuals 1602 1599 
Note: Conditional logistic models on preference for government party (base category: preference for 
opposition party). Regression coefficients, se in parenthesis. Significant at *0.05, **0.01, ***0.001. 
The model includes duration of party preference, age, and interest in politics as controls. Since the 
effects of the control variables are not relevant here, these effects are not presented. Source: SOEP 
1984-2010, BHPS 1991-2008, SHP 1999-2010. 
 
In Germany and Switzerland, the classic hypothesis on economic voting is not 
supported. This is in line with findings of Van der Brug et al. (2007) for low-clarity 
countries. In both countries, the income variable is significant but points into the 
wrong direction. These effects may be party specific. In Germany, the SPD 
participated most frequently in the government during the period of observation from 
1984-2010. An income increase may reflect decreasing support for the SPD due to its 
left position rather because of its government status (see model 4). For Switzerland, 
there are two party-specific explanations for the opposite effect of household income 
on support for the government parties. Firstly, a party-specific analysis shows that an 
income increase reduces support for the Socialist Party, which is one of the four 
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government parties. Secondly, the SVP presents itself (quite successfully) as an anti-
establishment party even though it has become the largest party in Switzerland. 
Furthermore, the SVP is the party with the lowest median income of its supporters. 
Therefore, those experiencing an income decline may not only switch to opposition 
parties, but also to the SVP. 
Next we look at how income changes influence support for large parties (Model 2 in 
Table 28). In Germany, we find a causal relationship between a change in the 
economic situation (both objective and subjective) and support for larger parties. If 
the economic situation improves, citizens are more likely to switch to a large party. If 
the economic situation deteriorates, citizens are more likely to switch to small parties. 
This is in line with results from van der Brug et al. (2007), because Germany is a low-
responsibility country where voters hold large parties rather than government parties 
responsible for policies and economic conditions. It is also in line with findings from 
Duch and Stevenson (2008) for Germany, that economic voting declined strongly 
over time and became insignificant. Also in Great Britain, voters seem to hold large 
parties responsible for their objective and perceived economic situation. But 
considering that the largest party is also the government party, this just confirms 
results from model 2.  
However, for Switzerland the hypothesis on the accountability of large parties is not 
supported. This is not surprising, considering results from model 1 and the high 
correlation of party size and government status. As in model 1, even the opposite 
effect is significant. But again, the effect is very small and not significant for 
subjective income. Because the Socialist Party and the Swiss People’s party are the 
two largest parties, we also assume that the same party specific explanations apply as 
for model 1 on government status. 
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Finally, we look at whether pocketbook voting can be explained by the economic left-
right dimension (Model 3 in Table 28). In Great Britain, this hypothesis is not 
supported. This may be due to the majoritarian system, where the government and 
opposition role is more important than the ideological profile of parties. According to 
the median-voter theorem, the two main parties do not differ strongly in their 
ideological positions. When comparing individuals (e.g. with regression or random 
effect models), we find that rich voters are more likely to support the economically 
right parties (in particular the conservative party) and that poorer voters more likely to 
support the economically left-wing parties (particularly Labour) (Sanders and Brynin 
1999). But an income change does not have this effect. 
In Germany, objective or subjective income change influence the preference for 
economic left- or right-wing parties significantly. If individuals experience an income 
increase, they become more likely to support economic right-wing parties. If 
individuals experience a loss of income, they become more likely to support economic 





 percentile shifts the dependent variable by less than 1 unit to the right on a 
scale from 0 to 100 (the same holds for maximal change in perceptions). 
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Table 28 : Income change: effect on party size and economic left-right positions in DE, GB, CH 
  Model 2 (fixed effects model)  Model 3 (fixed effects model)  Model 4(fixed effects model)  
DE party size left-right party 
household income (/1000)  0.007*** (0.00)  0.018*** (0.00) 
subj. economic conditions  0.430*** (0.12)  0.759*** (0.17) 
constant 33.058*** (0.12) 33.022*** (0.14) 54.442*** (0.17) 54.588*** (0.18)         
n observation 137’325   135’918 138’760               
n individual 21’316   21’234 21’537               
GB party size left-right party  
household income (/1000)  0.010*** (0.00) -0.004 (0.00) 
subj. economic conditions  0.973*** (0.13) -0.674** (0.25) 
constant 31.190*** (0.15) 30.710*** (0.15) 52.308***   52.692***  (0.29)         
n observation 114’353 114’244 115’828 115’718 
n individual 14’933   14’929   15’031   15’027           
CH party size left-right party left-right individual 
household income (/1000) -0.003** (0.00) 0.001 (0.00)  0.010**  (0.00) 
subj. economic conditions -0.165 (0.25)  1.080 (0.67)  1.436 (0.76) 
constant 17.344*** (0.22) 17.151*** (0.26) 59.885*** (0.60) 59.174*** (0.71) 28.297***  (0.65) 28.360*** (0.77) 
n observations 32’123 32’094 32’572 32’543 38’127 38’070 
n individual 7382 7381 7422 7422 7931 7933 
 
Note: Linear fixed effects model. Dependent variable M2: share of parliamentary votes in per cent (0-100). Dependent variable M3: economic left right position of parties (0 
party most to the left, 100 party furthest to the right). Dependent variable M4: economic left-right position of individuals (5 item scale from 0 to 100). Regression 
coefficients, se in parenthesis. Significant at *0.05, **0.01, ***0.001. The model includes duration of party preference, age, and interest in politics as controls. Since the 
effects of the control variables are not relevant here, these effects are not presented. Source: SOEP 1984-2010, BHPS 1991-2008, SHP 1999-2010. 
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Surprisingly, we do not find support for the proximity model in Switzerland. Changes 
in income do not affect whether individuals support economic left-wing or economic 
right-wing parties. A possible explanation becomes evident if we look at the 
individuals’ economic left-right position (model 4 in Table 28). Here, an income 
change does change the position on the economic left-right axis. For subjective 
income, the coefficient is not significant, even though effect size is larger than in 
Germany and Great Britain.
72
 Although income affects the ideological position, this 
does not translate to party preferences. This is in line with findings on voting 
behaviour in Switzerland, which found that cultural issues (EU integration, 
immigration) are much more important than issues belonging to the traditional 
economic left-right dimension.  
 Conclusions for pocketbook voting 10.5
In this chapter, we addressed pocketbook voting. More precisely, we looked at 
whether and how changes in the personal economic situation affect volatility in party 
preferences. Recent economic voting literature mostly looked at cross-sectional data 
and socio-tropic voting. We added to this literature by incorporating changes and 
looking at the personal economic situation. Besides the accountability for economic 
conditions, we also tested the effect of income on ideological or interest voting. 
In our empirical models we found that an improvement in the perceived economic 
situation does increase volatility considerably. The perceived deterioration and 
objective household income were only significant in some of the models. Focusing on 
change between parties and personal income, we can be confident that this reflects a 
causal relationship. 
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 Once the control for duration of party preference is removed, the effect becomes significant. 
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Although we found effects of pocketbook voting in all three countries, the 
mechanisms differ strongly between the countries. In Great Britain, which is the 
prototype of a country with clear responsibilities for policies, the classic economic 
voting hypothesis is supported also for party switches and egocentric voting. An 
improvement in personal economic conditions increases probability for voting for the 
government party. A deterioration in personal economic conditions increases 
probability for voting for the opposition. 
In Germany, which presents a country with low “clarity of responsibility”, the 
government or opposition status is not relevant for party preference, but citizens hold 
large parties partly responsible for their personal economic situation. If income 
increases, citizens are more likely to support large parties. If income decreases, 
citizens are more likely to support small parties. Furthermore, improved economic 
conditions increase the support for economic-left wing parties and a deterioration of 
economic conditions increases support for economic right-wing parties.  
In Switzerland, we accountability hypothesis was confirmed neither for government 
parties, nor for party size. At least for pocketbook voting, economic voting theory 
does not seem applicable to Switzerland. The proximity model is partly supported in 
Switzerland. An income increase causes a shift to more economic right positions. An 
income decrease causes a shift to more economic left positions. However, this does 
not translate to party preference, because economic issues are less relevant than 
cultural issues for party preferences. But to better understand effects of income 
change, party specific analysis would need to be conducted for Switzerland. We 
suspect that the Swiss People’s party plays an important role. Although it is the 
largest party and part of the government coalition, it is often perceived as an anti-
establishment and opposition party.  
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11 Conclusions 
This contribution set out to explain how stable citizens are in their preferences for 
political parties. While electoral research mostly focuses at explaining the choice for 
specific parties or candidates or particular elections, we have taken a more general 
perspective by concentrating on patterns which hold across different years and party 
systems in Western Europe. The analysis relied on household panel data from 
Germany (SOEP), Great Britain (BHPS) and Switzerland (SHP) and covers several 
electoral cycles.   
For all results, it is important to keep in mind that the volatility we measured in 
household panel data refers to party preferences irrespectively of specific elections. 
Our findings can therefore not be interpreted in terms of actual behaviour. However, 
party preferences are strongly related to actual behaviour. Party preference refers to 
voting intentions in Great Britain and Switzerland, and to party identification in 
Germany. With few exceptions, results are consistent between countries despite these 
differences.  
A first important finding is that switching preferences between different political 
parties is quite a frequent phenomenon and more widespread than according to most 
previous studies. Different reasons are responsible for this diverging finding. Firstly, 
we focus not on party shares at elections (net volatility), but on individuals (gross 
volatility) as electoral outcomes mask a large extent of changes. Secondly, previous 
studies using individual data mostly rely on data including only two or three 
observations per individual, whereas the household panel data used here covers over 
12 (yearly) waves. Our data has confirmed that volatility increases when a longer time 
span and more observations are considered. And thirdly, even if previous studies used 
long panel data, they usually apply methods which focus on transitions between two 
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waves (e.g. event-history models, dynamic models, Markov chain models) and so 
ignore many party switches. Transitions between two waves simply miss what we 
called indirect changes: citizens who change from a party preference in a first step and 
then turn to another party in a second step. These indirect changes are in fact more 
frequent than direct switches from one party to another. Attrition, which is a serious 
issue for panel data, cannot be responsible for the high volatility. Citizens with stable 
party preferences have a higher probability to stay in the panel, which makes us 
confident that we not overestimate volatility levels.  
Focusing on party preference over eleven years, we find that at least 39 % of 
individuals have switched parties at least once in Great Britain. In Switzerland, even 
50% of citizens have changed parties, while the amount of change is, with 23%, 
clearly lower in Germany. Although the level of volatility in all three countries is 
considerable, there are important differences due to both methodological reasons and 
different party systems. The different question wording is to a large extent responsible 
for the high stability observed in this Germany, where information on identification 
with a party rather than voting intention has been collected. Volatility is most frequent 
in Switzerland because it has the highest number of parties.  
The party system affects not only the amount of change but also the type of change. In 
Switzerland, most changes occur between ideologically similar parties, while in Great 
Britain most switches are observed between the two major parties. To take account of 
the differences in the party system we also analysed party blocks, which were built at 
the basis of their ideological positions. Interestingly, the volatility level in Great 
Britain and Switzerland becomes highly comparable when party blocks are analysed. 
For example with three party blocks, 36 % (GB) and 32 % (CH) of citizens change 
between blocks. Considering that these changes occur between ideologically very 
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different parties, the amount of change is considerable. Again due to the different 
question wording, the changes between party blocks (assuming three blocks) are 
lower in Germany (13%).  
A closer look at trajectories reveals a large heterogeneity. Most importantly, only few 
citizens change inconsistently and seemingly randomly between parties. The most 
frequent types of changers are on the one hand citizens who abandon their preferred 
party in the short term and come back to their preferred party as well as citizens who 
change durably to another party on the other. If we interpret this finding in light of the 
debate between the traditional and the revisionist model of party identification, both 
are partly supported by the data. But apart from this, a considerable share of citizens 
switches back and forth between parties for which they have preferences in parallel. 
Most importantly, there is no dominant type of change and there is no single 
theoretical model, which is able to explain individual dynamics in general. Although 
the different theories (e.g. the traditional model, the revisionist model, ambiguity, 
bounded partisanship) remain crucial to interpret change and structure research, the 
debate about the true model of individual dynamics loses somewhat its relevance. 
Rather than finding the best model to fit individual dynamics, find it more fruitful to 
look for factors which explain why some citizens switch parties while others remain 
stable in their party preference. We briefly summarise the main results of several 
crucial factors turn. 
A first important cause of volatility is socialisation and reinforcement. Volatility is 
highest among young adults up to the age of about 30, who are in a learning phase to 
find their ideological position. At the same time, young voters react strongly to 
external influences. Once a party preference is established, citizens are likely to hold 
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it. Moreover, preferences are reinforced they longer they are held. Overall, volatility 
declines over the life course. 
Another important cause of volatility are other persons. Within households, the 
strongest interpersonal influence impact is between partners. Individuals choose not 
only partners with similar political preferences, but also adapt their party preferences 
to their partners. If partners disagree on the party preference, it is very likely that one 
adjust the preference to the other. There is no systematic difference between men and 
women in this respect.  The stabilisation effects if partners share a preference for the 
same party is even stronger than the impact of divergent preferences. Apart from 
partners, we find a strong influence from parents on their children, which is in line 
with literature on socialisation. More surprising is that also children have a 
considerable impact on their parents, in particular on mothers. However, the channel 
of influence is different in the two cases. The children’s influence seems to be 
conditional on political discussions in the family. The fact that mothers spend usually 
more time with their children than fathers probably explains the stronger influence of 
children on mothers. In contrast, the parental transmission of party preferences to their 
children does not depend on explicit political discussion, but seems to pass through 
more implicit channels, such as values or behaviour. Finally, for young adults, 
influences between siblings are very important and at least as strong as influence from 
parents. Also this association becomes stronger the more discussions on politics take 
place in a household.   
Considering the findings on life-cycle effects and interpersonal transmission together 
gives interesting implications for parties and campaigns. A focus on young voters 
should pay off in several ways. First of all, young adults are more likely to change 
their party preference than older voters. Additionally, persuasions may be multiplied 
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as they are passed to parents or siblings, and most likely also to peers. Finally, gaining 
supporters has long-term effect as citizens are likely to keep their preference over the 
life course. It is therefore surprising that the young electorate is not more strongly in 
the focus of political campaigns.   
A strong stabilising effect occurs through reinforcement and predispositions. Citizens, 
who have preferred a party for a long time or who identify strongly with a party is 
highly stable. There are different explanations for this stabilising effect. Citizens who 
are close to a party may be predominantly exposed to information which supports 
their opinions or they may have a biased interpretation of information and events. 
Stability may also result from rational behaviour. Once individuals have established a 
strong preference, they may spend time and energy to reconsider and update their 
preferences.  
Socio-structural cleavages are a central factor in electoral research. Given that social 
class or religion is highly stable over time, they should present another stabilising 
factor for party preferences. Indeed, we found that individuals who are clearly 
embedded in the cleavage structure according to their social class, region of residence 
and religion, are more stable than individuals with no clear socio-structural 
predispositions for a particular party. However, the stabilising effects of cleavages is 
small in comparison to others factors explaining volatility.  
Another crucial aspect for the understanding of electoral volatility is political 
awareness, which we measured by educational level and interest in politics. If 
volatility is associated with high political awareness, party switches can be explained 
by an attentive electorate which rewards and punishes parties according to their 
performance. But if mostly little aware citizens switch parties, we have to worry about 
manipulation and irrationality. In this respect, our results are reassuring for the 
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democratic model, because the least politically aware citizens show the lowest 
volatility level. At first sight, this finding contradicts many previous studies and 
socio-psychological theories of opinion formation, which state that political 
awareness increases stability. However, we have taken a slightly different perspective 
and compared citizens who switch parties not only to stable citizens but also to 
citizens who abandoned their party preference (which have on average a low average 
political awareness). By neglecting citizens who abandoned their party preference or 
even considering them as changers, previous studies implicitly made volatile citizens 
appear little politically aware. Our results suggest that – at least in the countries and 
time-period covered – a volatile electorate can be interpreted as assuming their role of 
controlling, rewarding and sanctioning political parties.  
Apart from this finding of low volatility of the little aware, the relationship between 
political awareness and volatility is rather complex. Firstly, the distinction of within-
block change and between-block change has revealed to be crucial. Secondly, the 
relationship between political awareness and volatility depends on whether and how 
predisposition strength is controlled for. Considering these distinctions, we found that 
within-block volatility increases both with educational levels and with interest in 
politics irrespectively of the model specification. In contrast, volatility between party 
blocks depends on political predispositions. Without controlling for predisposition 
strength, changes between party blocks are most frequent for intermediate levels of 
political interest. Once strength of party identification is controlled for, volatility 
increases with interest in politics and thus shows the same relationship as for within 
block change. The only exception to this positive relation between political awareness 
and volatility is the educational level for between-block change, because highly 
educated citizens are least likely to change between party blocks. Overall, Zaller’s 
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response-acceptance-sample model (RAS), extended by predisposition strength gives 
a coherent framework to explain the relationship between political awareness and 
volatility.  
Besides the strong and consistent patterns found for all three countries, other findings 
differed for the different context. In general, cohorts do not seem to affect volatility. 
The generation replacement should therefore not increase volatility in the future. The 
only meaningful effect is the high volatility the of generation born before 1940 in 
Germany, which has been socialised before the current political system was installed. 
In some of the models, we found a similar effect for between-block changes of 
immigrants, who have also grown up in another political system than they currently 
live in. This suggests that socialisation in the current political system has a stabilising 
effect. However, we did not find such effects for Great Britain and former East 
German citizens.  
Also for pocketbook voting we found important differences between countries. In all 
three contexts, a perceived improvement or deterioration of the personal economic 
situation increases volatility. In Great Britain, an improvement of the economic 
situation is related to switches to the government party, which is in line with 
economic voting theory. In Germany, an improvement of the personal economic 
situation has two different effects. Firstly, it may cause a switch to large parties, who 
are held accountable for the economic situation. Secondly, it may cause a change to 
right-wing parties on an economic left-right axis. In contrast, an income decline is 
associated with shifts to parties which favour strong income redistribution and higher 
taxes. In Switzerland, the mechanism of pocketbook voting remained unclear. Voters 
seem to neither hold government parties nor large parties accountable for their 
economic situation. Although a rise in income does cause a shift in opinions, this does 
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not translate into support for economic right-wing parties. Federalism, direct 
democracy and the consensual system are factors which limit effect of economic 
voting in general and pocketbook voting in particular.  
Covering a relatively long time span, the data also allowed us to look at period effects. 
In contrast to the dealignment theory we do not observe a general increase in volatility 
at the individual level over time.  But here again, results are more nuances for certain 
countries and distinguishing within and between-block change. 
The final aspect for volatility to discuss here is the electoral cycle. Changes from a 
party preference to no preference are most frequent when national elections are 
distant, which illustrate strong activation effects of electoral campaigns. Furthermore, 
party switches are most frequent when national elections are close, which shows that 
campaigns also have persuasion effects. While almost all studies on campaign effects 
compare voting intentions before and after the campaign, we were able to focus on 
change since the previous election. With this approach we compare preference to a 
time point when predispositions were activated and are therefore confident to not 
misinterpret activation of predispositions as persuasion effects. We also looked at 
whether campaign effects depend on the political awareness of citizens, but did not 
find consistent results. When we did find effects, it pointed to stronger campaign 
effects for individuals with low political awareness. But overall, campaigns seem to 
impact both little aware and highly aware citizens. 
As a last point, we discuss the implication of our results for democratic theory and 
stability of democracies. The high volatility discovered in our analysis for three 
established Western Democracies should be neither interpreted as evidence for a 
rational and enlightened electorate nor for malleable citizens. Nevertheless, we have 
several indicators that favour a positive interpretation of volatility. Firstly, only few 
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individuals showed random patterns in party preference. Secondly, volatility is 
particularly frequent among citizens with high levels of political awareness. Thirdly, 
campaign effects seem to impact citizens in general, and are not restricted to unaware 
citizens. Although there are many different reasons for volatility, it seems that 
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